e6vk
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
FORM 6-K
Report of Foreign Private Issuer
Pursuant to Rule 13a 16 or 15d 16 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
For the month of March 2011
HSBC Holdings plc
42nd Floor, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, England
(Indicate by check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual reports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F).
Form 20-F þ Form 40-F o
(Indicate by check mark whether the registrant by furnishing the information contained in this Form is also thereby furnishing the information to the Commission pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
Yes o No þ
(If Yes is marked, indicate below the file number assigned to the registrant in connection with Rule 12g3-2(b): 82- ).
HSBC Holdings plc
Capital and Risk Management
Pillar 3 Disclosures
at
31 December 2010
Certain defined terms
Unless the context requires otherwise, HSBC Holdings
means HSBC Holdings plc and HSBC, the Group, we, us and
our refers to HSBC Holdings together with its subsidiaries.
Within this document the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the Peoples Republic of China is referred to as Hong Kong.
When used in the terms shareholders equity and total
shareholders equity, shareholders means holders of HSBC
Holdings ordinary shares and those preference shares classified
as equity. The abbreviations US$m and US$bn represent
millions and billions (thousands of millions) of US dollars,
respectively.
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
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Contents |
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1
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Tables
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Table 1 |
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Basel III phase-in arrangements |
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4 |
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Table 2 |
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Capital structure |
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7 |
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Table 3 |
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Risk-weighted assets analysis by geographical region |
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8 |
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Table 4 |
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Risk-weighted assets analysis by customer group and global business |
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8 |
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Table 5 |
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Credit risk summary |
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16 |
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Table 6 |
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Credit risk exposure analysis by geographical region |
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17 |
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Table 7 |
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Risk weightings analysis by geographical region |
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18 |
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Table 8 |
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Credit risk exposure analysis by counterparty sector |
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19 |
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Table 9 |
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Credit risk exposure analysis by residual maturity |
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20 |
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Table 10 |
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IRB advanced exposure analysis of risk components |
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22 |
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Table 11 |
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IRB advanced exposure analysis by obligor grade |
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23 |
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Table 12 |
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IRB foundation exposure |
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24 |
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Table 13 |
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Retail IRB exposure analysis by geographical region |
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25 |
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Table 14 |
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IRB exposure credit risk mitigation analysis |
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28 |
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Table 15 |
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IRB credit risk expected loss and impairment charges analysis by exposure class |
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29 |
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Table 16 |
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IRB credit risk expected loss and impairment charges analysis by geographical region |
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29 |
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Table 17 |
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IRB advanced models projected and actual values |
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30 |
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Table 18 |
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Standardised approach exposure analysis by credit quality step |
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31 |
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Table 19 |
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Standardised approach exposure credit risk mitigation analysis |
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32 |
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Table 20 |
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Counterparty credit risk exposure net derivative credit exposure |
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34 |
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Table 21 |
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Counterparty credit risk exposure analysis by exposure class |
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34 |
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Table 22 |
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Counterparty credit risk exposure analysis by product |
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35 |
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Table 23 |
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Credit derivative transactions |
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35 |
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Table 24 |
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Securitisation exposures movement in the year |
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38 |
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Table 25 |
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Securitisation exposures analysis by method |
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38 |
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Table 26 |
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Securitisation exposures asset values and impairment charges |
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39 |
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Table 27 |
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Securitisation exposures analysis by risk weighting |
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39 |
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Table 28 |
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Market risk |
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40 |
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Table 29 |
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Non-trading book equity investments |
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42 |
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Table 30 |
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Operational risk |
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44 |
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Table 31 |
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Aggregate remuneration expenditure |
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45 |
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Table 32 |
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Analysis of remuneration between fixed and variable amounts |
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45 |
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Table 33 |
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Analysis of deferred remuneration |
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45 |
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Table 34 |
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Analysis of sign-on and severance payments |
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46 |
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Table 35 |
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Global Banking and Markets fair value adjustments |
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51 |
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Table 36 |
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Exposures to derivative transactions entered into directly with monoline insurers |
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53 |
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Cautionary statement regarding forward-looking statements
The Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures as at 31 December 2010 (Pillar 3
Disclosures 2010) contains certain forward-looking statements with respect to HSBCs financial
condition, results of operations and business.
Statements that are not historical facts, including statements about HSBCs beliefs and
expectations, are forward-looking statements. Words such as expects, anticipates, intends,
plans, believes, seeks, estimates, potential and reasonably possible, variations of
these words and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These
statements are based on current plans, estimates and projections, and therefore undue reliance
should not be placed on them. Forward-
looking statements speak only as of the date they are
made, and it should not be assumed that they have been revised or updated in the light of new
information or future events.
Written and/or oral forward-looking statements may also be made in the periodic reports to
the US Securities and Exchange Commission, summary financial statements to shareholders, proxy
statements, offering circulars and prospectuses, press releases and other written materials, and
in oral statements made by HSBCs Directors, officers or employees to third parties, including
financial analysts. Forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties. Readers
are cautioned that a number of factors could cause actual results to differ, in some instances
materially, from those anticipated or implied in any forward-looking
2
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
statement. These factors include changes in general economic conditions in the markets in which
we operate, changes in government policy and regulation and factors specific to HSBC. A more
detailed cautionary statement is provided on page 379 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Introduction
Headquartered in London, HSBC is one of the worlds largest banking and financial services
organisations and one of the industrys most valuable brands. We provide a comprehensive range
of financial services to around 95 million customers through two customer groups, Personal
Financial Services (including consumer finance), and Commercial Banking, and two global
businesses, Global Banking and Markets, and Global Private Banking.
Our international network covers 87 countries and territories in six geographical regions;
Europe, Hong Kong, Rest of Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, North America and Latin America.
With listings on the London, Hong Kong, New York, Paris and Bermuda stock exchanges, shares
in HSBC Holdings plc are held by over 221,000 shareholders in 127 countries and territories.
Details of the Groups principal activities and its strategic direction can be found on
page 10 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Basel II
The United Kingdom (UK) Financial Services Authority (FSA) supervises HSBC on a consolidated
basis, and therefore receives information on the capital adequacy of, and sets capital
requirements for, the Group as a whole. Individual banking subsidiaries are directly regulated
by their local banking supervisors, who set and monitor their capital adequacy requirements.
We calculate capital at a Group level using the Basel II framework of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee). However, local regulators are at different stages of
implementation and local reporting may still be on a Basel I basis, notably in the United States
(US). In most jurisdictions, non-banking financial subsidiaries are also subject to the
supervision and capital requirements of local regulatory authorities.
Basel II is structured around three pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory
review process and market discipline. The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) implemented
Basel II in the European Union (EU) and the
FSA then gave effect to the CRD by including the
requirements of the CRD in its own rulebooks.
Pillar 3 disclosures 2010
Pillar 3, market discipline, complements the minimum capital requirements and the supervisory
review process. Its aim is to encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure
requirements which allow market participants to assess certain specified information on the
scope of application of Basel II, capital, particular risk exposures and risk assessment
processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution. Disclosures consist of both
quantitative and qualitative information and are provided at the consolidated level.
Banks are required to disclose all their material risks as part of the pillar 3 framework.
All material and non-proprietary information required by pillar 3 is included in the Pillar 3
Disclosures 2010. The FSA permits certain Pillar 3 requirements to be satisfied by inclusion
within the financial statements. Where this is the case, page references are provided to the
relevant sections in the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Future developments
The regulation and supervision of financial institutions continues to undergo significant change
in response to the global financial crisis. In December 2010, the Basel Committee issued final
rules in two documents: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking
systems and International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring,
which together are commonly referred to as Basel III. The new minimum capital requirements
will be phased in from 1 January 2013, with full implementation required by 1 January 2019. The
minimum common equity tier 1 requirement of 4.5% and additional capital conservation buffer
requirement of 2.5% will be phased in sequentially from 1 January 2013, becoming fully effective
on 1 January 2019. Any additional countercyclical capital buffer requirements will also be
phased in, starting in 2016, in parallel with the capital conservation buffer to a maximum level
of 2.5% effective on 1 January 2019, although individual jurisdictions may choose to implement
larger countercyclical capital buffers. The leverage ratio will be subject to a supervisory
monitoring period, which commenced on 1 January 2011, and a parallel run period which will run
from 1 January 2013 until 1 January 2017. Further calibration of the leverage ratio will be
carried out in the first half of 2017, with a view to migrating to a
3
Pillar 1 requirement from 1 January 2018. The Basel Committee has increased the capital
requirements for the trading book and complex securitisation exposures, which are due to be
implemented on 31 December 2011. They will continue to conduct the fundamental review of the
trading book, which is targeted for completion by the end of 2011. In addition to the reforms
discussed above, institutions designated as Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions
(G-SIFIs) may be subjected to additional requirements, which have yet to be proposed by
regulators. The Basel Committee will provide the approach to defining G-SIFIs by the end of
2011. On 13 January 2011, the Basel Committee issued further minimum requirements to ensure that
all classes of capital instruments fully absorb losses at the point of non-viability before
taxpayers are exposed to loss. Instruments issued on or after 1 January 2013 may only be
included in regulatory capital if the new requirements are met. The capital treatment of
securities issued prior to this date will be phased out over a 10-year period commencing 1
January 2013.
Under the proposed liquidity framework, a liquidity coverage ratio and a net stable funding
ratio have been developed. These measures will be phased in from 1 January 2015 and 1 January
2018 respectively, after a period of observation which commences on 1 January 2012.
Impact of Basel III
In order to provide some insight into the possible effects of the new Basel III rules on HSBC,
we have estimated the pro forma common equity tier 1 ratio of the Group on the basis of our
interpretation of those rules, as they would apply at 1 January 2019, but based on the position
at 31 December 2010. We have estimated that the application of the full Basel III rules on a pro
forma basis would result in a
common equity tier 1 ratio which is lower than the Basel II core tier 1 ratio by some 250300
basis points. However, as the new rules will be phased in
between 1 January 2013 and 1 January
2019, their impact will be gradual over that period. This estimate does not, however, take
account of any future retained earnings, nor any management actions to reduce RWAs. The Basel
III changes relate to increased capital deductions, new regulatory adjustments and increases in
RWAs. The majority of the increase in RWAs relates to Basel III changes which are scheduled to
come into effect on 1 January 2013, in particular to changes to counterparty credit risk capital
charges and amounts for securitisation positions that were previously deducted from capital that
will now be risk-weighted instead. Other increases in RWAs will begin to be phased in from 1
January 2014, including the majority of the unconsolidated investments that were previously
deducted from capital. The remainder of the RWA increase arises from increases in trading book
capital requirements which take effect on 31 December 2011, primarily relating to changes in
market risk.
The estimated impact of Basel III is subject to change as regulators develop their
requirements around the practical application and interpretation of the new rules, in particular
the counterparty credit risk capital charge. Further uncertainty remains regarding any capital
requirements which may be imposed on the Group over the period to 1 January 2019 in respect of
the countercyclical capital buffer and any additional regulatory requirements for G-SIFIs. Under
the Basel III rules as they will apply from 1 January 2019, we believe that ultimately the level
for the common equity tier 1 ratio of the Group may lie in the range 9.5% to 10.5%. This exceeds
the minimum requirement for common equity tier 1 capital plus the capital conservation buffer.
HSBC has a strong track record of capital generation and actively manages its RWAs. Before these
new rules come into force, we will take appropriate management action over the implementation
period to 1 January 2019 to reduce the quantum of increase in RWAs that would have occurred if
the new rules had been in effect at 31 December 2010.
Table 1: Basel III phase-in arrangements
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2013 |
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2014 |
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2015 |
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2016 |
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2017 |
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2018 |
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2019 |
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% |
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% |
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% |
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% |
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% |
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% |
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% |
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Minimum common equity capital ratio |
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3.5 |
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4.0 |
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4.5 |
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4.5 |
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4.5 |
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4.5 |
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4.5 |
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Capital conservation buffer |
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0.625 |
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1.25 |
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1.875 |
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2.5 |
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Minimum common equity plus capital
conservation buffer |
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3.5 |
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4.0 |
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4.5 |
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5.125 |
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5.75 |
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6.375 |
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7.0 |
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Minimum tier 1 ratio |
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4.5 |
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5.5 |
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6.0 |
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6.0 |
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6.0 |
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6.0 |
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6.0 |
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Minimum total capital plus
conservation buffer |
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8.0 |
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8.0 |
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8.0 |
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8.625 |
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9.25 |
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9.875 |
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10.5 |
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4
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Frequency
In accordance with FSA requirements, we intend to publish comprehensive pillar 3 disclosures
annually. Summarised information will be provided each quarter from March 2011.
Comparison with the Annual Report and Accounts 2010
The Pillar 3 Disclosures 2010 have been prepared in accordance with regulatory capital adequacy
concepts and rules, rather than in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRSs). Therefore, some information in the Pillar 3 Disclosures 2010 is not directly
comparable with the financial information in the Annual Report and Accounts 2010. This is most
pronounced for the credit risk disclosures, where credit exposure is defined as the maximum loss
the Group has estimated under specified Basel II parameters. This differs from similar
information in the Annual Report and Accounts 2010, which is mainly reported as at the balance
sheet date and, therefore, does not reflect the likelihood of future drawings of committed
credit lines.
Verification
The Pillar 3 Disclosures 2010 have been appropriately verified internally, but have not been
audited by the Groups external auditor.
Significant subsidiaries
Links to the financial information of significant subsidiaries, including capital resources and
requirements, are available on our investor relations website page
www.hsbc.com/investor-relations/financial-results/hsbc-group-companies.
Consolidation basis
The basis of consolidation for financial accounting purposes is described on page 251 of the
Annual Report and Accounts 2010 and differs from that used for regulatory purposes. Investments
in banking associates, which are equity accounted in the financial accounting consolidation, are
proportionally consolidated for regulatory purposes. Subsidiaries and associates engaged in
insurance and non-financial activities are excluded from the regulatory consolidation and are
deducted from regulatory capital. The regulatory consolidation does not include Special Purpose
Entities (SPEs) where significant risk has been transferred to third parties. Exposures to
these SPEs are risk-weighted as securitisation positions for regulatory purposes.
Scope of Basel II permissions
Credit risk capital requirements
Basel II applies three approaches of increasing sophistication to the calculation of Pillar 1
credit risk capital requirements. The most basic, the standardised approach, requires banks to
use external credit ratings to determine the risk weightings applied to rated counterparties and
group other counterparties into broad categories and apply standardised risk weightings to these
categories. The next level, the internal ratings-based (IRB) foundation approach, allows banks
to calculate their credit risk capital requirements on the basis of their internal assessment of
the probability that a counterparty will default (PD), but subjects their quantified estimates
of exposure at default (EAD) and loss given default (LGD) to standard supervisory
parameters. Finally, the IRB advanced approach allows banks to use their own internal assessment
in both determining PD and quantifying EAD and LGD.
The capital resources requirement, which is intended to cover unexpected losses, is derived
from a formula specified in the regulatory rules, which incorporates these factors and other
variables such as maturity and correlation. Expected losses under the IRB approaches are
calculated by multiplying PD by EAD and LGD. Expected losses are deducted from capital to the
extent that they exceed accounting impairment allowances.
For consolidated group reporting, the FSAs rules permit the use of other regulators
standardised approaches where they are considered equivalent. The use of other regulators IRB
approaches is subject to the agreement of the FSA. For credit risk, we have adopted the IRB
advanced approach for the majority of our business. A number of Group companies and portfolios
are in transition to IRB advanced from standardised or IRB foundation approaches, pending
definition of local regulations or model development and approval; others will remain on
standardised under exemptions from IRB treatment.
Counterparty credit risk capital requirement
Counterparty credit risk in both the trading and non-trading books is the risk that the
counterparty to a transaction may default before completing the satisfactory settlement of the
transaction. Three approaches to calculating counterparty credit risk and determining exposure
values are defined by Basel II: standardised, mark-to-market and internal model method (IMM).
These exposure values are used to determine capital requirements under one of the credit risk
approaches; standardised, IRB foundation and IRB advanced.
5
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
We use the mark-to-market and IMM approaches for counterparty credit risk. Our longer-term
aim is to migrate more positions from the mark-to-market to the IMM approach.
Market risk capital requirement
Market risk is the risk that movements in market risk factors, including foreign exchange,
commodity prices, interest rates, credit spread and equity prices will reduce our income or the
value of our portfolios. The market risk capital requirement is measured, with FSA permission,
using Value at Risk (VAR) models or the standard rules prescribed by the FSA.
We use both VAR and standard rules approaches for market risk. Our aim is to migrate more
positions from standard rules to VAR.
Operational risk capital requirement
Basel II includes capital requirements for operational risk, again utilising three levels of
sophistication. The capital required under the basic indicator approach is a simple percentage
of gross revenues, whereas under the standardised approach, it is one of three different
percentages of gross revenues allocated to each of eight defined business lines. Both these
approaches use an average of the last three financial years revenues. Finally, the advanced
measurement approach uses banks own statistical analysis and modelling of operational risk data
to determine capital requirements.
