formdefa14a.htm
UNITED
STATES
SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington,
D.C. 20549
SCHEDULE
14A
Proxy
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the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
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Preliminary
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Confidential, for Use of the
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Definitive
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Definitive
Additional Materials
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Soliciting
Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12
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ORTHOFIX
INTERNATIONAL N.V.
(Name of
Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)
(Name
of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)
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The following
point-by-point response to statements made by Ramius in their December 3, 2008
letter to Orthofix shareholders was provided by Orthofix to RiskMetrics Group on
March 17, 2009.
Ramius
statement 1) “Despite heavy investments of capital and resources into
Blackstone, operating performance has declined precipitously to a level where
Blackstone now generates material operating losses and negative free cash flow.”
Page 2, paragraph 1
Orthofix’s
reply 1) In its arguments, Ramius includes information that we believe
distorts the current situation at Blackstone. Ramius’ criticisms of the
Blackstone business focus largely on Blackstone’s 2008 third quarter
performance, even though the Company was engaged in a restructuring effort at
Blackstone during this period, that we believe makes these results an anomaly.
For example, the Company expects the size of the 2008 operating loss and
negative operating cash flow to decrease substantially in 2009. Specifically, we
expect that approximately $25.0 million of the use of cash that occurred at
Blackstone in 2008 will not recur in 2009, in that the Company made substantial
cash investments in 2008 related to the purchase of Trinity® and the
Musculoskeletal Transplant Foundation and Intelligent Implant Systems strategic
product acquisitions that the Company does not expect to recur in 2009. Finally,
as previously disclosed, the Company has multiple initiatives planned or in
progress that we believe are reducing operating loss and negative cash flow at
Blackstone. These initiatives include:
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·
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our
previously-announced spine reorganization and consolidation plan;
and
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·
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the
introduction of new products including our new Firebird Pedicle Screw
System and our Trinity® Evolution™ stem-cell based allograft
matrix.
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Based
upon our 2009 internal forecast and as set forth in our earnings guidance
provided on February 12, 2009, we expect Blackstone will generate a quarterly
operating profit by the fourth quarter of 2009.
Ramius statement 2)
“We believe management and the Board of Directors failed to address critical
risk factors during due diligence, failed to implement and execute a viable
operating plan, and, in light of the recent restructuring announcement, have
once again failed to take sufficient action.” Page 2; paragraph 1
Orthofix’s reply
2) We believe these statements are baseless. In addition to
internal diligence efforts undertaken as part of the Blackstone acquisition
process, we supplemented our internal team with input from Ernst & Young,
Hogan & Hartson LLP (our outside legal counsel) and Cowen & Co (our
financial advisor). The revenue assumptions in our original operating
plan have not been met due to factors that we believe were
unforeseeable. Blackstone’s reorganization and consolidation plan is
expected to improve operations as well as reduce operating
costs. Additionally, the Trinity® Evolution™ product (the MTF
strategic acquisition) is expected to improve Blackstone gross margins and
operating margins in 2009, resulting in Blackstone generating a quarterly
operating profit by the fourth quarter of 2009.
Ramius statement 3)
“the acquisition of Blackstone saddled Orthofix with a heavy debt load which has
now put the Company in a precarious position. The recently announced, costly
amendment to the term loan only provides some covenant leniency for the
short-term. The covenants tighten quickly in late 2009, requiring significant
improvement in EBITDA or substantial reductions in total debt.” Page 2,
paragraph 1
Orthofix’s reply
3) Once again, we believe these allegations are baseless and
ignore the reality of the Company’s fiscal position. Since entering into the
credit agreement in September 2006 at the time of the Blackstone acquisition,
the Company has remained in compliance with the leverage ratio and other
covenants under such agreement. For example, on December 31, 2008, the Company’s
leverage ratio was 3.4, well-below the current maximum leverage ratio of 4.0
required by the agreement and even below the maximum leverage ratio that will be
allowed at the time of the step-down in September 2009. The Company has no
reason to believe that it will not remain in compliance with the debt covenants
in the future, including after the lower maximum leverage ratio requirements
take effect in the third quarter of 2009.
