UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
Pursuant to Section 13 OR 15(d) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported): April 29, 2011
XILINX, INC.
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
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Delaware
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000-18548
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77-0188631 |
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(State or other jurisdiction
of incorporation)
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(Commission File Number)
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(IRS Employer Identification No.) |
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2100 Logic Drive,
San Jose, California
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95124 |
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(Address of principal executive offices)
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(Zip Code) |
Registrants telephone number, including area code: (408) 559-7778
(Former name or former address, if changed since last report.)
Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions:
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Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425) |
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Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12) |
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Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b)) |
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Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c)) |
Item 5.02 Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of
Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers
Executive Incentive Plan for Fiscal Year 2012
On April 29, 2011, the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of Xilinx, Inc. (the
Company) approved the Companys Executive Incentive Plan for fiscal year 2012 (the 2012
Incentive Plan). The 2012 Incentive Plan is designed to tie executive compensation to the
Companys achievement of its financial and individual performance objectives. The 2012 Incentive
Plan is effective as of April 3, 2011.
The 2012 Incentive Plan provides for a cash bonus calculated as a percentage of the executive
officers base salary. For fiscal 2012, the bonus target for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is
110% of his base salary and the bonus targets for all other executive officers range from 60% to
75% of their respective base salaries, depending on their position.
Under the 2012 Incentive Plan, the cash bonuses for the CEO and all other executive officers are
determined using three different components, each with a different weighting. The three components
are: (1) the Companys revenue growth (the Growth Component), weighted at 20%; (2) the Companys
operating profit determined in accordance with U.S. GAAP (the OP Component), weighted at 30%; and
(3) individual performance goals pertaining to each officers position and responsibilities (the
Individual Performance Component), weighted at 50%. The OP Component and Individual Performance
Component are paid on a semi-annual basis, and the Growth Component is paid on an annual basis.
Growth Component
The Growth Component is designed to reward year-over-year revenue growth. The Growth Component is
subject to a minimum threshold for payout and a multiplier that increases the target payout
depending on Company performance. The Growth Component multiplier is 20% if the minimum threshold
is met and 100% if the target range is met. If the target range of revenue growth percentage is
met, the multiplier increases by increments of 20% for each percentage increase in revenue growth,
and is capped at an annual maximum of 200%.
OP Component
The OP Component is determined by a formula which measures and rewards improvements in the
Companys operating profit. The OP Component is subject to a minimum threshold range for any payout
and a multiplier that increases the payout depending on Company performance. For the OP Component,
the threshold range of operating profit percentages is subject to a multiplier of 20%, and the
multiplier increases by increments of 10% after the top of the threshold range is met. If the
target range of operating profit percentage is met, the multiplier is 100%, and thereafter the
multiplier increases by increments of 10%. At the discretion of the Compensation Committee, any
extraordinary or one-time charges may be excluded for purposes of calculating the OP Component.
The OP Component is not subject to a cap.
Individual Performance Component
The Individual Performance Component is based on a maximum of ten individual performance goals per
semi-annual performance period. Achievement of each goal is measured on a scale of 0% achievement
to 150% achievement. The minimum threshold for any payout of the Individual Performance Component
is 50% overall achievement and the maximum performance multiplier is capped at 150%.