We have adopted the standardised approach in determining our operational risk capital
requirement.
6
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Capital
Table 2: Capital structure
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At 31 December |
|
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2010 |
|
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2009 |
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US$bn |
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US$bn |
|
Composition of regulatory capital1 |
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Tier 1 capital |
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Shareholders equity |
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142.7 |
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135.3 |
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Shareholders equity per balance sheet2 |
|
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147.7 |
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128.3 |
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Preference share premium |
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(1.4 |
) |
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(1.4 |
) |
Other equity instruments |
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(5.9 |
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(2.1 |
) |
Deconsolidation of special purpose entities3 |
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2.3 |
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10.5 |
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Non-controlling interests |
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3.9 |
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3.9 |
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Non-controlling interests per balance sheet |
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7.2 |
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7.4 |
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Preference share non-controlling interests |
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(2.4 |
) |
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(2.4 |
) |
Non-controlling interest transferred to tier 2 capital |
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(0.5 |
) |
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(0.7 |
) |
Non-controlling interest in deconsolidated subsidiaries |
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(0.4 |
) |
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(0.4 |
) |
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Regulatory adjustments to the accounting basis |
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1.8 |
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0.2 |
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Unrealised losses on available-for-sale debt securities4 |
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3.8 |
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0.9 |
|
Own credit spread |
|
|
(0.9 |
) |
|
|
(1.0 |
) |
Defined benefit pension fund adjustment5 |
|
|
1.7 |
|
|
|
2.5 |
|
Reserves arising from revaluation of property and unrealised gains on
available-for-sale equities |
|
|
(3.1 |
) |
|
|
(2.2 |
) |
Cash flow hedging reserve |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Deductions |
|
|
(32.3 |
) |
|
|
(33.1 |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
Goodwill capitalised and intangible assets |
|
|
(28.0 |
) |
|
|
(28.6 |
) |
50% of securitisation positions |
|
|
(1.5 |
) |
|
|
(1.6 |
) |
50% of tax credit adjustment for expected losses |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
50% of excess of expected losses over impairment allowances |
|
|
(3.1 |
) |
|
|
(3.4 |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Core tier 1 capital |
|
|
116.1 |
|
|
|
106.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other tier 1 capital before deductions |
|
|
17.9 |
|
|
|
15.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Preference share premium |
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
Preference share non-controlling interests |
|
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
2.4 |
|
Hybrid capital securities |
|
|
14.1 |
|
|
|
12.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Deductions |
|
|
(0.8 |
) |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Unconsolidated investments6 |
|
|
(1.1 |
) |
|
|
(0.4 |
) |
50% of tax credit adjustment for expected losses |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Tier 1 capital |
|
|
133.2 |
|
|
|
122.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Tier 2 capital |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total qualifying tier 2 capital before deductions |
|
|
52.7 |
|
|
|
50.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Reserves arising from revaluation of property and unrealised gains on
available-for-sale equities |
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
2.2 |
|
Collective impairment allowances7 |
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
Perpetual subordinated debt |
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
3.0 |
|
Term subordinated debt |
|
|
43.4 |
|
|
|
40.4 |
|
Non-controlling interest in tier 2 capital |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total deductions other than from tier 1 capital |
|
|
(18.3 |
) |
|
|
(16.5 |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
Unconsolidated investments6 |
|
|
(13.7 |
) |
|
|
(11.5 |
) |
50% of securitisation positions |
|
|
(1.5 |
) |
|
|
(1.6 |
) |
50% of excess of expected losses over impairment allowances |
|
|
(3.1 |
) |
|
|
(3.4 |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total regulatory capital |
|
|
167.6 |
|
|
|
155.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total tier 2 capital before deductions plus hybrid capital securities |
|
|
66.8 |
|
|
|
62.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
Capital required |
8 |
|
RWAs |
|
|
Capital required |
8 |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit risk |
|
|
890.6 |
|
|
|
71.3 |
|
|
|
903.5 |
|
|
|
72.3 |
|
Counterparty credit risk |
|
|
50.2 |
|
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
51.9 |
|
|
|
4.2 |
|
Market risk |
|
|
38.7 |
|
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
51.9 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
Operational risk |
|
|
123.6 |
|
|
|
9.8 |
|
|
|
125.9 |
|
|
|
10.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
1,103.1 |
|
|
|
88.2 |
|
|
|
1,133.2 |
|
|
|
90.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
Capital ratios |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Core tier 1 ratio |
|
|
10.5 |
|
|
|
9.4 |
|
Tier 1 ratio |
|
|
12.1 |
|
|
|
10.8 |
|
Total capital ratio |
|
|
15.2 |
|
|
|
13.7 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
The terms and conditions of capital securities issued by the Group are detailed in the
Appendix on page 55. |
|
2 |
|
Includes externally verified profits for the year to 31 December 2010. |
|
3 |
|
Mainly comprises unrealised losses on available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities within
special purpose entities which are excluded from the regulatory consolidation. |
|
4 |
|
Under FSA rules, unrealised gains/losses on debt securities net of tax must be excluded
from capital resources. |
|
5 |
|
Under FSA rules, the defined benefit liability may be substituted with the additional
funding that will be paid into the relevant schemes over the following five year period. |
|
6 |
|
Mainly comprise investments in insurance entities. |
|
7 |
|
Under FSA rules, collective impairment allowances on loan portfolios on the standardised approach are included in tier 2 capital. |
|
8 |
|
Calculated as 8% of RWAs. |
Table 3: Risk-weighted assets analysis by geographical region
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rest of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hong |
|
|
Asia- |
|
|
Middle |
|
|
North |
|
|
Latin |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
Europe |
|
|
Kong |
|
|
Pacific |
|
|
East |
|
|
America |
|
|
America |
|
|
RWAs |
1 |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit risk |
|
|
217.3 |
|
|
|
86.3 |
|
|
|
190.9 |
|
|
|
45.7 |
|
|
|
274.5 |
|
|
|
75.9 |
|
|
|
890.6 |
|
Counterparty credit risk |
|
|
22.7 |
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
16.3 |
|
|
|
2.2 |
|
|
|
50.2 |
|
Market risk1 |
|
|
22.4 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
3.5 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
11.3 |
|
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
38.7 |
|
Operational risk |
|
|
39.2 |
|
|
|
15.3 |
|
|
|
19.0 |
|
|
|
6.5 |
|
|
|
28.6 |
|
|
|
15.0 |
|
|
|
123.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total RWAs1 |
|
|
301.6 |
|
|
|
106.9 |
|
|
|
217.5 |
|
|
|
54.1 |
|
|
|
330.7 |
|
|
|
95.9 |
|
|
|
1,103.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit risk |
|
|
237.5 |
|
|
|
99.0 |
|
|
|
150.2 |
|
|
|
46.7 |
|
|
|
306.3 |
|
|
|
63.8 |
|
|
|
903.5 |
|
Counterparty credit risk |
|
|
26.6 |
|
|
|
2.1 |
|
|
|
3.7 |
|
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
16.9 |
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
51.9 |
|
Market risk1 |
|
|
33.5 |
|
|
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
14.7 |
|
|
|
2.1 |
|
|
|
51.9 |
|
Operational risk |
|
|
42.1 |
|
|
|
16.0 |
|
|
|
16.7 |
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
|
|
31.3 |
|
|
|
14.3 |
|
|
|
125.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total RWAs1 |
|
|
339.7 |
|
|
|
119.5 |
|
|
|
173.9 |
|
|
|
54.3 |
|
|
|
369.2 |
|
|
|
81.7 |
|
|
|
1,133.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 RWAs are non-additive across geographical regions due to market risk diversification
effects within the Group. |
|
Table 4: Risk-weighted assets analysis by customer group and global business
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rest of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hong |
|
|
Asia- |
|
|
Middle |
|
|
North |
|
|
Latin |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
Europe |
|
|
Kong |
|
|
Pacific |
|
|
East |
|
|
America |
|
|
America |
|
|
RWAs |
1 |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Personal Financial Services |
|
|
50.9 |
|
|
|
18.2 |
|
|
|
15.6 |
|
|
|
7.6 |
|
|
|
220.6 |
|
|
|
30.3 |
|
|
|
343.2 |
|
Commercial Banking |
|
|
79.9 |
|
|
|
39.8 |
|
|
|
35.2 |
|
|
|
24.8 |
|
|
|
44.9 |
|
|
|
34.9 |
|
|
|
259.5 |
|
Global Banking and Markets1 |
|
|
143.7 |
|
|
|
38.2 |
|
|
|
48.8 |
|
|
|
20.1 |
|
|
|
58.5 |
|
|
|
30.3 |
|
|
|
336.0 |
|
Global Private Banking |
|
|
16.7 |
|
|
|
2.1 |
|
|
|
1.9 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
3.6 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
25.1 |
|
Other |
|
|
10.4 |
|
|
|
8.6 |
|
|
|
116.0 |
|
|
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
139.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total RWAs1 |
|
|
301.6 |
|
|
|
106.9 |
|
|
|
217.5 |
|
|
|
54.1 |
|
|
|
330.7 |
|
|
|
95.9 |
|
|
|
1,103.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
RWAs are non-additive across geographical regions due to market risk diversification
effects within the Group. |
8
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Capital management and allocation
Our approach to capital management is driven by our strategic and organisational requirements,
taking into account the regulatory, economic and commercial environment in which we operate.
It is our objective to maintain a strong capital base to support the development of our
business and to meet regulatory capital requirements at all times. To achieve this, our policy
is to hold capital in a range of different forms and from diverse sources, and all capital
raising is agreed with major subsidiaries as part of their individual and the Groups overall
capital management processes.
Our policy is underpinned by a capital management framework, which enables us to manage our
capital in a consistent and aligned manner. The framework, which is approved by the Group
Management Board (GMB), incorporates a number of different capital measures including market
capitalisation, invested capital, economic capital and regulatory capital.
The responsibility for global capital allocation principles and decisions rests with GMB.
Through our structured internal governance processes, we maintain discipline over our investment
and capital allocation decisions and seek to ensure that returns on investment are adequate
after taking account of capital costs. Our strategy is to allocate capital to businesses on the
basis of their economic profit generation, regulatory and economic capital requirements and cost
of capital.
Transferability of capital within the Group
HSBC Holdings is the primary provider of capital to its subsidiaries and these investments are
substantially funded by its own capital issuance and profit retention. As part of its capital
management process, HSBC Holdings seeks to maintain a prudent balance between the composition of
its capital and that of its investment in subsidiaries. Each of the subsidiaries manage their
own capital to support their planned business growth and meet their local regulatory
requirements within the context of the approved annual Group capital plan. In accordance with
our capital management framework, capital generated by subsidiaries in excess of planned
requirements is returned to HSBC Holdings, normally by way of dividends. During 2010 and 2009,
none of the Groups subsidiaries experienced significant restrictions on paying dividends or
repaying loans and advances.
Internal assessment of capital adequacy
We assess the adequacy of our capital by considering the resources necessary to cover unexpected
losses arising from discretionary risks, such as credit risk and market risk, or
non-discretionary risks, such as operational risk and reputational risk. The framework, together
with related policies define the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) by which
GMB examines our risk profile from both regulatory and economic capital viewpoints and ensures
that our level of capital:
|
|
remains sufficient to support our risk profile and outstanding commitments; |
|
|
|
exceeds our formal minimum regulatory capital requirements by an agreed margin; |
|
|
|
is capable of withstanding a severe economic downturn stress scenario; and |
|
|
|
remains consistent with our strategic and operational goals, and shareholder and rating
agency expectations. |
The regulatory and economic capital assessments rely upon the use of models that are
integrated into our management of risk. Economic capital is the internally calculated capital
requirement which we deem necessary to support the risks to which we are exposed, at a
confidence level consistent with a target credit rating of AA. The minimum regulatory capital
that we are required to hold is determined by the rules established by the FSA for the
consolidated Group and by local regulators for individual Group companies. The economic capital
assessment is the more risk-sensitive measure, as it covers a wider range of risks and takes
account of the substantial diversification of risk accruing from our operations. Our economic
capital models are calibrated to quantify the level of capital that is sufficient to absorb
potential losses over a one-year time horizon to a 99.95% level of confidence for our banking
activities and to a 99.5% level of confidence for our insurance activities and pension risks.
Our approach to capital management is aligned to our corporate structure, business model and
strategic direction. Our discipline around capital allocation is maintained within established
processes and benchmarks, in particular the approved annual Group capital plan, further details
of which can be found on page 177 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Economic capital is the metric by which risk is measured and linked to capital within our risk
appetite framework. The framework, which
9
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
expresses the types and quantum of risks to which we wish to be exposed, is approved annually by
the Board of Directors of HSBC Holdings (the Board), and its implementation is overseen by
GMB. Further details on the risk appetite framework may be found on page 87 of the Annual Report
and Accounts 2010.
Our risk management framework fosters the continuous monitoring of the risk environment and
an integrated evaluation of risks and their interactions. Certain of these risks are assessed
and managed via the capital planning process. Risks assessed via capital and those that are not
are compared below:
Risks assessed via capital
Credit (including counterparty credit), market and operational risk
We assess economic capital requirements for these risk types by utilising the embedded
operational infrastructure used for the pillar 1 capital calculation, together with an
additional suite of models that take into account, in particular:
|
|
the increased level of confidence required to meet our strategic goals (99.95%); and |
|
|
|
internal assessments of diversification of risks within our portfolios and, similarly,
any concentrations of risk that arise. |
Our economic capital assessment operates alongside our regulatory capital process and
consistently demonstrates a substantially lower overall capital requirement for credit risk than
the regulatory equivalent, reflecting the empirical evidence of the benefits of global
diversification. However, we maintain a prudent stance on capital coverage, ensuring that any
model risk is mitigated. Economic capital requirements are used to monitor our risks against our
risk appetite.
Interest rate risk in the banking book
Interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB) is defined as the exposure of our non-trading
products to interest rates.
Non-trading portfolios include positions that primarily arise from the interest rate
management of future yield on assets and their funding costs, as a result of interest rate
changes. Analysis of this risk is complicated by having to make assumptions on embedded
optionality within certain product areas such as the incidence of mortgage prepayments, and from
behavioural assumptions regarding the economic duration of liabilities which are contractually
repayable on demand such as current accounts. IRRBB economic capital is measured as
the amount
of capital necessary to cover an unexpected loss in the value of our non-trading products over
one year to a 99.95% level of confidence.
Insurance risk
We operate a bancassurance model which provides insurance products for customers with whom we
have a banking relationship. Many of these insurance products are manufactured by our
subsidiaries but, where we consider it operationally more effective, third parties are engaged
to manufacture insurance products for sale through our banking network. We work with a limited
number of market-leading partners to provide such products. When manufacturing products
ourselves, we underwrite the insurance risk and retain the risks and rewards associated with
writing insurance contracts.
We continue to make progress towards the implementation of a risk-based capital methodology
for our insurance businesses. While this is being implemented across HSBC, a Net Asset Value
capital deduction methodology is being employed for Group economic capital assessment purposes.
Pension risk
We operate a number of pension plans throughout the world. Some of them are defined benefit
plans, of which the largest is the HSBC Bank (UK) Pension Scheme. In order to fund the benefits
associated with these plans, sponsoring group companies (and in some instances, employees) make
regular contributions in accordance with advice from actuaries and in consultation with the
schemes trustees (where relevant). In situations where a funding deficit emerges, sponsoring
Group companies agree to make additional contributions to the plans, to address the deficit over
an appropriate repayment period. Further details of such payments can be found in Note 7 on page
274 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010. The defined benefit plans invest these contributions
in a range of investments designed to meet their long-term liabilities.
Pension risk arises from the potential for a deficit in a defined benefit plan to arise
from a number of factors, including:
|
|
investments delivering a return below that required to provide the projected
plan benefits. This could arise, for example, when there is a fall in the market value of
equities, or when increases in long-term interest rates cause a fall in the value of fixed
income securities held; |
10
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
|
|
the prevailing economic environment leading to corporate failures, thus
triggering write-downs in asset values (both equity and debt); |
|
|
|
a change in either interest rates or inflation which causes an increase in
the value of the scheme liabilities; and |
|
|
|
scheme members living longer than expected (known as longevity risk). |
Pension risk is assessed by way of an economic capital model that takes into account
potential variations in these factors, using VAR methodology.
Residual risk
Residual risk is, primarily, the risk that mitigation techniques prove less effective than
expected. This category also includes risks that arise from specific reputational or business
events that give rise to exposures not deemed to be included in the major risk categories. We
conduct economic capital assessments of such risks on a regular, forward-looking basis to ensure
that their impact is adequately covered by our capital base.
Risks not explicitly assessed via capital
Liquidity risk
Liquidity and funding risk management is described in detail on page 140 of the Annual Report
and Accounts 2010.
We use cash-flow stress testing as part of our control processes to assess liquidity risk.