In fact,
since the loan facility was established in September 2006, the Company has
repaid approximately $56 million of the term loan’s outstanding principal.
Moreover, the Company had enough excess cash flow to make $45.2 million of these
principal payments ahead of scheduled maturities. Finally, shareholders should
be aware that no significant principal payments are required until December
2012, demonstrating that Ramius’ implication that the Company cannot repay the
loan on time is without factual support. Contrary to Ramius’ suggestions, the
Company is not in a precarious situation with respect to this facility, which
makes taking a disruptive corporate action, such as selling Blackstone,
unnecessary and an imprudent decision at this time.
Ramius statement 4)
“it is incumbent upon the Board of Directors of Orthofix to immediately engage a
strategic advisor to explore and execute a sale or disposition of Blackstone at
the highest possible price.” Page 2; paragraph 2
Orthofix’s reply
4) Ramius ignores the fact that the Board has been working
with Morgan Stanley since June 2008, well before Ramius’ initial letter to our
shareholders. After discussion with Morgan Stanley, the Board believes that the
current market makes this a particularly poor time to attempt to sell an asset
of this type. As a result, the Board believes that executing a sale of
Blackstone at this time would be an ill-timed blunder as it is not likely that,
during the current global financial crisis, the Company would receive a bid that
would reflect the intrinsic value of Blackstone to the
Company. Moreover, it appears that Ramius may have had a flip-flop on
the position it articulated in December 2008, as its definitive proxy statement
and other recent SEC filings state that “the Ramius Nominees have no present
plans to pursue specific strategies at this time.”]
Ramius statement 5)
“we believe the Company must also re-assess corporate overhead expenses which
have grown by more than three times since the acquisition of
Blackstone.” Page 2; paragraph 2
Orthofix’s reply
5) During the periods prior to the Blackstone acquisition, the
Company accounted for certain expenses at the subsidiary level, rather than as
corporate overhead in the Company’s financial statements. For reasons unrelated
to the Blackstone acquisition, the Company now uses a different internal cost
allocation structure resulting in certain costs that were previously accounted
for at the subsidiary level now being identified as corporate overhead in its
financial statements. These expenses include, among other things, costs for some
or all of the salaries and benefits for certain personnel in the general
management, legal and financial areas. If we had accounted for these overhead
expenses at the corporate level in 2006 in the same way that we do today, the
overhead expenses for the twelve months prior to the Blackstone acquisition
would have been approximately $12.6 million, instead of the $10.2 million that
Ramius references. Moreover, the Company's parent-level corporate overhead
expenses for the last twelve months include approximately $4 million for
non-recurring items such as strategic initiatives. If these non-recurring items
are excluded from Ramius’ $20 million overhead estimate for the last twelve
months, the increase in parent-level corporate overhead is only approximately
$3.4 million, or 27% of $12.6 million. We also note that the Company had revenue
of $365 million in 2006 and revenue of $520 million in 2008, an increase of over
40%.
Ramius
statement 6)
“Blackstone’s last quarter revenue declined 15.3% year-over-year and the last
quarter operating loss, adjusted for the goodwill impairment and inventory
charges, was a loss of $8.8 million”. Page 3; paragraph
1
Orthofix’s reply
6) Ramius exaggerates. Excluding intersegment
sales, the revenue decline in Q308 was 11%. Additionally,
Blackstone’s adjusted operating loss improved sequentially by 33% in Q408, to
$4.2 million. Further, based upon our 2009 internal forecast and as
set forth in our earnings guidance provided on February 12, 2009, we expect
Blackstone will generate a quarterly operating profit by the fourth quarter of
2009.