We do not manage liquidity through the explicit allocation of capital as, in common with
standard industry practice, this is not considered to be an appropriate or adequate mechanism
for managing these risks. However, we recognise that a strong capital base can help to mitigate
liquidity risk both by providing a capital buffer to allow an entity to raise funds and deploy
them in liquid positions, and by serving to reduce the credit risk taken by providers of funds
to the Group.
Structural foreign exchange risk
Structural foreign exchange risks arise from our net investments in subsidiaries, branches and
associates, the functional currencies of which are other than the US dollar. Unrealised gains or
losses due to revaluations of structural foreign exchange exposures are reflected in reserves,
whereas other unrealised gains or losses arising from revaluations of foreign exchange positions
are reflected in the income statement.
Our structural foreign exchange exposures are managed with the primary objective of
ensuring, where practical, that our consolidated capital ratios and the capital ratios of the
individual banking subsidiaries are largely protected from the effect of changes in exchange
rates. This is usually achieved by ensuring that, for each subsidiary bank, the ratio of
structural exposures in a given currency to RWAs denominated in that currency is broadly equal
to the capital ratio of the subsidiary in question. We evaluate residual structural foreign
exchange exposures using a VAR model, but typically do not assign any economic capital for these
since they are managed within appropriate economic capital buffers.
Details of our management of structural foreign exchange risk can be found on page 149 of
the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Reputational risk
As a banking group, our good reputation depends upon the way in which we conduct our business,
but it can also be affected by the way in which clients, to whom we provide financial services,
conduct themselves.
Details of our management of reputational risk can be found on page 172 of the Annual
Report and Accounts 2010.
Sustainability risk
Sustainability risks arise from the provision of financial services to companies or projects
which run counter to the needs of sustainable development; in effect, this risk arises when the
environmental and social effects outweigh economic benefits.
Details of our management of sustainability risk can be found on page 173 of the Annual
Report and Accounts 2010.
Business risk
The FSA specifies that banks, as part of their internal assessment of capital adequacy process,
should review their exposure to business risk.
Business risk is the potential negative impact on profits and capital from the Group not
meeting our strategic objectives, as set out in the rolling operating plan, as a result of
unforeseen changes in the business and regulatory environment, exposure to economic cycles and
technological changes.
We manage and mitigate business risk through our business planning and stress testing
processes, which ensure that our business model and planned
11
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
activities are appropriately resourced and capitalised consistent with the commercial,
economic and risk environment in which the Group operates and that the potential vulnerability
to our business plans are identified at an early stage so that mitigating actions can be taken
proactively.
Risk management objectives and policies
Overview
All our activities whether lending, payment transmission, trading business to support clients
and markets, or maintenance of our infrastructure for delivering financial services involve
to varying degrees the measurement, evaluation, acceptance and management of risks.
The objective of risk management, shared across the organisation, is to support Group
strategies to build sustainably profitable business in the best long-term interests of our
shareholders and other stakeholders. Our approach is therefore to ensure that risk management is
deeply and firmly embedded in how we run our business. This is achieved through:
|
|
a historically strong risk culture, with personal accountability for
decisions; |
|
|
|
a robust governance structure, with a clear, well understood framework of
risk ownership, standards and policy; |
|
|
|
the alignment of risk and business objectives, and integration of risk
appetite into business planning and capital management; and |
|
|
|
an independent, integrated and specialist global Risk function. |
Our risk culture is a major strength of the Group, and fostering it is a key responsibility
of senior executives assisted by the Risk function. All employees are held accountable for
identifying, assessing and managing risks within the scope of their assigned responsibilities. A
primary duty of the senior executive in each country in which we operate is to maintain an
effective risk strategy to address all risks in the business they manage, and we have a system
of personal, not collective, authorities for lending decisions. Personal accountability,
reinforced by learning and development, helps sustain a disciplined and constructive culture of
risk management and control throughout HSBC.
Our risk governance structure is set out in the Report of the Group Risk Committee (GRC
Report) on page 197 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010. Strong risk management and internal
control systems are evidenced in a well established,
clear framework of risk ownership and
documented standards, policy and procedure.
Risk management objectives are integrated into the balanced scorecards of the heads of
regions, global businesses and key functions from the GMB down, and cascaded through the
organisation. The objectives of the Risk function as such are also fully aligned in this process
with strategic business objectives.
Our approach to risk appetite, explained in further detail in the GRC Report, reinforces
the integration of risk considerations into key business goals and planning processes.
Preserving our strong capital position remains a key priority for HSBC, and the level of
integration of our risk and capital management helps to optimise our response to business demand
for regulatory and economic capital (see also Capital management and allocation above).
As risk is not static, our risk profile continually alters as a result of change in the
scope and impact of a wide range of factors, from geopolitical to transactional. The risk
environment requires continual monitoring and holistic assessment in order to understand and
manage its complex interactions across the Group.
The global Risk function, headed by the Group Chief Risk Officer (GCRO), provides an
expert, integrated and independent assessment of risks across the Group:
|
|
supporting our regions and global businesses in the development and
achievement of strategic objectives; |
|
|
|
partnering the business in risk appetite planning and operation; |
|
|
|
carrying out central approvals, controls, risk systems leadership and the
analysis and reporting of management information; |
|
|
|
fostering development of the Risk function and the Groups risk culture; and |
|
|
|
addressing risk issues in dealings with external stakeholders including
regulators and analysts. |
In addition to business as usual operations, the Risk function engages fully in business
development activities such as new product approval and post-implementation review, and
acquisition due diligence.
Diversification is an important aspect of our management of risk. Our geographical
diversification supports our strategies of growth in emerging markets and international
connectivity,
12
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
and the diversification of our risk portfolio across markets, customer groups and products
ensures that we are not dependent on a few sources for revenue and growth, mitigating both
business risks and capital usage. Diversification models are developed, together with the
business, within Risks quantitative analytics division.
The global Risk function has also led work on stress scenario development, testing and
analysis, details of our approach to which are set out in the GRC Report and which is now
integrated into our operations planning and capital management. In addition to stress scenario
analysis, the Risk function pro-actively identifies emerging risks of all kinds, for example in
work on sustainability and climate change.
The external environment for a global financial institution such as HSBC is constantly
changing. The main challenges and uncertainties faced by the Group are set out on page 88 of the
Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Scope and nature of risk measurement and reporting systems
The purpose of our risk measurement and reporting systems is to ensure that risks are
comprehensively captured with all the attributes necessary to support well-founded decisions,
that those attributes are accurately assessed and that information is delivered in a timely way
to the right points in the organisation for those risks to be successfully managed and
mitigated.
Risk measurement and reporting systems are also subject to a robust governance framework,
to ensure that their design is fit for purpose and that they are functioning properly. Group
risk IT systems development is a key responsibility of the GCRO, while the operation and
development of risk rating and management systems and processes are ultimately subject to the
oversight of the Board.
We invest significant resources in IT systems and processes in order to maintain and
improve our risk management capabilities. Group policy promotes the deployment of preferred
technology where practicable. Group standards govern the procurement and operation of systems
used in our subsidiaries, processing risk information within business lines and risk functions.
The measurement and monitoring of the major risks we encounter, including credit, market and
operational risks, are increasingly delivered by central systems or, where this is not the case
for sound business reasons, through structures and processes that support comprehensive
oversight by senior management.
Risk measurement, monitoring and reporting structures deployed at Group Management Office
(GMO) level are replicated in global businesses and subsidiaries through a common operating
model for integrated risk management and control. This model sets out the respective
responsibilities of Group Risk, regional and country Risk functions in respect of such matters
as risk governance and oversight, approval authorities and lending guidelines, global and local
scorecards, management information and reporting, and relations with third parties including
regulators, rating agencies and auditors.
Credit risk
Credit risk is the risk of financial loss if a customer or counterparty fails to meet a
payment obligation under a contract. It arises principally from direct lending, trade finance
and leasing business, but also from off-balance sheet products such as counterparty risk
guarantees and credit derivatives, and from our holdings of debt securities. Of the risks in
which we engage, credit risk generates the largest regulatory capital requirement. This includes
a capital requirement for counterparty credit risk in the banking and trading books. Further
details regarding our management of counterparty credit risk can be found on page 32.
Objectives
The objectives of credit risk management, underpinning sustainably profitable business, are
principally:
|
|
to maintain across HSBC a strong culture of responsible lending, and a robust risk
policy and control framework; |
|
|
|
to both partner and challenge our businesses in defining and implementing risk appetite,
continually re-evaluating under actual and stress scenario conditions; and |
|
|
|
to ensure independent, expert scrutiny and approval of credit risks, their costs and
their mitigation. |
Organisation and responsibilities
Group Risk supports the GCRO in overseeing credit risks at the highest level. For this, its
major duties comprise: undertaking independent reviews of larger and higher-risk credit
proposals, large exposure policy and reporting oversight of our wholesale and retail credit risk
management disciplines, ownership of our credit policy and credit systems programmes, and
reporting on risk matters to senior executive management and to regulators. It works closely
with
13
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
other parts of the Risk function, for example: with Fraud/Security Risk on enhancement of
protection against retail product fraud, with Market Risk on complex transactions, with
Operational Risk on the internal control framework and with Risk Strategy on developing our
economic capital model, risk appetite process and stress testing. The credit responsibilities of
Group Risk are set out in detail on page 93 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Group-wide, the credit risk function comprises a network of credit risk management offices
reporting within regional, integrated risk functions. They fulfil an essential role as
independent risk control units distinct from business line management in providing an objective
scrutiny of risk rating assessments, credit proposals for approval and other risk matters.
We operate through a hierarchy of personal credit limit approval authorities, not committee
structures. Risk officers of individual operating companies, acting under authorities delegated
by their boards and executive bodies within local and Group standards, are accountable for their
recommendations and credit approval decisions. Each operating company is responsible for the
quality and performance of its credit portfolios, and for monitoring and controlling all credit
risks in those portfolios, to Group standards.
Above certain risk-based thresholds established in line with authorities delegated by the
Board, GMO concurrence must be sought for locally-approved facilities before they are extended
to the customer. Moreover, risk proposals in certain portfolios sovereign obligors, banks,
some non-bank financial institutions and intra-Group exposures are approved centrally in GMO
to facilitate efficient control and the reporting of regulatory large and cross-border
exposures. Most approval authorities for these exposures are delegated by the local Chief
Executive Officer to the GCRO, with only limited levels of authority being maintained locally.
Risk analytics
The Group Risk Analytics function is located within Group Risk as part of a wider analytics
discipline supporting rating and scoring models, economic capital and stress testing. Group Risk
Analytics formulates technical responses to industry developments and regulatory policy in the
field of credit risk analytics. It develops HSBCs global credit risk models and guides and
oversees local model development and use around the Group in progress toward our implementation
targets for the IRB advanced approach.
The risk analytics models are governed by the Group Credit Risk Analytics Oversight
Committee (CRAOC) which meets monthly and reports to Risk Management Meeting (RMM). Group
CRAOC is chaired by the GCRO, and its membership is drawn from Risk, global businesses and
customer groups and major Group subsidiaries. Its primary responsibilities are to oversee the
governance of our risk rating models for both wholesale and retail business, to manage the
development of global models and to oversee the development of local models.
Parallel model governance and decision-making arrangements are in place in the Groups
major subsidiaries.
Measurement and monitoring credit risk rating systems
Our exposure to credit risk arises from a very wide range of customer and product types, and the
risk rating systems in place to measure and monitor these risks are correspondingly diverse.
Each major subsidiary typically has some exposures across this range, and requirements differ
from place to place.
Credit risk exposures are generally measured and managed in portfolios of either customer
types or product categories. Risk rating systems for the former are designed to assess the
default risk of, and loss severity associated with distinct customers who are typically managed
as individual relationships. These rating systems tend to have a higher subjective content. Risk
ratings systems for the latter are generally more purely analytical, applying techniques such as
behavioural analysis across product portfolios comprising large numbers of homogeneous
transactions.
Whatever the nature of the exposure, a fundamental principle of our policy and approach is
that analytical risk rating systems and scorecards are all valuable tools at the disposal of
management, serving ultimately judgemental decisions for which individual approvers are
accountable. In the case of automated decision-making processes, as used in retail credit
origination where risk decisions may be taken at the point of sale with no management
intervention, that accountability rests with those responsible for the parameters built into
those processes/systems and the controls surrounding their use. For customers, the credit
process provides for at least an annual review of facility limits granted. Review may be more
frequent, as required by circumstances, such as the development of adverse risk factors, and any
consequent amendments to risk ratings must be promptly implemented.
14
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
We constantly seek to improve the quality of our risk management. Thus, for central
management and reporting purposes, Group information technology systems have been deployed to
process credit risk data efficiently and consistently; a database has been constructed within
GMO Finance and Risk covering substantially all our direct lending exposures and holding the
output of risk rating systems Group-wide, to support regulatory reporting and to deliver
comprehensive management information at an increasingly granular level.
Group standards govern the process through which risk rating systems are initially
developed, judged fit for purpose, approved and implemented; the conditions under which
analytical risk model
outcomes can be overridden by decision-takers; and the process of model performance monitoring
and reporting. The emphasis here is on an effective dialogue between business line and risk
management, suitable independence of decision-takers, and a good understanding and robust
challenge on the part of senior management.
Like other facets of risk management, analytical risk rating systems are not static and are
subject to review and modification in the light of the changing environment, the greater
availability and quality of data and any deficiencies identified through internal and external
regulatory review. Structured processes and metrics are in place to capture relevant data and
feed this into continuous model improvement.
The following pages set out credit risk exposure values, RWAs and regulatory capital
requirements as at 31 December 2010 together with 31 December 2009 comparatives.
15
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Table 5: Credit risk summary
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Capital |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Capital |
|
|
|
value |
|
|
value |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
required |
1 |
|
value |
|
|
value |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
required |
1 |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total credit risk capital requirements |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit risk |
|
|
1,998.7 |
|
|
|
1,923.4 |
|
|
|
890.6 |
|
|
|
71.3 |
|
|
|
1,887.2 |
|
|
|
1,846.7 |
|
|
|
903.5 |
|
|
|
72.3 |
|
Counterparty credit risk2 |
|
|
127.8 |
|
|
|
138.0 |
|
|
|
50.2 |
|
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
130.2 |
|
|
|
147.3 |
|
|
|
51.9 |
|
|
|
4.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
2,126.5 |
|
|
|
2,061.4 |
|
|
|
940.8 |
|
|
|
75.3 |
|
|
|
2,017.4 |
|
|
|
1,994.0 |
|
|
|
955.4 |
|
|
|
76.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit risk analysis by
exposure class |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposures under the IRB advanced
approach |
|
|
1,458.0 |
|
|
|
1,416.3 |
|
|
|
557.2 |
|
|
|
44.7 |
|
|
|
1,405.0 |
|
|
|
1,215.8 |
|
|
|
598.1 |
|
|
|
47.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Retail: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
secured on real estate property |
|
|
291.7 |
|
|
|
280.6 |
|
|
|
154.2 |
|
|
|
12.4 |
|
|
|
277.6 |
|
|
|
269.2 |
|
|
|
136.6 |
|
|
|
11.0 |
|
qualifying revolving
retail |
|
|
138.6 |
|
|
|
142.7 |
|
|
|
57.6 |
|
|
|
4.6 |
|
|
|
148.8 |
|
|
|
147.2 |
|
|
|
77.4 |
|
|
|
6.2 |
|
SMEs3 |
|
|
13.2 |
|
|
|
12.7 |
|
|
|
7.4 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
12.3 |
|
|
|
13.3 |
|
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
other retail4 |
|
|
69.0 |
|
|
|
68.5 |
|
|
|
27.9 |
|
|
|
2.2 |
|
|
|
71.8 |
|
|
|
79.7 |
|
|
|
40.2 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total retail |
|
|
512.5 |
|
|
|
504.5 |
|
|
|
247.1 |
|
|
|
19.8 |
|
|
|
510.5 |
|
|
|
509.4 |
|
|
|
261.0 |
|
|
|
20.9 |
|
Central governments and
central banks |
|
|
291.5 |
|
|
|
265.7 |
|
|
|
31.8 |
|
|
|
2.5 |
|
|
|
237.6 |
|
|
|
195.6 |
|
|
|
33.4 |
|
|
|
2.7 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
178.0 |
|
|
|
179.5 |
|
|
|
31.3 |
|
|
|
2.5 |
|
|
|
180.3 |
|
|
|
187.2 |
|
|
|
40.0 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
413.7 |
|
|
|
397.7 |
|
|
|
228.3 |
|
|
|
18.4 |
|
|
|
399.5 |
|
|
|
239.2 |
|
|
|
244.7 |
|
|
|
19.6 |
|
Securitisation positions5 |
|
|
62.3 |
|
|
|
68.9 |
|
|
|
18.7 |
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
77.1 |
|
|
|
84.4 |
|
|
|
19.0 |
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposures under the IRB foundation
approach |
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
7.6 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
163.4 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
7.6 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
163.4 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposures under the
standardised approach |
|
|
532.9 |
|
|
|
499.5 |
|
|
|
329.3 |
|
|
|
26.3 |
|
|
|
474.3 |
|
|
|
467.5 |
|
|
|
301.1 |
|
|
|
24.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
82.4 |
|
|
|
76.3 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
64.6 |
|
|
|
57.5 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
40.8 |
|
|
|
38.5 |
|
|
|
11.3 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
41.8 |
|
|
|
48.3 |
|
|
|
9.9 |
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
210.3 |
|
|
|
192.2 |
|
|
|
197.5 |
|
|
|
15.9 |
|
|
|
180.5 |
|
|
|
175.0 |
|
|
|
165.1 |
|
|
|
13.2 |
|
Retail |
|
|
54.9 |
|
|
|
52.3 |
|
|
|
41.7 |
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
53.7 |
|
|
|
58.2 |
|
|
|
40.4 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
Secured on real estate
property |
|
|
39.3 |
|
|
|
35.8 |
|
|
|
20.6 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
32.3 |
|
|
|
27.9 |
|
|
|
17.1 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
Past due items |
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
4.4 |
|
|
|
5.6 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
4.6 |
|
|
|
3.9 |
|
|
|
6.5 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
Regional governments or
local authorities |
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
Equity |
|
|
5.5 |
|
|
|
7.3 |
|
|
|
6.1 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
8.8 |
|
|
|
8.1 |
|
|
|
15.3 |
|
|
|
1.2 |
|
Other items6 |
|
|
94.1 |
|
|
|
91.3 |
|
|
|
44.2 |
|
|
|
3.5 |
|
|
|
86.7 |
|
|
|
87.7 |
|
|
|
44.7 |
|
|
|
3.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
1,998.7 |
|
|
|
1,923.4 |
|
|
|
890.6 |
|
|
|
71.3 |
|
|
|
1,887.2 |
|
|
|
1,846.7 |
|
|
|
903.5 |
|
|
|
72.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Calculated as 8% of RWAs. |
|
2 |
|
For further details of counterparty credit risk, see page 32. |
|
3 |
|
The FSA allows exposures to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to be treated
under the Retail IRB approach, where the total amount owed to the Group by the counterparty
is less than EUR 1m and the customer is not managed individually as a corporate
counterparty. |
|
4 |
|
Includes overdrafts and personal lending. |
|
5 |
|
Excludes securitisation positions deducted from regulatory capital (that would
otherwise be risk-weighted at 1,250%). Securitisation positions deducted from capital are
shown in Table 2 and Table 27. |
|
6 |
|
Primarily includes such items as fixed assets, prepayments, accruals and Hong Kong
Government certificates of indebtedness. Also includes immaterial exposures to Regulatory
high-risk categories, Short-term claims, Securitisation positions, Collective investment
undertakings, Administrative bodies and non-commercial undertakings and Multilateral
development banks under the standardised approach. |
16
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Exposure values are allocated to a region based on the country of incorporation of
the HSBC subsidiary or associate where the exposure was originated.
Table 6: Credit risk exposure analysis by geographical region
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure value |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rest of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hong |
|
|
Asia- |
|
|
Middle |
|
|
North |
|
|
Latin |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average |
|
|
|
Europe |
|
|
Kong |
|
|
Pacific |
|
|
East |
|
|
America |
|
|
America |
|
|
exposure |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
RW |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
% |
|
At 31 December 2010
IRB advanced approach |
|
|
516.6 |
|
|
|
309.6 |
|
|
|
191.1 |
|
|
|
22.4 |
|
|
|
377.8 |
|
|
|
40.5 |
|
|
|
1,458.0 |
|
|
|
557.2 |
|
|
|
38 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
57.8 |
|
|
|
65.6 |
|
|
|
52.2 |
|
|
|
16.2 |
|
|
|
63.5 |
|
|
|
36.2 |
|
|
|
291.5 |
|
|
|
31.8 |
|
|
|
11 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
44.7 |
|
|
|
75.1 |
|
|
|
30.1 |
|
|
|
6.1 |
|
|
|
17.7 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
178.0 |
|
|
|
31.3 |
|
|
|
18 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
142.6 |
|
|
|
97.4 |
|
|
|
75.8 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
97.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
413.7 |
|
|
|
228.3 |
|
|
|
55 |
|
Retail |
|
|
216.6 |
|
|
|
70.3 |
|
|
|
32.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
193.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
512.5 |
|
|
|
247.1 |
|
|
|
48 |
|
Securitisation positions1 |
|
|
54.9 |
|
|
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
62.3 |
|
|
|
18.7 |
|
|
|
30 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach |
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
53 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
53 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standardised approach |
|
|
156.7 |
|
|
|
41.7 |
|
|
|
192.1 |
|
|
|
45.0 |
|
|
|
24.6 |
|
|
|
72.8 |
|
|
|
532.9 |
|
|
|
329.3 |
|
|
|
62 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
47.7 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
31.2 |
|
|
|
2.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
82.4 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
9.6 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
29.2 |
|
|
|
1.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
40.8 |
|
|
|
11.3 |
|
|
|
28 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
48.6 |
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
91.2 |
|
|
|
30.3 |
|
|
|
2.2 |
|
|
|
34.7 |
|
|
|
210.3 |
|
|
|
197.5 |
|
|
|
94 |
|
Retail |
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
14.0 |
|
|
|
4.4 |
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
22.3 |
|
|
|
54.9 |
|
|
|
41.7 |
|
|
|
76 |
|
Secured on real estate property |
|
|
11.0 |
|
|
|
4.5 |
|
|
|
15.0 |
|
|
|
2.2 |
|
|
|
2.1 |
|
|
|
4.5 |
|
|
|
39.3 |
|
|
|
20.6 |
|
|
|
52 |
|
Past due items |
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
5.6 |
|
|
|
140 |
|
Regional governments or local
authorities |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
88 |
|
Equity |
|
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
|
|
6.1 |
|
|
|
111 |
|
Other items2 |
|
|
30.9 |
|
|
|
27.6 |
|
|
|
10.3 |
|
|
|
2.6 |
|
|
|
14.9 |
|
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
94.1 |
|
|
|
44.2 |
|
|
|
47 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
681.1 |
|
|
|
351.3 |
|
|
|
383.2 |
|
|
|
67.4 |
|
|
|
402.4 |
|
|
|
113.3 |
|
|
|
1,998.7 |
|
|
|
890.6 |
|
|
|
45 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB advanced approach |
|
|
512.2 |
|
|
|
292.5 |
|
|
|
154.9 |
|
|
|
20.5 |
|
|
|
396.8 |
|
|
|
28.1 |
|
|
|
1,405.0 |
|
|
|
598.1 |
|
|
|
43 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
25.5 |
|
|
|
80.5 |
|
|
|
42.1 |
|
|
|
13.7 |
|
|
|
53.4 |
|
|
|
22.4 |
|
|
|
237.6 |
|
|
|
33.4 |
|
|
|
14 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
47.4 |
|
|
|
80.0 |
|
|
|
27.4 |
|
|
|
6.6 |
|
|
|
13.2 |
|
|
|
5.7 |
|
|
|
180.3 |
|
|
|
40.0 |
|
|
|
22 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
157.3 |
|
|
|
73.2 |
|
|
|
62.5 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
106.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
399.5 |
|
|
|
244.7 |
|
|
|
61 |
|
Retail |
|
|
216.3 |
|
|
|
57.3 |
|
|
|
22.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
214.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
510.5 |
|
|
|
261.0 |
|
|
|
51 |
|
Securitisation positions1 |
|
|
65.7 |
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
9.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
77.1 |
|
|
|
19.0 |
|
|
|
25 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach |
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
54 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
54 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standardised approach |
|
|
154.9 |
|
|
|
40.9 |
|
|
|
146.3 |
|
|
|
48.5 |
|
|
|
25.8 |
|
|
|
57.9 |
|
|
|
474.3 |
|
|
|
301.1 |
|
|
|
63 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
33.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
27.8 |
|
|
|
3.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
64.6 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
17.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
20.6 |
|
|
|
3.6 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
41.8 |
|
|
|
9.9 |
|
|
|
24 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
50.5 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
73.0 |
|
|
|
30.1 |
|
|
|
2.5 |
|
|
|
23.8 |
|
|
|
180.5 |
|
|
|
165.1 |
|
|
|
91 |
|
Retail |
|
|
9.0 |
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
|
|
10.1 |
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
19.3 |
|
|
|
53.7 |
|
|
|
40.4 |
|
|
|
75 |
|
Secured on real estate property |
|
|
10.5 |
|
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
10.3 |
|
|
|
2.2 |
|
|
|
1.9 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
32.3 |
|
|
|
17.1 |
|
|
|
53 |
|
Past due items |
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.1 |
|
|
|
4.6 |
|
|
|
6.5 |
|
|
|
141 |
|
Regional governments or local
authorities |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
92 |
|
Equity |
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
8.8 |
|
|
|
15.3 |
|
|
|
174 |
|
Other items2 |
|
|
29.9 |
|
|
|
30.4 |
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
2.3 |
|
|
|
13.7 |
|
|
|
7.1 |
|
|
|
86.7 |
|
|
|
44.7 |
|
|
|
52 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
675.0 |
|
|
|
333.4 |
|
|
|
301.2 |
|
|
|
69.0 |
|
|
|
422.6 |
|
|
|
86.0 |
|
|
|
1,887.2 |
|
|
|
903.5 |
|
|
|
48 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Excludes Securitisation positions deducted from regulatory capital (that would
otherwise be risk-weighted at 1,250%). Securitisation positions deducted from capital are
shown in Table 2 and Table 27. |
|
2 |
|
Primarily includes such items as fixed assets, prepayments, accruals and Hong Kong
Government certificates of indebtedness. Also includes immaterial exposures to Regulatory
high-risk categories, Short-term claims, Securitisation positions, Collective investment
undertakings, Administrative bodies and non-commercial undertakings, and Multilateral
development banks under the standardised approach. |
17
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Table 7: Risk weightings analysis by geographical region
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rest of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hong |
|
|
Asia- |
|
|
Middle |
|
|
North |
|
|
Latin |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Europe |
|
|
Kong |
|
|
Pacific |
|
|
East |
|
|
America |
|
|
America |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB advanced approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total exposure value |
|
|
516.6 |
|
|
|
309.6 |
|
|
|
191.1 |
|
|
|
22.4 |
|
|
|
377.8 |
|
|
|
40.5 |
|
|
|
1,458.0 |
|
Total RWAs |
|
|
140.3 |
|
|
|
72.1 |
|
|
|
68.7 |
|
|
|
6.9 |
|
|
|
256.1 |
|
|
|
13.1 |
|
|
|
557.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average RW (%) |
|
|
27 |
|
|
|
23 |
|
|
|
36 |
|
|
|
31 |
|
|
|
68 |
|
|
|
32 |
|
|
|
38 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total exposure value |
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.8 |
|
Total RWAs |
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average RW (%) |
|
|
53 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
53 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standardised approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total exposure value |
|
|
156.7 |
|
|
|
41.7 |
|
|
|
192.1 |
|
|
|
45.0 |
|
|
|
24.6 |
|
|
|
72.8 |
|
|
|
532.9 |
|
Total RWAs |
|
|
72.9 |
|
|
|
14.2 |
|
|
|
122.2 |
|
|
|
38.8 |
|
|
|
18.4 |
|
|
|
62.8 |
|
|
|
329.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average RW (%) |
|
|
47 |
|
|
|
34 |
|
|
|
64 |
|
|
|
86 |
|
|
|
75 |
|
|
|
86 |
|
|
|
62 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total credit risk |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total exposure value |
|
|
681.1 |
|
|
|
351.3 |
|
|
|
383.2 |
|
|
|
67.4 |
|
|
|
402.4 |
|
|
|
113.3 |
|
|
|
1,998.7 |
|
Total RWAs |
|
|
217.3 |
|
|
|
86.3 |
|
|
|
190.9 |
|
|
|
45.7 |
|
|
|
274.5 |
|
|
|
75.9 |
|
|
|
890.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average RW (%) |
|
|
32 |
|
|
|
25 |
|
|
|
50 |
|
|
|
68 |
|
|
|
68 |
|
|
|
67 |
|
|
|
45 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB advanced approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total exposure value |
|
|
512.2 |
|
|
|
292.5 |
|
|
|
154.9 |
|
|
|
20.5 |
|
|
|
396.8 |
|
|
|
28.1 |
|
|
|
1,405.0 |
|
Total RWAs |
|
|
152.3 |
|
|
|
79.9 |
|
|
|
58.9 |
|
|
|
7.4 |
|
|
|
285.3 |
|
|
|
14.3 |
|
|
|
598.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average RW (%) |
|
|
30 |
|
|
|
27 |
|
|
|
38 |
|
|
|
36 |
|
|
|
72 |
|
|
|
51 |
|
|
|
43 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total exposure value |
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
Total RWAs |
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average RW (%) |
|
|
54 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
54 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standardised approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total exposure value |
|
|
154.9 |
|
|
|
40.9 |
|
|
|
146.3 |
|
|
|
48.5 |
|
|
|
25.8 |
|
|
|
57.9 |
|
|
|
474.3 |
|
Total RWAs |
|
|
80.9 |
|
|
|
19.1 |
|
|
|
91.3 |
|
|
|
39.3 |
|
|
|
21.0 |
|
|
|
49.5 |
|
|
|
301.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average RW (%) |
|
|
52 |
|
|
|
47 |
|
|
|
62 |
|
|
|
81 |
|
|
|
81 |
|
|
|
85 |
|
|
|
63 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total credit risk |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total exposure value |
|
|
675.0 |
|
|
|
333.4 |
|
|
|
301.2 |
|
|
|
69.0 |
|
|
|
422.6 |
|
|
|
86.0 |
|
|
|
1,887.2 |
|
Total RWAs |
|
|
237.5 |
|
|
|
99.0 |
|
|
|
150.2 |
|
|
|
46.7 |
|
|
|
306.3 |
|
|
|
63.8 |
|
|
|
903.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average RW (%) |
|
|
35 |
|
|
|
30 |
|
|
|
50 |
|
|
|
68 |
|
|
|
72 |
|
|
|
74 |
|
|
|
48 |
|
18
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Table 8: Credit risk exposure analysis by counterparty sector
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure value |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporate |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
and |
|
|
Govern- |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Personal |
|
|
Commercial |
|
|
ment |
|
|
Financial |
1 |
|
Banks |
|
|
exposure |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB advanced approach |
|
|
499.3 |
|
|
|
419.3 |
|
|
|
291.5 |
|
|
|
74.3 |
|
|
|
173.6 |
|
|
|
1,458.0 |
|
|
|
557.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
291.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
291.5 |
|
|
|
31.8 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.4 |
|
|
|
173.6 |
|
|
|
178.0 |
|
|
|
31.3 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
406.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
413.7 |
|
|
|
228.3 |
|
Retail |
|
|
499.3 |
|
|
|
13.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
512.5 |
|
|
|
247.1 |
|
Securitisation positions2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
62.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
62.3 |
|
|
|
18.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standardised approach |
|
|
85.7 |
|
|
|
221.6 |
|
|
|
84.0 |
|
|
|
4.9 |
|
|
|
42.6 |
|
|
|
438.8 |
|
|
|
285.1 |
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
82.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
82.4 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
40.7 |
|
|
|
40.8 |
|
|
|
11.3 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
207.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
210.3 |
|
|
|
197.5 |
|
Retail |
|
|
48.9 |
|
|
|
6.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
54.9 |
|
|
|
41.7 |
|
Secured on real estate property |
|
|
34.2 |
|
|
|
5.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
39.3 |
|
|
|
20.6 |
|
Past due items |
|
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
5.6 |
|
Regional governments or local authorities |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
Equity |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
1.9 |
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
|
|
6.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
585.0 |
|
|
|
647.8 |
|
|
|
375.5 |
|
|
|
80.1 |
|
|
|
216.2 |
|
|
|
1,904.6 |
|
|
|
846.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other items3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
94.1 |
|
|
|
44.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total exposures |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1,998.7 |
|
|
|
890.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB advanced approach |
|
|
498.2 |
|
|
|
401.7 |
|
|
|
237.6 |
|
|
|
90.1 |
|
|
|
177.4 |
|
|
|
1,405.0 |
|
|
|
598.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
237.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
237.6 |
|
|
|
33.4 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.9 |
|
|
|
177.4 |
|
|
|
180.3 |
|
|
|
40.0 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
389.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
10.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
399.5 |
|
|
|
244.7 |
|
Retail |
|
|
498.2 |
|
|
|
12.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
510.5 |
|
|
|
261.0 |
|
Securitisation positions2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
77.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
77.1 |
|
|
|
19.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standardised approach |
|
|
79.6 |
|
|
|
193.2 |
|
|
|
65.9 |
|
|
|
5.2 |
|
|
|
43.7 |
|
|
|
387.6 |
|
|
|
256.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
64.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
64.6 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
41.7 |
|
|
|
41.8 |
|
|
|
9.9 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
178.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
180.5 |
|
|
|
165.1 |
|
Retail |
|
|
49.0 |
|
|
|
4.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
53.7 |
|
|
|
40.4 |
|
Secured on real estate property |
|
|
27.9 |
|
|
|
4.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
32.3 |
|
|
|
17.1 |
|
Past due items |
|
|
2.7 |
|
|
|
1.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.6 |
|
|
|
6.5 |
|
Regional governments or local authorities |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
1.2 |
|
Equity |
|
|
|
|
|
|
3.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
8.8 |
|
|
|
15.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
577.8 |
|
|
|
602.2 |
|
|
|
303.5 |
|
|
|
95.9 |
|
|
|
221.1 |
|
|
|
1,800.5 |
|
|
|
858.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other items3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
86.7 |
|
|
|
44.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total exposures |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1,887.2 |
|
|
|
903.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Includes non-bank financial institutions and corporates. |
|
2 |
|
Excludes Securitisation positions deducted from regulatory capital (that would
otherwise be risk-weighted at 1,250%). Securitisation positions deducted from capital are
shown in Table 2 and Table 27. |
|
3 |
|
Primarily includes such items as fixed assets, prepayments, accruals and Hong Kong
Government certificates of indebtedness for which a counterparty sector split is not
appropriate. Also includes immaterial exposures to Regulatory high-risk categories,
Short-term claims, Securitisation positions, Collective investment undertakings,
Administrative bodies and non-commercial undertakings and Multilateral development banks
under the standardised approach. |
19
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
The following is an analysis of exposures by period outstanding from the reporting
date to the maturity date. The full exposure value is allocated to a residual maturity band
based on the contractual end date.