Ramius statement 7)
“Although Blackstone performed well for several quarters following the closing
of the transaction, in the middle of 2007 things began to deteriorate. In July
2007, Blackstone received a subpoena issued by the Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), under the authority of
the federal healthcare anti-kickback and false claims statutes.” Page 4;
paragraph 1
Orthofix reply
7) The OIG subpoena, which covered a period almost entirely
prior to our acquisition, did not impact Q307 financial performance, in which
Blackstone had revenue growth of 41% and an operating loss of
$800,000. Additionally, Orthofix met consolidated Q307 EPS
expectations.
Ramius statement 8)
Not long after the OIG issue came to light, in the fourth quarter of 2007, the
Lyons Brothers, who founded Blackstone and who agreed to remain with the Company
after closing, left the Company. Page 4; paragraph 1
”The
Lyons Brothers departure from the Company initiated a slew of departures from
Blackstone, including key internal people in research and development and sales
and marketing, as well as several key outside distributors.” Page 4, paragraph
2
Orthofix reply
8) Ramius also points to the departure of the Lyons brothers
and other members of Blackstone’s senior management, and the termination of
several distributors, at Blackstone as indications that the Company has
mismanaged the subsidiary. Again, Ramius does not tell the full story. The
Company initiated much of the executive turnover at Blackstone in order to
strengthen Blackstone’s operations and performance. Additionally, much of the
distributor turnover was the result of Orthofix initiatives designed to upgrade
the distribution network.
Ramius statement 9)
“The Company then began a painful process of restructuring the Blackstone
distribution network from one that was historically 100% third-party
distributors to a hybrid model including both indirect sales representatives as
well as a team of direct sales representatives that were hired at an additional
expense of over $5 million per year.” Page 4, paragraph 2
Orthofix reply 9)
During 2008, we moved away from a hybrid sales force at Blackstone, returning to
a 3rd party
independent distribution network and reducing associated operating
expenses. We do have several biologic sales reps and directors which
have helped drive a 57% increase in monthly biologic sales from January to
December 2008.
Ramius statement 10)
“Capital expenditures at Blackstone alone totaled more than $15 million for
2007, representing over 80% of total capital spending for the entire Orthofix
business even though it represented less than 25% of total revenues.” Page 5,
paragraph 1
Orthofix reply
10) This is an example of Ramius not taking into account the
underlying factors causing changes in expenditures, and we believe, not
providing shareholders with sufficient context. In particular, Ramius
fails to acknowledge that the capital expenditures at Blackstone in 2007
included the InSWing acquisition of $7 million, as well as the purchase of
instrument sets in connection with needed increases in product
inventory.
Ramius statement 11)
“In May 2008, Blackstone took another hit when a key competitor, NuVasive Inc.
(NUVA), announced the acquisition of the Osteocel business unit from Osiris
Therapeutics Inc. (OSIR). Blackstone is currently the exclusive distributor of
Osteocel’s key product, Trinity, a biological spine implant using adult stem
cells. The Trinity product has been credited with most of the growth in
Blackstone’s biologics business historically. However, the distribution
agreement terminates in 2009 and Blackstone will no longer be able to distribute
the Trinity product. The Trinity product has been a key differentiator for
Blackstone. This major setback could have been avoided had the Company
identified this risk factor during the due diligence process and addressed the
issue through the creative structuring of an earn-out payment based on the
successful renewal of the distribution agreement or a re-negotiation of a
longer-term contract with Osiris prior to closing.” Page 5, paragraph
1
Orthofix reply
11) At the time of the acquisition, Blackstone had just begun
to distribute Trinity®, which was significantly supply
constrained. Therefore, it only generated 9% of total annual
Blackstone revenues, so it was not a significant portion of revenue and
therefore not a significant part of our valuation of
Blackstone. Subsequent to the acquisition we did have discussions
with Osiris regarding an alternative arrangement to ensure further supply of
this product. We were not able to come to terms that we felt were
viable for us. However, in view of our recent announcements regarding
the MTF product discussed earlier, we believe our decisions with respect to this
product were correct.