Table 9: Credit risk exposure analysis by residual maturity
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure value |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Between |
|
|
More |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Less than |
|
|
1 and |
|
|
than 5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 year1 |
|
|
5 years |
|
|
years |
|
|
Undated |
|
|
exposure |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB advanced approach |
|
|
667.0 |
|
|
|
407.5 |
|
|
|
380.8 |
|
|
|
2.7 |
|
|
|
1,458.0 |
|
|
|
557.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
177.4 |
|
|
|
71.2 |
|
|
|
42.4 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
291.5 |
|
|
|
31.8 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
128.9 |
|
|
|
44.3 |
|
|
|
3.6 |
|
|
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
178.0 |
|
|
|
31.3 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
186.1 |
|
|
|
179.1 |
|
|
|
47.5 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
413.7 |
|
|
|
228.3 |
|
Retail |
|
|
133.7 |
|
|
|
109.6 |
|
|
|
269.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
512.5 |
|
|
|
247.1 |
|
Securitisation positions2 |
|
|
40.9 |
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
18.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
62.3 |
|
|
|
18.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach |
|
|
3.6 |
|
|
|
3.7 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
3.6 |
|
|
|
3.7 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standardised approach |
|
|
117.1 |
|
|
|
247.7 |
|
|
|
69.5 |
|
|
|
98.6 |
|
|
|
532.9 |
|
|
|
329.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
14.1 |
|
|
|
51.0 |
|
|
|
17.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
82.4 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
8.1 |
|
|
|
32.5 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
40.8 |
|
|
|
11.3 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
63.0 |
|
|
|
130.2 |
|
|
|
15.2 |
|
|
|
1.9 |
|
|
|
210.3 |
|
|
|
197.5 |
|
Retail |
|
|
23.6 |
|
|
|
26.3 |
|
|
|
5.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
54.9 |
|
|
|
41.7 |
|
Secured on real estate property |
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
30.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
39.3 |
|
|
|
20.6 |
|
Past due items |
|
|
3.0 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
5.6 |
|
Regional governments or local authorities |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
Equity |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
|
|
6.1 |
|
Other items3 |
|
|
2.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
91.2 |
|
|
|
94.1 |
|
|
|
44.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
787.7 |
|
|
|
658.9 |
|
|
|
450.8 |
|
|
|
101.3 |
|
|
|
1,998.7 |
|
|
|
890.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB advanced approach |
|
|
622.0 |
|
|
|
414.2 |
|
|
|
365.7 |
|
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
1,405.0 |
|
|
|
598.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
154.4 |
|
|
|
61.8 |
|
|
|
21.2 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
237.6 |
|
|
|
33.4 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
105.9 |
|
|
|
70.6 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
1.8 |
|
|
|
180.3 |
|
|
|
40.0 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
167.7 |
|
|
|
168.4 |
|
|
|
62.3 |
|
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
399.5 |
|
|
|
244.7 |
|
Retail |
|
|
140.4 |
|
|
|
110.9 |
|
|
|
259.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
510.5 |
|
|
|
261.0 |
|
Securitisation positions2 |
|
|
53.6 |
|
|
|
2.5 |
|
|
|
21.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
77.1 |
|
|
|
19.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach |
|
|
4.2 |
|
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
4.2 |
|
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standardised approach |
|
|
116.8 |
|
|
|
213.8 |
|
|
|
49.1 |
|
|
|
94.6 |
|
|
|
474.3 |
|
|
|
301.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
20.7 |
|
|
|
39.7 |
|
|
|
4.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
64.6 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
16.9 |
|
|
|
24.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
41.8 |
|
|
|
9.9 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
51.2 |
|
|
|
114.7 |
|
|
|
14.1 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
180.5 |
|
|
|
165.1 |
|
Retail |
|
|
21.6 |
|
|
|
27.3 |
|
|
|
4.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
53.7 |
|
|
|
40.4 |
|
Secured on real estate property |
|
|
1.7 |
|
|
|
5.8 |
|
|
|
24.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
32.3 |
|
|
|
17.1 |
|
Past due items |
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.6 |
|
|
|
6.5 |
|
Regional governments or local authorities |
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
1.2 |
|
Equity |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
8.8 |
|
|
|
8.8 |
|
|
|
15.3 |
|
Other items3 |
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
85.3 |
|
|
|
86.7 |
|
|
|
44.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
743.0 |
|
|
|
631.1 |
|
|
|
415.4 |
|
|
|
97.7 |
|
|
|
1,887.2 |
|
|
|
903.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Revolving exposures such as overdrafts are considered to have a residual maturity of
less than one year. |
|
2 |
|
Excludes Securitisation positions deducted from regulatory capital (that would
otherwise be risk-weighted at 1,250%). Securitisation positions deducted from capital are
shown in Table 2 and Table 27. |
|
3 |
|
Primarily includes such items as fixed assets, prepayments, accruals and Hong Kong
Government certificates of indebtedness. Also includes immaterial exposures to Regulatory
high-risk categories, Short-term claims, Securitisation positions, Collective investment
undertakings, Administrative bodies and non-commercial undertakings and Multilateral
development banks under the standardised approach. |
20
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Application of the IRB approach for credit risk
This section sets out our overall risk rating systems, a description of the population of credit
risk analytical models and our approaches to model governance and the use of IRB metrics.
Risk rating systems
Our Group-wide credit risk rating framework incorporates the PD of an obligor and loss severity
expressed in terms of EAD and LGD. These measures are used to calculate regulatory expected loss
(EL) and capital requirements. They are also used in conjunction with other inputs to inform
rating assessments for the purpose of credit approval and many other risk management decisions.
The narrative explanations that follow relate to the advanced IRB approaches; that is
Advanced IRB for distinct customers and Retail IRB for the portfolio-managed retail business. At
December 2010, portfolios in much of Europe, Hong Kong, Rest of Asia-Pacific and North America
were on advanced IRB approaches. Others remain on the standardised or foundation approaches
under Basel II, pending the definition of local regulations or model development and approval,
or under exemptions from IRB treatment. Further details of our use of the standardised approach
can be found on page 30.
Wholesale business
PD for wholesale customer segments (Central Governments and Central Banks (sovereigns),
Institutions, Corporates) and for certain individually assessed personal customers is estimated
using a Customer Risk Rating (CRR) scale of 23 grades (2009: 22 grades), of which 21 (2009:
20) are non-default grades representing varying degrees of strength of financial condition and
two are default grades. A score generated by a model for the individual obligor type is mapped
to the corresponding CRR. The process through which this or a judgementally amended CRR is then
recommended to, and reviewed by, a credit approver takes into account all information relevant
to the risk rating determination, including external ratings and market data where available.
The finally approved CRR is mapped to a PD value range of which the mid-point is used in the
regulatory capital calculation.
EAD and LGD estimation for the wholesale business is subject to a Group framework of basic
principles which permits flexibility in the definition of parameters by our operating entities
to suit conditions in their own jurisdictions. Group Risk
provides co-ordination, benchmarks and
the sharing and promotion of best practice. EAD is estimated to a 12-month horizon and broadly
represents the current exposure plus an estimate for future increases in exposure, taking into
account such factors as available but undrawn facilities and the crystallisation of contingent
exposures, post-default. LGD focuses on the facility and collateral structure, involving such
factors as facility priority/seniority, the type and value of collateral, type of client and
regional variances in experience, and is expressed as a percentage of EAD.
Retail business
The wide range of application and behavioural models used in the management of retail portfolios
has been supplemented with models used to derive the measures of PD, EAD and LGD required for
Basel II. For management information and reporting purposes, retail portfolios are segmented
according to local, analytically-derived EL bands, which map to ten composite EL grades,
facilitating comparability across the Groups retail customer segments, business lines and
product types.
Global and local models
Global PD models have been developed for asset classes or clearly identifiable sub-classes where
the customer relationship is managed on a global basis: sovereigns, banks, certain non-bank
financial institutions and the largest corporate clients, typically operating internationally.
Such global management facilitates consistent implementation by Group Risk and our operating
subsidiaries worldwide of standards, policies, systems, approval procedures and other controls,
reporting, pricing, performance guidelines and comparative analysis. All global models require
FSA approval for IRB accreditation and fall directly under the remit of the Group CRAOC.
Local PD models are developed where the risk profile of obligors is specific to a country,
sector or other non-global factor. This applies to large corporate clients having distinct
characteristics in a particular geography, middle market corporates, corporate and retail small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and all other retail segments. There are several hundred
such models in use or under development within HSBC.
Our approach to EAD and LGD, the framework which is described under Risk rating systems
above, similarly encompasses both global and local models. The former include EAD and LGD models
for each of sovereigns and banks, as exposures to
21
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
these two customer types are managed centrally by Group Risk. All local EAD and LGD models
fall within the scope and principles of the Group EAD and LGD framework, subject to dispensation
from Group Risk.
Model governance
Model governance is under the general oversight of Group CRAOC, whose responsibilities are set
out in Risk Analytics on page 14. Group CRAOC has regional and entity-level counterparts with
comparable terms of reference, because the development, validation and monitoring of local
models to meet local requirements and using local data are the responsibility of regional and/or
local entities under the governance of their own management, subject to overall Group policy and
oversight. Such models are typically approved by national or regional regulators and need to be
passed to Group CRAOC only if they apply to exposures exceeding a prescribed monetary threshold
or are otherwise deemed material.
Group Risk utilises Group standards for the development, validation, independent review,
approval, implementation and performance monitoring of credit risk rating models, and oversight
over respective local standards for local models. All models must be reviewed at least annually,
or more frequently as the need arises. The threshold for referral of material local models to
Group CRAOC and RMM is a portfolio coverage of US$20bn or more by risk-weighted assets. Group
CRAOC may additionally deem a model material, due to the higher-risk nature of the customer
sector in question.
Compliance with Group standards is subject to examination both by risk oversight and review
from within the Risk function itself, and by internal audit. While the standards set out minimum
general requirements, Group Risk has discretion to approve dispensations, and fosters best
practice between offices.
Use of internal estimates
Internal risk parameters derived from applying the IRB approach are not only employed in the
calculation of RWAs for the purpose of determining regulatory capital requirements, but also in
many other contexts within risk management and business processes and include:
|
|
credit approval: IRB models, scorecards and other methodologies are valuable tools
deployed in the assessment of customer and portfolio risk in lending decisions; |
|
|
|
risk appetite: IRB measures are an important element of risk appetite definition at
customer, sector and portfolio levels, and in the implementation of the Group risk appetite
framework, for instance in subsidiaries operating plans; |
|
|
|
portfolio management: regular reports to the Board, RMM and Group Audit Committee
contain analyses of risk exposures, e.g. by customer segment and quality grade, employing
IRB metrics; |
|
|
|
pricing: customer relationship managers apply an IRB Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital
(RAROC) methodology in RWA and profitability calculators; and |
|
|
|
economic capital: IRB measures provide customer risk components for the economic capital
model that has been implemented across HSBC to improve the consistent analysis of economic
returns, help determine which customers, business units and products add greatest value,
and drive higher returns through effective economic capital allocation. |
|
The following tables provide an analysis of the IRB risk measures used to calculate RWAs
under the IRB approach and set out the distribution of IRB exposures by credit quality. |
Table
10: IRB advanced exposure analysis of risk components
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
weighted |
|
|
weighted |
|
|
weighted |
|
|
Undrawn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
average |
|
|
average |
|
|
average |
|
|
commit- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
value |
|
|
PD |
|
|
LGD |
|
|
risk weight |
|
|
ments |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
291.5 |
|
|
|
0.11 |
|
|
|
20.9 |
|
|
|
11 |
|
|
|
3.9 |
|
|
|
31.8 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
178.0 |
|
|
|
0.36 |
|
|
|
29.5 |
|
|
|
18 |
|
|
|
10.9 |
|
|
|
31.3 |
|
Corporates1 |
|
|
409.4 |
|
|
|
2.82 |
|
|
|
38.4 |
|
|
|
55 |
|
|
|
227.3 |
|
|
|
226.0 |
|
22
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
weighted |
|
|
weighted |
|
|
weighted |
|
|
Undrawn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
average |
|
|
average |
|
|
average |
|
|
commit- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
value |
|
|
PD |
|
|
LGD |
|
|
risk weight |
|
|
ments |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
237.6 |
|
|
|
0.16 |
|
|
|
19.9 |
|
|
|
14 |
|
|
|
4.7 |
|
|
|
33.4 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
180.3 |
|
|
|
0.49 |
|
|
|
32.5 |
|
|
|
22 |
|
|
|
9.0 |
|
|
|
40.0 |
|
Corporates1 |
|
|
395.3 |
|
|
|
3.32 |
|
|
|
38.9 |
|
|
|
61 |
|
|
|
203.0 |
|
|
|
242.2 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Excludes Specialised Lending exposures subject to the supervisory slotting approach. |
Table
11: IRB advanced exposure analysis by obligor grade1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
Weighted |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
Weighted |
|
|
Weighted |
|
|
average risk |
|
|
|
|
|
|
value |
|
|
average PD |
|
|
average LGD |
|
|
weight |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
US$bn |
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Minimal default risk |
|
|
210.9 |
|
|
|
0.01 |
|
|
|
13.8 |
|
|
|
3 |
|
|
|
5.8 |
|
Low default risk |
|
|
62.2 |
|
|
|
0.08 |
|
|
|
37.6 |
|
|
|
17 |
|
|
|
10.6 |
|
Satisfactory default risk |
|
|
9.3 |
|
|
|
0.42 |
|
|
|
44.7 |
|
|
|
59 |
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
Fair default risk |
|
|
7.0 |
|
|
|
1.24 |
|
|
|
44.7 |
|
|
|
91 |
|
|
|
6.4 |
|
Moderate default risk |
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
2.88 |
|
|
|
47.8 |
|
|
|
131 |
|
|
|
1.7 |
|
Significant default risk |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
5.75 |
|
|
|
44.7 |
|
|
|
150 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
High default risk |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
9.52 |
|
|
|
87.4 |
|
|
|
350 |
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
Special management |
|
|
|
|
|
|
19.00 |
|
|
|
88.0 |
|
|
|
456 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
291.5 |
|
|
|
0.11 |
|
|
|
20.9 |
|
|
|
11 |
|
|
|
31.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Institutions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Minimal default risk |
|
|
44.6 |
|
|
|
0.03 |
|
|
|
26.8 |
|
|
|
6 |
|
|
|
2.7 |
|
Low default risk |
|
|
104.8 |
|
|
|
0.10 |
|
|
|
29.1 |
|
|
|
13 |
|
|
|
13.8 |
|
Satisfactory default risk |
|
|
20.3 |
|
|
|
0.31 |
|
|
|
31.3 |
|
|
|
30 |
|
|
|
6.1 |
|
Fair default risk |
|
|
5.5 |
|
|
|
1.29 |
|
|
|
41.9 |
|
|
|
82 |
|
|
|
4.5 |
|
Moderate default risk |
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
2.82 |
|
|
|
44.6 |
|
|
|
115 |
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
Significant default risk |
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
6.20 |
|
|
|
44.3 |
|
|
|
143 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
High default risk |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
12.27 |
|
|
|
60.8 |
|
|
|
267 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
Special management |
|
|
|
|
|
|
18.17 |
|
|
|
30.2 |
|
|
|
170 |
|
|
|
|
|
Default |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
100.00 |
|
|
|
62.7 |
|
|
|
50 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
178.0 |
|
|
|
0.36 |
|
|
|
29.5 |
|
|
|
18 |
|
|
|
31.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Minimal default risk |
|
|
34.5 |
|
|
|
0.04 |
|
|
|
39.7 |
|
|
|
13 |
|
|
|
4.4 |
|
Low default risk |
|
|
94.0 |
|
|
|
0.10 |
|
|
|
40.2 |
|
|
|
23 |
|
|
|
21.4 |
|
Satisfactory default risk |
|
|
137.8 |
|
|
|
0.39 |
|
|
|
39.0 |
|
|
|
49 |
|
|
|
67.2 |
|
Fair default risk |
|
|
76.4 |
|
|
|
1.28 |
|
|
|
36.5 |
|
|
|
78 |
|
|
|
59.5 |
|
Moderate default risk |
|
|
39.6 |
|
|
|
2.98 |
|
|
|
35.3 |
|
|
|
99 |
|
|
|
39.3 |
|
Significant default risk |
|
|
9.1 |
|
|
|
6.57 |
|
|
|
35.4 |
|
|
|
129 |
|
|
|
11.7 |
|
High default risk |
|
|
8.0 |
|
|
|
10.58 |
|
|
|
36.8 |
|
|
|
171 |
|
|
|
13.7 |
|
Special management |
|
|
3.8 |
|
|
|
32.05 |
|
|
|
35.9 |
|
|
|
184 |
|
|
|
7.0 |
|
Default3 |
|
|
6.2 |
|
|
|
100.00 |
|
|
|
44.9 |
|
|
|
29 |
|
|
|
1.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
409.4 |
|
|
|
2.82 |
|
|
|
38.4 |
|
|
|
55 |
|
|
|
226.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
23
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
Weighted |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
Weighted |
|
|
Weighted |
|
|
average risk |
|
|
|
|
|
|
value |
|
|
average PD |
|
|
average LGD |
|
|
weight |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
US$bn |
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Minimal default risk |
|
|
164.8 |
|
|
|
0.02 |
|
|
|
13.2 |
|
|
|
3 |
|
|
|
5.1 |
|
Low default risk |