Ramius statement 12)
“Even if it is available in mid-2009, the lack of clinical data and physician
support for the MTF product will, in our opinion, make it extremely difficult to
generate any meaningful sales before 2010.” Page 5, paragraph 2
Orthofix reply
12) In some respects our pre-clinical data for Trinity®
Evolution™ is better and more extensive than what was available when Trinity®
was initially launched. We are very confident that the MTF product
will be available by mid-2009, and in fact we have moved up our launch date by
two months to May 1st after
the successful early completion of our last milestone. We have grown
Trinity® sales to approximately $22.5 million/year over a period of about 2
years despite a lack of clinical data and a lack of adequate supply until the
beginning of 2008. We are therefore confident that the Company will
generate meaningful sales of the MTF product before 2010.
Ramius statement 13)
“The expected cash cost of the restructuring is $4.2 million between 2008 and
2009 and is expected to yield savings of $2 million in 2010 and $5 million in
2011 and beyond. These savings compare to the nearly $8.8 million of negative
operating income last quarter which equates to negative $35.2 million on an
annualized basis.” Page 5; paragraph 3
Orthofix reply
13) This analysis is not accurate, in that Blackstone’s
adjusted Q408 operating loss improved by 33% over Q308. Further, as
discussed earlier, based upon our 2009 internal forecast and as set forth in our
earnings guidance provided on February 12, 2009, we expect Blackstone will
generate a quarterly operating profit by the fourth quarter of
2009. This result is expected to be due, in large part, to the
ongoing reorganization and consolidation plan at Blackstone in addition to
improved revenue and higher gross margins resulting from new product launches
such as Firebird and Trinity® Evolution™.
Ramius statement 14)
“Including the full impact of the announced restructuring initiatives and the
savings from firing the direct sales force, we estimate Blackstone would have to
grow 35% from the last quarter run rate without increasing operating costs in
order to just break even. Remember that the initial objective as outlined by
management was a transaction that would be accretive after taking into account
interest expense and amortization of purchased intangibles. In order for
Blackstone to achieve that hurdle, revenue would have to grow 84%” Page 6;
paragraph 1
Orthofix reply
14) This analysis does not tell the full story, in that Ramius
used the adjusted operating loss of $8.8 million from Q308 as the annual run
rate for their calculations. Blackstone’s Q408 adjusted operating loss improved
by 33%, and as discussed earlier, based upon our 2009 internal forecast and as
set forth in our earnings guidance provided on February 12, 2009, we expect
Blackstone will generate a quarterly operating profit by the fourth quarter of
2009.
Ramius statement 15)
“Prior to the acquisition of Blackstone, Orthofix was a healthy and debt-free
company focused on a variety of niche markets within orthopedics that allowed
the Company to generate reasonable growth, healthy profits, and substantial free
cash flow. Although the results at Blackstone have negatively impacted
consolidated revenue, earnings, and cash flow, the legacy businesses continue to
perform well.” Page 7; paragraph 1
Orthofix reply
15) Ramius is correct that the Orthofix legacy businesses have
continued to perform well. However, for the following reasons , we
believe success in the spine market will bring greater value to shareholders
than Orthofix could provide without Blackstone. The spine markets
that Blackstone currently serves are large and growing. According to Millennium
Research Group, Inc., the total U.S. market for spine fusion technologies
expects to grow from approximately $3.6 billion in 2007 to approximately $4.3
billion in 2012 and the total U.S. market for orthopedic biomaterials expects to
grow from approximately $1.1 billion in 2007 to approximately $1.8 billion in
2012. In addition, Blackstone is currently developing “non-fusion”
technologies to allow it to enter the “non-fusion” technologies
market. According to Millennium Research Group, Inc., the global
spine market for “non-fusion” technologies expects to grow from approximately
$295 million in 2007 to $2.4 billion in 2012. In addition, we believe that the
increased access to advanced healthcare in developing countries should result in
increased market opportunities for Blackstone.