|
|
46.1 |
|
|
|
0.07 |
|
|
|
31.4 |
|
|
|
18 |
|
|
|
8.2 |
|
Satisfactory default risk |
|
|
14.6 |
|
|
|
0.24 |
|
|
|
36.9 |
|
|
|
40 |
|
|
|
5.9 |
|
Fair default risk |
|
|
5.3 |
|
|
|
1.03 |
|
|
|
45.4 |
|
|
|
83 |
|
|
|
4.4 |
|
Moderate default risk |
|
|
5.8 |
|
|
|
2.18 |
|
|
|
44.1 |
|
|
|
122 |
|
|
|
7.1 |
|
Significant default risk |
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
6.42 |
|
|
|
45.1 |
|
|
|
186 |
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
High default risk |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
9.69 |
|
|
|
85.7 |
|
|
|
400 |
|
|
|
1.2 |
|
Special management |
|
|
|
|
|
|
22.85 |
|
|
|
79.5 |
|
|
|
419 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
237.6 |
|
|
|
0.16 |
|
|
|
19.9 |
|
|
|
14 |
|
|
|
33.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Institutions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Minimal default risk |
|
|
38.2 |
|
|
|
0.03 |
|
|
|
27.1 |
|
|
|
6 |
|
|
|
2.3 |
|
Low default risk |
|
|
89.2 |
|
|
|
0.09 |
|
|
|
32.2 |
|
|
|
13 |
|
|
|
12.0 |
|
Satisfactory default risk |
|
|
40.6 |
|
|
|
0.27 |
|
|
|
34.3 |
|
|
|
31 |
|
|
|
12.5 |
|
Fair default risk |
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
0.99 |
|
|
|
42.5 |
|
|
|
76 |
|
|
|
6.0 |
|
Moderate default risk |
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
2.93 |
|
|
|
49.9 |
|
|
|
131 |
|
|
|
2.1 |
|
Significant default risk |
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
6.11 |
|
|
|
52.8 |
|
|
|
163 |
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
High default risk |
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
12.22 |
|
|
|
59.7 |
|
|
|
220 |
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
Special management |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
20.60 |
|
|
|
47.3 |
|
|
|
250 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
Default |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
100.00 |
|
|
|
50.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
180.3 |
|
|
|
0.49 |
|
|
|
32.5 |
|
|
|
22 |
|
|
|
40.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Minimal default risk |
|
|
32.3 |
|
|
|
0.03 |
|
|
|
40.3 |
|
|
|
15 |
|
|
|
4.7 |
|
Low default risk |
|
|
74.8 |
|
|
|
0.10 |
|
|
|
40.6 |
|
|
|
25 |
|
|
|
18.4 |
|
Satisfactory default risk |
|
|
124.5 |
|
|
|
0.40 |
|
|
|
38.0 |
|
|
|
48 |
|
|
|
60.1 |
|
Fair default risk |
|
|
92.3 |
|
|
|
1.26 |
|
|
|
38.8 |
|
|
|
79 |
|
|
|
73.1 |
|
Moderate default risk |
|
|
38.7 |
|
|
|
3.00 |
|
|
|
37.0 |
|
|
|
107 |
|
|
|
41.6 |
|
Significant default risk |
|
|
12.0 |
|
|
|
6.41 |
|
|
|
35.3 |
|
|
|
133 |
|
|
|
15.9 |
|
High default risk |
|
|
8.7 |
|
|
|
10.89 |
|
|
|
39.7 |
|
|
|
190 |
|
|
|
16.5 |
|
Special management |
|
|
5.2 |
|
|
|
32.00 |
|
|
|
38.7 |
|
|
|
190 |
|
|
|
9.9 |
|
Default3 |
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
100.00 |
|
|
|
51.2 |
|
|
|
29 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
395.3 |
|
|
|
3.32 |
|
|
|
38.9 |
|
|
|
61 |
|
|
|
242.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
See glossary for definition of obligor grade. |
|
2 |
|
Excludes Specialised Lending exposures subject to the supervisory slotting approach. |
|
3 |
|
There is a requirement to hold additional capital for unexpected losses on defaulted
exposures where LGD exceeds best estimate of EL. As a result, in some cases, RWAs arise for
exposures in default. |
Table 12: IRB foundation exposure1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Weighted |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
average risk |
|
|
|
|
|
|
value |
|
|
weight |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
% |
|
|
US$bn |
|
Corporates2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
53 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
54 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Exposures have not been disclosed by obligor grade as the amounts are not significant
at Group level. |
|
2 |
|
Excludes Specialised Lending exposures subject to the supervisory slotting approach. |
The EL bandings for the retail business summarise a more granular EL scale for
these customer segments which combine obligor and facility/product risk factors in a composite
measure of PD and LGD. The definitions of PD and LGD for retail portfolios are both subject to
degrees of national regulators discretion and the international variability of the measures
preclude their direct use
as global comparators. The composite EL measure enables the diverse
risk profiles of retail portfolios across the Group to be assessed on a more comparable scale
than through the direct utilisation of PD and LGD measures. The Middle East and Latin America
are not included in this table as retail exposures in these regions are calculated under the
standardised approach.
24
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Table
13: Retail IRB exposure analysis by geographical region
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure value |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rest of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hong |
|
|
Asia- |
|
|
North |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
Europe |
|
|
Kong |
|
|
Pacific |
|
|
America |
|
|
exposure |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Secured on real estate property |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected loss band |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than 1% |
|
|
116.3 |
|
|
|
40.4 |
|
|
|
29.1 |
|
|
|
51.3 |
|
|
|
237.1 |
|
greater than or equal to 1% and less than 5% |
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
21.5 |
|
|
|
24.4 |
|
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% |
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
8.2 |
|
|
|
8.7 |
|
greater than or equal to 10% and less than 20% |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5.7 |
|
|
|
5.9 |
|
greater than or equal to 20% and less than 40% |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.8 |
|
|
|
4.9 |
|
greater than or equal to 40% and exposures in default |
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
9.2 |
|
|
|
10.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
120.2 |
|
|
|
40.8 |
|
|
|
30.0 |
|
|
|
100.7 |
|
|
|
291.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Qualifying revolving retail exposures |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected loss band |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than 1% |
|
|
33.3 |
|
|
|
15.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
47.2 |
|
|
|
95.9 |
|
greater than or equal to 1% and less than 5% |
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
16.4 |
|
|
|
26.4 |
|
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% |
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.6 |
|
|
|
8.6 |
|
greater than or equal to 10% and less than 20% |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.9 |
|
|
|
3.7 |
|
greater than or equal to 20% and less than 40% |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
1.2 |
|
greater than or equal to 40% and exposures in default |
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
43.1 |
|
|
|
19.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
76.0 |
|
|
|
138.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMEs1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected loss band |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than 1% |
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
5.4 |
|
greater than or equal to 1% and less than 5% |
|
|
5.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
5.8 |
|
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% |
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
greater than or equal to 10% and less than 20% |
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
greater than or equal to 20% and less than 40% |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
greater than or equal to 40% and exposures in default |
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
11.7 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
13.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other retail2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected loss band |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than 1% |
|
|
34.2 |
|
|
|
8.9 |
|
|
|
2.5 |
|
|
|
5.9 |
|
|
|
51.5 |
|
greater than or equal to 1% and less than 5% |
|
|
4.7 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.7 |
|
|
|
9.7 |
|
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% |
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.7 |
|
|
|
2.9 |
|
greater than or equal to 10% and less than 20% |
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
1.8 |
|
greater than or equal to 20% and less than 40% |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
greater than or equal to 40% and exposures in default |
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
2.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
41.6 |
|
|
|
9.4 |
|
|
|
2.5 |
|
|
|
15.5 |
|
|
|
69.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total retail |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected loss band |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than 1% |
|
|
187.9 |
|
|
|
65.3 |
|
|
|
31.6 |
|
|
|
105.1 |
|
|
|
389.9 |
|
greater than or equal to 1% and less than 5% |
|
|
19.1 |
|
|
|
3.8 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
42.8 |
|
|
|
66.3 |
|
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% |
|
|
3.5 |
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
16.5 |
|
|
|
20.7 |
|
greater than or equal to 10% and less than 20% |
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
10.0 |
|
|
|
11.8 |
|
greater than or equal to 20% and less than 40% |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.4 |
|
|
|
7.1 |
|
greater than or equal to 40% and exposures in default |
|
|
3.9 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
12.3 |
|
|
|
16.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
216.6 |
|
|
|
70.3 |
|
|
|
32.5 |
|
|
|
193.1 |
|
|
|
512.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
25
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure value |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rest of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hong |
|
|
Asia- |
|
|
North |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
Europe |
|
|
Kong |
|
|
Pacific |
|
|
America |
|
|
exposure |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Secured on real estate property |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected loss band |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than 1% |
|
|
110.9 |
|
|
|
34.1 |
|
|
|
19.3 |
|
|
|
63.2 |
|
|
|
227.5 |
|
greater than or equal to 1% and less than 5% |
|
|
2.6 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
14.4 |
|
|
|
17.9 |
|
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% |
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
9.9 |
|
|
|
10.4 |
|
greater than or equal to 10% and less than 20% |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5.7 |
|
|
|
5.9 |
|
greater than or equal to 20% and less than 40% |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
greater than or equal to 40% and exposures in default |
|
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
11.1 |
|
|
|
12.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
115.5 |
|
|
|
34.5 |
|
|
|
20.2 |
|
|
|
107.4 |
|
|
|
277.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Qualifying revolving retail exposures |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected loss band |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than 1% |
|
|
35.8 |
|
|
|
11.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
46.6 |
|
|
|
94.3 |
|
greater than or equal to 1% and less than 5% |
|
|
7.7 |
|
|
|
2.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
21.1 |
|
|
|
31.4 |
|
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% |
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
8.9 |
|
|
|
11.0 |
|
greater than or equal to 10% and less than 20% |
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.8 |
|
|
|
5.7 |
|
greater than or equal to 20% and less than 40% |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
1.8 |
|
greater than or equal to 40% and exposures in default |
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3.7 |
|
|
|
4.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
46.9 |
|
|
|
15.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
86.6 |
|
|
|
148.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMEs1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected loss band |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than 1% |
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
5.0 |
|
greater than or equal to 1% and less than 5% |
|
|
5.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% |
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
greater than or equal to 10% and less than 20% |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
greater than or equal to 20% and less than 40% |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
greater than or equal to 40% and exposures in default |
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
11.2 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
12.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other retail2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected loss band |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than 1% |
|
|
33.2 |
|
|
|
6.1 |
|
|
|
2.3 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
45.9 |
|
greater than or equal to 1% and less than 5% |
|
|
6.0 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
6.0 |
|
|
|
13.0 |
|
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% |
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
greater than or equal to 10% and less than 20% |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
3.5 |
|
greater than or equal to 20% and less than 40% |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
greater than or equal to 40% and exposures in default |
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.1 |
|
|
|
3.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
42.7 |
|
|
|
7.4 |
|
|
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
19.3 |
|
|
|
71.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total retail |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected loss band |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than 1% |
|
|
184.0 |
|
|
|
52.2 |
|
|
|
21.6 |
|
|
|
114.9 |
|
|
|
372.7 |
|
greater than or equal to 1% and less than 5% |
|
|
21.6 |
|
|
|
3.8 |
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
41.7 |
|
|
|
67.8 |
|
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% |
|
|
3.8 |
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
21.6 |
|
|
|
26.1 |
|
greater than or equal to 10% and less than 20% |
|
|
1.8 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
13.3 |
|
|
|
15.4 |
|
greater than or equal to 20% and less than 40% |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5.9 |
|
|
|
6.6 |
|
greater than or equal to 40% and exposures in default |
|
|
4.5 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
16.9 |
|
|
|
21.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
216.3 |
|
|
|
57.3 |
|
|
|
22.6 |
|
|
|
214.3 |
|
|
|
510.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
The FSA allows exposures to SMEs to be treated under the Retail IRB approach, where the
total amount owed to the Group by the counterparty is less than EUR 1m and the customer is
not managed as individually as a corporate counterparty. |
|
2 |
|
Includes overdrafts and personal lending. |
26
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Risk mitigation
Our approach, when granting credit facilities, is to do so on the basis of capacity to repay,
rather than to place primary reliance on credit risk mitigation. Depending on a customers
standing and the type of product, facilities may be provided unsecured. Mitigation of credit
risk is nevertheless a key aspect of effective risk management and, in a diversified financial
services organisation such as HSBC, takes many forms. There is no material concentration of
credit risk mitigation held.
Our general policy is to promote the use of credit risk mitigation, justified by commercial
prudence and good practice as well as capital efficiency. Specific, detailed policies cover the
acceptability, structuring and terms of various types of business with regard to the
availability of credit risk mitigation, for example in the form of collateral security, and
these policies, together with the determination of suitable valuation parameters, are subject to
regular review to ensure that they are supported by empirical evidence and continue to fulfil
their intended purpose.
The most common method of mitigating credit risk is to take collateral. In our residential
and commercial real estate businesses, a mortgage over the property is usually taken to help
secure claims. Physical collateral is also typically taken in vehicle financing in some
jurisdictions, and in various forms of specialised lending and leasing transactions where
physical assets form the principal source of facility repayment. In the commercial and
industrial sectors, charges are created over business assets such as premises, stock and
debtors. Loans to private banking clients may be made against the pledge of eligible marketable
securities or cash (known as Lombard lending) or real estate. Facilities to SMEs are commonly
granted against guarantees given by their owners and/or directors. Guarantees from third parties
can arise where the Group extends facilities without the benefit of any alternative form of
security, e.g. where it issues a bid or performance bond in favour of a non-customer at the
request of another bank.
In the institutional sector, trading facilities are supported by charges over financial
instruments such as cash, debt securities and equities. Financial collateral in the form of
marketable securities is used in much of the Groups over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
activities and in its securities financing business (securities lending and borrowing or repos
and reverse repos). Netting is extensively used and is a prominent feature of market standard
documentation.
Our Global Banking and Markets business utilises credit risk mitigation to actively manage
the credit risk of its portfolios, with the goal of reducing concentrations in individual names,
sectors or portfolios. The techniques in use include credit default swaps (CDSs), structured
credit notes and securitisation structures. Buying credit protection creates credit exposure
against the protection provider, which is monitored as part of the overall credit exposure
against the relevant name (see also Collateral arrangements on page 33).
Settlement risk arises in any situation where a payment in cash, securities or equities is
made in the expectation of a corresponding receipt of cash, securities or equities. Daily
settlement limits are established to cover the aggregate of our transactions with a counterparty
on any single day. Settlement risk on many transactions, particularly those involving securities
and equities, is substantially mitigated by settling through assured payment systems or on a
delivery-versus-payment basis.
Policies and procedures govern the protection of our position from the outset of a customer
relationship, for instance in requiring standard terms and conditions or specifically agreed
documentation permitting the offset of credit balances against debt obligations and through
controls over the integrity, current valuation and, if necessary, realisation of collateral
security.
The valuation of credit risk mitigants seeks to monitor and ensure that they will continue
to provide the secure repayment source anticipated at the time they were taken. Where collateral
is subject to high volatility, valuation is frequent; where stable, less so. Trading businesses
typically carry out daily valuations. In the residential mortgage business, on the other hand,
Group policy prescribes valuation at intervals of up to three years, or more frequently as the
need may arise, at the discretion of the business line, by a variety of methods ranging from the
use of market indices to individual professional inspection.
In terms of their application within an IRB approach (for the standardised approach, see
page 30), risk mitigants are considered in two broad categories: first, those which reduce the
intrinsic probability of default of an obligor and therefore operate as adjustments to PD
estimation; secondly, those which affect the estimated recoverability of obligations and require
adjustment of LGD or, in certain circumstances, EAD. The first include, typically, full parental
guarantees; the second, collateral security of various kinds such as cash or mortgages over
residential property.
27
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
The adjustment of PD estimation is also subject to supplementary methodologies in respect
of a sovereign ceiling constraining the risk ratings assigned to obligors in countries of
higher risk, and of partial parental support.
EAD and LGD values, in the case of individually assessed exposures, are determined by
reference to regionally approved internal risk parameters based on the nature of the exposure.
For retail portfolios, credit mitigation data is incorporated into the internal risk parameters
for risk exposures and feeds into the calculation of the EL band value summarising both customer
delinquency and product or facility risk. Credit and risk mitigation data form the inputs
submitted to a centralised database by all Group offices, upon which a risk engine then performs
calculations applying the relevant Basel II rules and approach.
The table below details the effective value of credit risk mitigation. Under the IRB
advanced approach, financial collateral is taken into account in
the LGD. Under the IRB
foundation approach, for the calculation of financial collateral, an adjustment (or haircut)
is applied to the collateral to take account of price volatility. This adjusted collateral value
is then subtracted from the exposure value to create an adjusted exposure value. The exposure
value covered by collateral is the difference between original exposure value and adjusted
exposure value. An adjustment is then applied to LGD to reflect the credit risk mitigation.
Similarly, for physical collateral, the LGD of an exposure will be adjusted depending on certain
factors, including the value and type of the asset taken as collateral. For unfunded protection,
which includes credit derivatives and guarantees, a substitution method is applied. The
exposure value covered by collateral is substituted by a similar exposure to the protection
provider. Under the IRB foundation approach, the PD of the obligor is substituted by the PD of
the protection provider. Under the IRB advanced approach the recognition is more complicated and
may involve a PD or LGD adjustment or both.
Table 14: IRB exposure credit risk mitigation analysis
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
value covered |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
value covered |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
by eligible |
|
|
value covered |
|
|
|
|
|
|
by eligible |
|
|
value covered |
|
|
|
|
|
|
financial |
|
|
by credit |
|
|
|
|
|
|
financial |
|
|
by credit |
|
|
|
|
|
|
and other |
|
|
derivatives |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
and other |
|
|
derivatives |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
collateral |
|
|
or guarantees |
|
|
value |
|
|
collateral |
|
|
or guarantees |
|
|
value |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
Exposures under the IRB
advanced
approach1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and
central banks |
|
|
n/a |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
291.5 |
|
|
|
n/a |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
237.6 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
n/a |
|
|
|
18.4 |
|
|
|
178.0 |
|
|
|
n/a |
|
|
|
25.1 |
|
|
|
180.3 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
n/a |
|
|
|
48.8 |
|
|
|
413.7 |
|
|
|
n/a |
|
|
|
43.3 |
|
|
|
399.5 |
|
Retail |
|
|
n/a |
|
|
|
23.9 |
|
|
|
512.5 |
|
|
|
n/a |
|
|
|
23.7 |
|
|
|
510.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposures under the IRB
foundation approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
7.8 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Under the IRB advanced approach eligible financial collateral is reflected in the
Groups LGD model. As such, separate disclosure of exposures covered by eligible financial
collateral is not applicable. |
Loss experience and model validation
We analyse credit loss experience in order to assess the performance of our risk measurement and
control processes, and to inform corrective measures. This analysis includes validation of the
outputs of predictive risk analytical models, compared with other reported measures of risk and
losses.
The disclosures below set out:
|
|
commentary on the relationship between regulatory EL and impairment
allowances recognised in our financial statements; |
|
|
EL and impairment charges by exposure class (within Retail IRB, also by
sub-class) and by region; and model performance: projected and actual IRB metrics for major
global models in our portfolio. |
EL and impairment allowances
EL is calculated on IRB portfolios other than Securitisations, and FSA rules require that, to
the extent that EL exceeds individual and collective impairment allowances, it is to be deducted
from capital. When comparing EL with accounting impairment allowances on the related assets,
differences need to be taken into account between
28
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
the definition of EL under Basel II principles and impairment allowances within financial
statements prepared under IFRSs. For example:
|
|
EL is generally based on through-the-cycle PD estimates over a one-year
future horizon, determined via statistical analysis of historical default experience, while
impairment allowances in the financial statements means losses that have incurred at the
reporting date. Further detail of policy on the impairment of loans and advances is
provided on page 255 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010; |
|
|
EL is based on downturn estimates of LGD while impairment allowances are
based on loss experience at the balance sheet date; and |
|
|
|
EL is based on exposure values that incorporate expected future drawings of
committed credit lines, while impairment allowances are, generally, based on on-balance
sheet assets. |
These and other technical differences influence the way in which the impact of business and
economic drivers is expressed in the accounting and regulatory measures. The following tables
set out EL and actual loss experience for IRB credit risk exposures.
Table 15: IRB credit risk expected loss and impairment charges analysis by exposure
class
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected |
|
|
|
|
|
|
loss1 as at |
|
|
Impairment |
|
|
loss1 as at |
|
|
Impairment |
|
|
|
1 January |
|
|
charge for |
|
|
1 January |
|
|
charge for |
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
IRB exposure classes |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
Institutions |
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
5.9 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
3.4 |
|
|
|
3.7 |
|
Retail |
|
|
19.8 |
|
|
|
9.3 |
|
|
|
20.9 |
|
|
|
16.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
secured on real estate property |
|
|
8.5 |
|
|
|
4.5 |
|
|
|
7.7 |
|
|
|
5.8 |
|
qualifying revolving retail |
|
|
6.7 |
|
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
6.6 |
|
|
|
5.8 |
|
other retail |
|
|
3.9 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
6.0 |
|
|
|
4.4 |
|
SMEs |
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
26.3 |
|
|
|
10.7 |
|
|
|
24.7 |
|
|
|
19.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
EL is not calculated for Securitisation positions so this IRB exposure class is not
included in the analysis above. |
Table 16: IRB credit risk expected loss and impairment charges analysis by geographical
region
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Expected |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
loss1 as at |
|
|
Impairment |
|
|
loss1 as at |
|
|
Impairment |
|
|
|
1 January |
|
|
charge for |
|
|
1 January |
|
|
charge for |
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Europe |
|
|
6.7 |
|
|
|
2.3 |
|
|
|
4.8 |
|
|
|
3.9 |
|
Hong Kong |
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
Rest of Asia-Pacific |
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
Middle East |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
North America |
|
|
17.6 |
|
|
|
8.2 |
|
|
|
18.6 |
|
|
|
15.2 |
|
Latin America |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
26.3 |
|
|
|
10.7 |
|
|
|
24.7 |
|
|
|
19.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
EL is not calculated for Securitisation positions so this IRB exposure class is not
included in the analysis above. |
Impairment charges reflect loss events which arose during the financial year
and changes in estimates of losses arising on events which occurred prior to the current year.
The majority of EL at 1 January 2010 and the impairment charge through the year ended 31
December 2010 relate to our Retail exposures in North America. The drivers of the impairment
allowances and charges for 2010 in North America, including delinquency experience and loss
severities, are discussed on pages 127 of the Annual Report and
|
|
Accounts 2010. The levels of
delinquency, charge-off and loan loss allowances are reducing across North America as we
continue to write down or write-off an increasing number of loans upon either modification or
foreclosure. Despite these reductions, EL remains elevated as the impact of the deterioration in
the US economy and housing market over recent years is progressively captured within the various
Basel II model parameters. |
29
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
|
|
Full details of the Groups impaired loans and advances, past due but not impaired assets
and impairment allowances and charges are set out on page 116 of the Annual Report and Accounts
2010. These figures are prepared on an accounting consolidation basis but are not significantly
different from those calculated on a regulatory consolidation basis. Our approach for
determining impairment allowances are explained on page 94 of the Annual Report and Accounts
2010. |
Model performance
The large number of models utilised within the Group result in data at individual model level
being in most cases immaterial in the context of the whole
Group. Disclosure of such data could
place proprietary information at risk, whilst aggregation of it would greatly reduce its
usefulness.
We have therefore chosen to disclose model performance data only for the major global
models in use at the present time.
The table below shows projected and actual values for key Basel II metrics in respect of
the models for Central governments and central banks, Institutions and Global large corporates
models. The projections represent opening values at 1 January 2010, and actuals represent the
defaults and losses experienced during the year as a percentage of total facility limits.
Table 17: IRB advanced models projected and actual values
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
PD |
|
LGD |
|
EAD1 |
|
|
Projected |
|
|
Actual |
|
|
Projected |
|
|
Actual |
|
|
Actual |
|
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
Central governments and central banks model |
|
|
0.11 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
17.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Institutions model |
|
|
0.36 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
28.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Global large corporates model2 |
|
|
0.75 |
|
|
|
0.09 |
|
|
|
32.6 |
|
|
|
11.7 |
|
|
|
65.0 |
|
|
|
|
2009 |
|
|
PD |
|
LGD |
|
EAD1 |
|
|
Projected |
|
|
Actual |
|
|
Projected |
|
|
Actual |
|
|
Actual |
|
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central banks model |
|
|
0.20 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
20.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Institutions model |
|
|
0.47 |
|
|
|
0.05 |
|
|
|
29.6 |
|
|
|
8.7 |
|
|
|
73.0 |
|
Global large corporates model2 |
|
|
0.46 |
|
|
|
0.06 |
|
|
|
33.8 |
|
|
|
44.1 |
|
|
|
100.0 |
|
1 EAD of defaulted counterparties as a percentage of their total facility limits.
Projected EAD figures for defaulted borrowers are not disclosed, this population having
been undefined at the start of the period.
2 The Global Large Corporates model covers the segment of the largest, and generally
lower-risk, corporates whose annual turnover exceeds US$700m. The PD analysis includes all
IRB advanced or foundation exposures. The LGD and EAD analyses include IRB advanced
exposures only because, under the IRB foundation approach, regulatory LGD parameters are
applied. Actual LGD percentage for the Global Large Corporates model reflects additional
conservatism applied to estimates of recoveries over time from specific defaults within the
large corporate portfolio.
Application of the standardised approach for credit risk
The standardised approach is applied where exposures do not qualify for use of an IRB approach
and/or where an exemption from IRB has been granted. The standardised approach requires banks to
use risk assessments prepared by External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIs) or Export
Credit Agencies to determine the risk weightings applied to rated counterparties.
ECAI risk assessments are used within the Group as part of the determination of risk
weightings for the following classes of exposure:
|
|
Central governments and central banks; |
|
|
|
Institutions; |
|
|
|
Corporates; |
|
|
|
Securitisation positions; |
|
|
|
Short-term claims on institutions and corporates; |
|
|
|
Regional governments and local authorities; and |
|
|
|
Multilateral development banks. |
We have nominated three FSA-recognised ECAIs for this purpose Moodys Investors Service
(Moodys), Standard & Poors Ratings Group (S&P) and Fitch Group (Fitch). We have not
nominated any Export Credit Agencies.
30
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit |
|
|
|
|
|
|
quality |
|
Moodys |
|
S&Ps |
|
Fitchs |
step |
|
assessments |
|
assessments |
|
assessments |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Aaa to Aa3 |
|
AAA to AA |
|
AAA to AA |
2 |
|
A1 to A3 |
|
A+ to A |
|
A+ to A |
3 |
|
Baa1 to Baa3 |
|
BBB+ to BBB |
|
BBB+ to BBB |
4 |
|
Ba1 to Ba3 |
|
BB+ to BB |
|
BB+ to BB |
5 |
|
B1 to B3 |
|
B+ to B |
|
B+ to B |
6 |
|
Caa1 |
|
CCC+ |
|
CCC+ |
|
|
and below |
|
and below |
|
and below |
Data files of external ratings from the nominated ECAIs are matched with customer
records in our centralised credit database.
When calculating the risk-weighted value of an exposure using ECAI risk assessments, risk
systems identify the customer in question and look up the available ratings in the central
database according to the FSAs rating selection rules. The systems then apply the FSAs
prescribed credit quality step mapping to derive from the rating the relevant risk weight.
All other exposure classes are assigned risk weightings as prescribed in the FSAs
rulebook.
Under guidance provided by the FSA, exposures guaranteed by central governments of EEA
States may be risk-weighted at 0% under the Standardised approach, provided exposures to these
EEA central governments would attract a 0% risk weight under the Standardised approach.
Banking associates exposures are calculated under the standardised approach and, at 31
December 2010, represented approximately 13% of total Group RWAs.
The table below sets out the distribution of standardised exposures across credit quality
steps. The analysis of credit quality step allocations for Regional governments or local
authorities, Short-term claims, Securitisation positions, Collective investment undertakings and
Multilateral development banks is excluded as their total exposures are less than 1% of the
total standardised approach exposures.
Table 18: Standardised approach exposure analysis by credit quality step
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
value |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
value |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
Central governments and central banks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 1 |
|
|
51.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
33.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 2 |
|
|
29.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
30.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step unrated |
|
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
82.4 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
64.6 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Institutions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 1 |
|
|
11.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
16.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 2 |
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step unrated |
|
|
28.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
25.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
40.8 |
|
|
|
11.3 |
|
|
|
41.8 |
|
|
|
9.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 1 |
|
|
4.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 2 |
|
|
4.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 3 |
|
|
28.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
27.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 4 |
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 5 |
|
|
1.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step 6 |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit quality step unrated |
|
|
163.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
132.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
210.3 |
|
|
|
197.5 |
|
|
|
180.5 |
|
|
|
165.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Risk mitigation
For exposures subject to the standardised approach covered by an eligible guarantee,
non-financial collateral, or credit derivatives the exposure is divided into covered and
uncovered portions. The covered portion, determined after applying an appropriate haircut for
currency and maturity
mismatch (and for omission of restructuring clauses for credit
derivatives, where appropriate) to the amount of protection provided, attracts the risk weight
of the protection provider, while the uncovered portion attracts the risk weight of the obligor.
For exposures fully or partially covered by eligible financial collateral, the value of the
exposure is adjusted under the Financial Collateral
31
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Comprehensive Method using supervisory volatility adjustments, including those arising
from currency mismatch, which are determined by the specific type of collateral (and, in the
case of eligible debt securities, their credit quality) and its liquidation period. The adjusted
exposure value is subject to
the risk weight of the obligor.
The table below sets out the effective value of credit risk mitigation for exposures under
the standardised approach, expressed as the exposure value covered by the credit risk mitigant.
Table 19: Standardised approach exposure credit risk mitigation analysis
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
value covered |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
value covered |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
by eligible |
|
|
value covered |
|
|
|
|
|
|
by eligible |
|
|
value covered |
|
|
|
|
|
|
financial |
|
|
by credit |
|
|
|
|
|
|
financial |
|
|
by credit |
|
|
|
|
|
|
and other |
|
|
derivatives |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
and other |
|
|
derivatives |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
collateral |
|
|
or guarantees |
|
|
value |
|
|
collateral |
|
|
or guarantees |
|
|
value |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposures under the
standardised approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and central
banks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
82.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
64.6 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
40.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
14.9 |
|
|
|
41.8 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
7.5 |
|
|
|
3.4 |
|
|
|
210.3 |
|
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
180.5 |
|
Retail |
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
54.9 |
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
53.7 |
|
Secured on real estate property |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
39.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
32.3 |
|
Past due items |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.6 |
|
Other items1 |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
94.1 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
86.7 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Primarily includes such items as fixed assets, prepayments, accruals and Hong Kong
Government certificates of indebtedness. Also includes immaterial exposures to Regulatory
high-risk categories, Short-term claims, Securitisation positions, Collective investment
undertakings, Administrative bodies and non-commercial undertakings, and Multilateral
development banks under the standardised approach. |
Counterparty credit risk
Counterparty credit risk arises for OTC derivatives and securities financing transactions. It is
calculated in both the trading and non-trading book, and is the risk that a counterparty to a
transaction may default before completing the satisfactory settlement of the transaction. An
economic loss occurs if the transaction or portfolio of transactions with the counterparty has a
positive economic value at the time of default.