Ramius statement 16)
“we believe Blackstone could be sold for a value between 0.5x and 1.0x revenues
or more.” Page 8; paragraph 1
Orthofix reply
16) After discussion with Morgan Stanley, the Board believes
that the current market makes this a particularly poor time to attempt to sell
an asset of this type. As a result, the Board believes that executing a sale of
Blackstone at this time would be an ill-timed blunder as it is not likely that,
during the current global financial crisis, the Company would receive a bid that
would reflect the intrinsic value of Blackstone to the Company. We
believe that Ramius’ proposal to attempt to sell Blackstone would not only be a
distraction to management, but would potentially destroy shareholder value at
precisely the time that Blackstone is prepared to launch a key stem cell based
allograft product, a new pedicle screw product and benefit from the recently
initiated consolidation and restructuring plan.
Ramius statement 17)
“management and the Board must also take prompt action to reduce corporate
overhead expenses. Corporate overhead was $10.2 million for the twelve-month
period preceding the acquisition of Blackstone. For the last twelve months, this
number has ballooned to over $20 million, even when excluding certain one-time
items. We believe this bloated cost structure has been driven by, among other
things, the highly distributed nature of the Company. As it stands today, the
executive offices are located in what is arguably some of the most expensive
real estate in Boston, a city where the Company has no other business purpose.
The legal, finance, and accounting groups are located in North Carolina. The
recently appointed President of Blackstone, who is also the President of North
America, is located in San Diego while some of the key manufacturing facilities
are located in Texas. This highly distributed infrastructure is neither
efficient nor cost effective, and should be remedied immediately.” Page 8;
paragraph 3
Orthofix reply
17) See reply #5 for our discussion of corporate overhead
expenses. With
respect to the geographic location of Company facilities, the executive offices
were moved from Huntersville, NC to Boston in 2008 to be located within Boston’s
growing health care environment and also to improve the financial team from a
better talent pool in Boston. The Company was able to negotiate a
sublease of furnished offices at $27 per square foot which is not only well
under the $50 per square foot average for Boston, but is also less than the cost
per square foot in Huntersville.
Ramius statement 18)
“Orthofix must either achieve 2009 EBITDA of $91.7 million versus LTM EBITDA of
$81.3 million or reduce debt by $33.6 million, or a combination of the two, in
order to remain in compliance with the tightening covenants. For 2010, Orthofix
must either achieve EBITDA of $119.2 million or reduce debt by $94.6 million, or
a combination of the two, in order to remain in compliance.” Page 8; paragraph
4
Orthofix reply
18) These calculations are correct. We have
publicly indicated that we expect to generate EBITDA of $93 to $98
million. Additionally, we made a December 2008 debt prepayment of $10
million and a February 2009 prepayment of $7 million. To the extent
the Company only achieves the lower end of its 2009 full-year Consolidated
EBITDA guidance range and does not make any additional debt prepayments in
2009, the Company will be at a leverage ratio of approximately 3.0
versus a maximum allowable ratio of 3.25.
Ramius statement 19)
“the value of Blackstone in a sale, a conservative multiple for the legacy
businesses, and only giving credit for half of the potential corporate overhead
savings, we believe Orthofix shares would be worth more than $25 per share, a
117% increase from the current price of $11.66.” Page 10; paragraph
1
Orthofix reply
19) We note that Ramius has removed this assertion in its
definitive proxy statement materials. We believe this is another
example of a Ramius flip-flop regarding critical matters affecting the Company,
and that it is further evidence of their own admission, contained in their
recent proxy filings, that they do not have any definitive plans with respect to
Blackstone.
About
Orthofix
Orthofix
International, N.V., a global medical device company, offers a broad line of
minimally invasive surgical, and non-surgical, products for the spine,
orthopedic, and sports medicine market sectors that address the lifelong
bone-and-joint health needs of patients of all ages–helping them achieve a more
active and mobile lifestyle. Orthofix’s products are widely distributed around
the world to orthopedic surgeons and patients via Orthofix’s sales
representatives and its subsidiaries, including BREG, Inc. and Blackstone
Medical, Inc., and via partnerships with other leading orthopedic product
companies. In addition, Orthofix is collaborating in R&D partnerships with
leading medical institutions such as the Orthopedic Research and Education
Foundation, Rutgers University, the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Texas Scottish
Rite Hospital for Children and National Osteoporosis Institute. For more
information about Orthofix, please visit www.orthofix.com.
Forward-Looking
Statements
This
communication contains certain forward-looking statements under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements,
which may include, but are not limited to, statements concerning the
projections, financial condition, results of operations and businesses of
Orthofix and its subsidiaries and are based on management's current expectations
and estimates and involve risks and uncertainties that could cause actual
results or outcomes to differ materially from those contemplated by the
forward-looking statements.
Factors
that could cause or contribute to such differences may include, but are not
limited to, risks relating to the expected sales of its products, including
recently launched products, unanticipated expenditures, changing relationships
with customers, suppliers and strategic partners, risks relating to the
protection of intellectual property, changes to the reimbursement policies of
third parties, changes to and interpretation of governmental regulation of
medical devices, the impact of competitive products, changes to the competitive
environment, the acceptance of new products in the market, conditions of the
orthopedic industry and the economy, corporate development and market
development activities, including acquisitions or divestitures, unexpected costs
or operating unit performance related to recent acquisitions and other factors
described in our annual report on Form 10-K and other periodic reports filed by
the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Important
Additional Information
Orthofix
International N.V. (“Orthofix”) has filed a definitive proxy statement, dated
February 26, 2009, with the SEC in connection with a special general meeting of
shareholders of Orthofix to be held on April 2, 2009 at which Ramius Capital and
certain of its affiliates propose to make changes to the composition of
Orthofix's board of directors. SHAREHOLDERS ARE URGED TO READ ORTHOFIX'S
DEFINITIVE PROXY MATERIALS AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT SOLICITATION MATERIALS FILED
BY ORTHOFIX WITH THE SEC BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. Investors
and shareholders may obtain a free copy of the proxy statement and other
materials filed by Orthofix with the SEC at the SEC's website
at www.sec.gov, at Orthofix's website at www.orthofix.com, or by
contacting Georgeson, 199 Water Street, 26th Floor, New York, NY 10038 or by
calling (212) 440-9800 (bankers and brokers) or toll-free (800) 323-4133 (all
others).
Orthofix
and its directors and certain executive officers are participants in the
solicitation of proxies in connection with the special general meeting of
shareholders. The names of such persons are: James F. Gero, Peter J. Hewett,
Jerry C. Benjamin, Charles W. Federico, Dr. Guy J. Jordan, Ph.D., Thomas J.
Kester, CPA, Alan W. Milinazzo, Maria Sainz, Dr. Walter P. von Wartburg, Kenneth
R. Weisshaar, Robert S. Vaters, Michael Simpson, Bradley R. Mason, Raymond C.
Kolls, J.D., and Michael M. Finegan. Information regarding such participants, as
well as each such person's respective interests in Orthofix (whether through
ownership of Orthofix securities or otherwise), is set forth in Orthofix's
definitive proxy statement dated February 26, 2009, which may be obtained free
of charge at the SEC's website at www.sec.gov, Orthofix's website at
www.orthofix.com, or by contacting Georgeson, 199 Water Street, 26th Floor, New
York, NY 10038 or by calling (212) 440-9800 (bankers and brokers) or toll-free
(800) 323-4133 (all others).