As discussed on page 5, there are three approaches under Basel II to calculating exposure
values for counterparty credit risk: the standardised, the mark-to-market and the IMM. Exposure
values calculated under these methods are used to determine RWAs using one of the credit risk
approaches. Across the Group, we use both the mark-to-market method and the IMM for counterparty
credit risk. Under the IMM, the EAD is calculated by multiplying the effective expected positive
exposure with a multiplier called alpha. Alpha accounts for several portfolio features that
increase the expected loss in the event of default above that indicated by effective expected
positive exposure: co-variance of exposures, correlation between exposures and default,
concentration risk and model risk. It also accounts for the level of volatility/correlation that
might coincide with a downturn. The default alpha
value of 1.4 is used. Limits for counterparty
credit risk exposures are assigned within the overall credit process for distinct customer limit
approval. The measure used for counterparty credit risk management both limits and
utilisations is the 95th percentile of potential future exposure.
The models and methodologies used in the calculation of counterparty risk are approved by
the Counterparty Risk Methodology Committee, a sub-committee of CRAOC. In line with the IMM
governance standards, models are subject to independent review when they are first developed and
ongoing, an annual review.
Credit risk adjustment
We adopt a credit risk adjustment (also frequently known as a credit valuation adjustment)
against OTC derivative transactions to reflect, within fair value, the possibility that the
counterparty may default, and we may not receive the full market value of the transactions. We
calculate a separate credit risk adjustment for each HSBC legal entity, and within each entity
for each counterparty to which the entity has exposure. The adjustment aims to calculate the
potential loss arising from the portfolio of derivative transactions against each third party,
based upon a modelled expected positive exposure profile, including allowance for credit risk
32
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
mitigants such as netting agreements and Credit Support Annexes (CSAs).
Further details of our credit risk adjustment methodology are provided on page 51 of this
document.
Collateral arrangements
We revalue all traded transactions and associated collateral positions on a daily basis. An
independent Collateral Management function manages the collateral process, which includes
pledging and receiving collateral, and investigating disputes and non-receipts.
Eligible collateral types are controlled under a policy which ensures the collateral agreed
to be taken exhibits characteristics such as price transparency, price stability, liquidity,
enforceability, independence, reusability and eligibility for regulatory purposes. A valuation
haircut policy reflects the fact that collateral may fall in value between the date the
collateral was called and the date of liquidation or enforcement. At least 95% of collateral
held as credit risk mitigation under CSAs is either cash or government securities.
Credit ratings downgrade
It has increasingly become the practice for market participants to employ credit ratings
downgrade language clauses in industry standard master agreements such as the ISDA Master
Agreement as a form of risk control. These clauses are designed to trigger a series of events
which may include the termination of transactions by the non-affected party, or assignment by
the affected party, if its credit rating falls below a specified level.
We control the inclusion of credit ratings downgrade language in industry standard master
agreements by requiring each Group office to obtain the endorsement of a senior member of the
Treasury function and the relevant local Credit authority prior to obtaining approval from Group
Risk.
Our position with regard to credit ratings downgrade language is monitored through two
reports, as below, and maintains liquidity to cover the contingent risk as required by the
regulator:
|
|
a report is produced which identifies the trigger ratings and individual
details for documentation where credit ratings downgrade language exists within an ISDA
Master Agreement; and |
|
|
|
a further report is produced which identifies the additional collateral
requirements where credit ratings downgrade language affects the threshold levels within a
collateral agreement. |
At 31 December 2010, the additional collateral required to be posted for a one notch
downgrade was US$0.9bn (2009: US$1.0bn) and for a two notch downgrade was US$1.2bn (2009:
US$1.3bn).
Wrong-way risk
Wrong-way risk is an aggravated form of concentration risk and arises when there is a strong
correlation between the counterpartys probability of default and the mark-to-market value of
the underlying transaction. Wrong-way risk can be seen in the following examples:
|
|
where the counterparty is resident and/or incorporated in an emerging market
and seeks to sell a non-domestic currency in exchange for its home currency; |
|
|
|
where the trade involves the purchase of an equity put option from a
counterparty whose shares are the subject of the option; |
|
|
|
the purchase of credit protection from a counterparty who is closely
associated with the reference entity of the credit default swap or total return swap; and |
|
|
|
the purchase of credit protection on an asset type which is highly
concentrated in the exposure of the counterparty selling the credit protection. |
We use a range of procedures to control and monitor wrong-way risk, including requiring
entities to obtain prior approval before undertaking wrong-way risk transactions outside
pre-agreed guidelines. The regional Credit Risk Management functions undertake control and the
monitoring process. A regular meeting of the local Risk Management Committee (RMC) comprising
senior management from Global Markets, Credit, Market Risk Management and Finance is responsible
for reviewing and actively managing wrong-way risk, including allocating capital. A global
report is now produced and submitted to Global Banking & Markets RMC and to the RMM.
33
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Table 20: Counterparty credit risk net derivative credit exposure1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December |
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Counterparty credit risk2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Gross positive fair value of contracts |
|
|
260.7 |
|
|
|
250.9 |
|
Less: netting benefits |
|
|
(178.3 |
) |
|
|
(168.5 |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
Netted current credit exposure |
|
|
82.4 |
|
|
|
82.4 |
|
Less: collateral held |
|
|
(19.2 |
) |
|
|
(21.1 |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Net derivative credit exposure |
|
|
63.2 |
|
|
|
61.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
This table provides a further breakdown of totals reported in the Annual Report and
Accounts 2010 on an accounting consolidation basis. The same figures are not significantly
different when consolidated on a regulatory basis. |
|
2 |
|
Excludes add-on for potential future credit exposures. |
Table 21: Counterparty credit risk exposure analysis by exposure class
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
IMM |
|
Mark-to-market method1 |
|
counterparty credit risk |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
value |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
value |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
value |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB advanced approach |
|
|
14.6 |
|
|
|
7.7 |
|
|
|
105.2 |
|
|
|
38.9 |
|
|
|
119.8 |
|
|
|
46.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and
central banks |
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
4.4 |
|
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
7.2 |
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
2.5 |
|
|
|
1.8 |
|
|
|
62.1 |
|
|
|
14.2 |
|
|
|
64.6 |
|
|
|
16.0 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
9.3 |
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
|
|
38.7 |
|
|
|
23.6 |
|
|
|
48.0 |
|
|
|
29.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3.8 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
3.8 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3.8 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
3.8 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standardised approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.2 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
4.2 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and
central banks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
Institutions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.1 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
2.1 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
14.6 |
|
|
|
7.7 |
|
|
|
113.2 |
|
|
|
42.5 |
|
|
|
127.8 |
|
|
|
50.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB advanced approach |
|
|
20.2 |
|
|
|
8.1 |
|
|
|
101.7 |
|
|
|
39.1 |
|
|
|
121.9 |
|
|
|
47.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Central governments and
central banks |
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
4.8 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
8.0 |
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
Institutions |
|
|
7.6 |
|
|
|
2.2 |
|
|
|
57.8 |
|
|
|
13.7 |
|
|
|
65.4 |
|
|
|
15.9 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
9.4 |
|
|
|
5.7 |
|
|
|
39.1 |
|
|
|
24.9 |
|
|
|
48.5 |
|
|
|
30.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
4.3 |
|
|
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standardised approach |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
2.3 |
|
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
2.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Institutions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.7 |
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
1.7 |
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
Corporates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
Retail |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
Short-term claims |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
Multilateral development banks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
Administrative bodies and
non-commercial undertakings |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
20.2 |
|
|
|
8.1 |
|
|
|
110.0 |
|
|
|
43.8 |
|
|
|
130.2 |
|
|
|
51.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Includes add-on for potential future exposure. |
34
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Table 22: Counterparty credit risk exposure analysis by product
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
IMM |
|
Mark-to-market method1 |
|
counterparty credit risk |
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
value |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
value |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
value |
|
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OTC derivatives1 |
|
|
14.6 |
|
|
|
7.7 |
|
|
|
96.2 |
|
|
|
38.4 |
|
|
|
110.8 |
|
|
|
46.1 |
|
Securities financing transactions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
16.2 |
|
|
|
3.6 |
|
|
|
16.2 |
|
|
|
3.6 |
|
Other2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
14.6 |
|
|
|
7.7 |
|
|
|
113.2 |
|
|
|
42.5 |
|
|
|
127.8 |
|
|
|
50.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OTC derivatives1 |
|
|
20.2 |
|
|
|
8.1 |
|
|
|
94.3 |
|
|
|
40.9 |
|
|
|
114.5 |
|
|
|
49.0 |
|
Securities financing transactions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
14.7 |
|
|
|
2.6 |
|
|
|
14.7 |
|
|
|
2.6 |
|
Other2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
20.2 |
|
|
|
8.1 |
|
|
|
110.0 |
|
|
|
43.8 |
|
|
|
130.2 |
|
|
|
51.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
OTC derivatives under the mark-to-market method include add-on for potential future
credit exposures. |
|
2 |
|
Includes free deliveries not deducted from regulatory capital. |
Table 23: Credit derivative transactions1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
Protection |
|
|
Protection |
|
|
Protection |
|
|
Protection |
|
|
|
bought |
|
|
sold |
|
|
bought |
|
|
sold |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit derivative products used for own credit portfolio |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit default swaps |
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.9 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total notional value |
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.9 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit derivative products used for intermediation |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit default swaps |
|
|
511.3 |
|
|
|
513.2 |
|
|
|
590.3 |
|
|
|
601.2 |
|
Total return swaps |
|
|
15.2 |
|
|
|
20.8 |
|
|
|
15.6 |
|
|
|
19.6 |
|
Credit spread options |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
Other |
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total notional value |
|
|
528.6 |
|
|
|
535.0 |
|
|
|
607.8 |
|
|
|
622.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
This table provides a further breakdown of totals reported in the Annual Report and
Accounts 2010 on an accounting consolidation basis. The same figures are not significantly
different when consolidated on a regulatory basis. |
Securitisation
Group securitisation strategy
HSBC acts as originator, sponsor, liquidity provider and derivative counterparty to its own
originated and sponsored securitisations, as well as those of third party securitisations. Our
strategy is to use securitisations to meet our needs for aggregate funding, to the extent that
market, regulatory treatments and other conditions are suitable, and for customer facilitation.
We have senior exposures to the securities investment conduits (SICs), Mazarin Funding
Limited, Barion Funding Limited, Malachite Funding Limited and Solitaire Funding Limited, which
are not considered core businesses, and resulting exposures are being repaid as the securities
held by the SICs amortise.
Group securitisation roles
Our roles in the securitisation process are as follows:
|
|
Originator: where we originate the assets being securitised, either directly or
indirectly; |
|
|
|
Sponsor: where we establish and manage a securitisation programme that purchases
exposures from third parties; and |
|
|
|
Investor: where we invest in a securitisation transaction directly or provide
derivatives or liquidity facilities to a securitisation. |
HSBC as originator
We use SPEs to securitise customer loans and advances that we have originated, in order to
diversify our sources of funding for asset origination and for capital efficiency purposes. In
such cases, we transfer the loans and advances to the SPEs for cash,
35
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
and the SPEs issue debt securities to investors to fund the cash purchases. This activity is
conducted in a number of regions and across a number of asset classes. We also act as
a derivative counterparty. Credit enhancements to the underlying assets may be used to obtain
investment grade ratings on the senior debt issued by the SPEs. The majority of these
securitisations are consolidated for accounting purposes. We have also established multi-seller
conduit securitisation programmes for the purpose of providing access to flexible market-based
sources of finance for our clients to finance discrete pools of third-party originated trade and
vehicle finance loan receivables.
In addition, we use SPEs to mitigate the capital absorbed by some of our customer loans and
advances we have originated. Credit derivatives are used to transfer the credit risk associated
with such customer loans and advances to an SPE, using securitisations commonly known as
synthetic securitisations by which the SPE writes credit default swap protection to HSBC. These
SPEs are consolidated for accounting purposes when we are exposed to the majority of risks and
rewards of ownership.
HSBC as sponsor
We are sponsor to a number of types of securitisation entity, including:
|
|
three active multi-seller conduit vehicles which were established to provide finance to
clients Regency Assets Limited in Europe, Bryant Park Funding LLC in the US and
Performance Trust in Canada to which we provide senior liquidity facilities and
programme-wide credit enhancement; and |
|
|
|
four SICs set up to take advantage of spread differentials between the long-term
underlying assets and shorter term funding costs. Solitaire Funding Limited and Mazarin
Funding Limited are asset-backed commercial paper conduits to which we provide
transaction-specific liquidity facilities; Barion Funding Limited and Malachite Funding
Limited are vehicles to which we provide senior term funding. We also provide a first loss
letter of credit to Solitaire Funding Limited. |
Full details of these entities can be found on page 362 of the Annual Report and Accounts
2010.
HSBC as investor
We have exposure to third party securitisations across a wide range of sectors in the form of
investments, liquidity facilities and as a derivative counterparty.
Valuation of securitisation positions
The performance of a securitisation position is primarily driven by the performance of the
assets underlying that securitisation position. We use a combination of market standard systems
and third party data providers to monitor the performance data for securitisation exposures.
The valuation process of our investments in securitisation exposures primarily focuses on
quotations from third parties, observed trade levels and calibrated valuations from market
standard models. This process did not change in 2010. Further details can be found on page 308
of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Group securitisation activities in 2010
Our securitisation activities in 2010 mainly consisted of transactions entered into with
customers, as both sponsor and investor, in the normal course of business. The other
securitisation activity conducted in the period was the continued repurchase of a proportion of
outstandings in Metrix Funding Limited and Metrix Securities plc which are vehicles representing
pools of securitised loans.
There has been a continued migration to lower securitisation ratings during 2010. This is a
result of the performance of the underlying assets being outside the expectations established at
inception of the original securitisations, and changes to the ratings methodology of the
principal credit rating agencies which occurred in 2009. During 2010, we carried out a number of
re-securitisations so that the ratings inputs into the regulatory capital calculation are a more
granular reflection of the underlying risk profile. As a result, the regulatory capital required
to be held in respect of these assets is more closely aligned to the underlying risk profile of
the assets.
During 2010, there were realised losses of US$0.2bn (2009: nil) on securitisation asset
disposals.
When securitising a revolving pool of exposures, the originator transfers a pool of
exposures to an SPE. The SPE then issues notes to external investors backed by a portion of this
pool. The originators interest is the proportion of the pool which is not in use as collateral
backing for notes issued to investors. At 31 December 2010, there were no securitisation
exposures based on a revolving pool of exposures (2009: originators interest US$3.4bn and
investors interest US$0.3bn).
36
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Turquoise Card Backed Securities plc series 2007-1 was fully paid off during the year.
Securitisation accounting treatment
For accounting purposes, we consolidate SPEs when the substance of the relationship indicates
that we control them. In assessing control, all relevant factors are considered, including
qualitative and quantitative aspects. Full details of these assessments can be found on page 361
of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
We reassess the required consolidation whenever there is a change in the substance of the
relationship between HSBC and an SPE, for example, when the nature of our involvement or the
governing rules, contractual arrangements or capital structure of the SPE change.
The transfer of assets to an SPE may give rise to the full or partial derecognition of the
financial assets concerned. Only in the event that derecognition is achieved are sales and any
resultant gains on sales recognised in the financial statements. In a traditional
securitisation, assets are sold to an SPE and no gain or loss on sale is recognised at
inception.
Full derecognition occurs when we transfer our contractual right to receive cash flows from
the financial assets, or retain the right but assume an obligation to pass on the cash flows
from the assets, and transfer substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership. The risks
include credit, interest rate, currency, prepayment and other price risks.
Partial derecognition occurs when we sell or otherwise transfer financial assets in such a
way that some but not substantially all of the risks and rewards of ownership are transferred
but control is retained. These financial assets are recognised on the balance sheet to the
extent of our continuing involvement.
Loans, credit cards, debt securities and trade receivables that have been securitised under
arrangements by which we retain a continuing involvement in such transferred assets do not
generally qualify for derecognition. Continuing involvement may entail retaining the rights to
future cash flows arising from the assets after investors have received their contractual terms
(for example, interest rate strips); providing subordinated interest; liquidity support;
continuing to service the underlying asset; or entering into derivative transactions with the
securitisation vehicles. As such, we continue to be exposed to risks associated with these
transactions.
Where assets have been derecognised in whole or in part, the rights and obligations that we
retain from our continuing involvement in securitisations are initially recorded as an
allocation of the fair value of the financial asset between the part that is derecognised and
the part that continues to be recognised on the date of transfer.
Securitisation regulatory treatment
For regulatory purposes, SPEs are not consolidated where significant risk has been transferred
to third parties. Exposure to these SPEs are risk weighted as securitisation positions for
regulatory purposes, including any derivatives or liquidity facilities. Of the US$6.2bn (2009:
US$11.4bn) of unrealised losses on available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities disclosed in the
Annual Report and Accounts 2010, US$2.3bn (2009: US$10.5bn) relates to assets within SPEs that
are not consolidated for regulatory purposes. The remaining US$3.8bn (2009: US$0.9bn) is subject
to the FSAs prudential filter that removes unrealised gains and losses on AFS debt securities
from capital and also adjusts the exposure value of the positions by the same amount before the
relevant risk weighting is applied. The movement of US$3.5bn in the year resulted from the
regulatory consolidation of Solitaire Funding Limited.
Calculation of risk-weighted assets for securitisation exposures
Basel II specifies two methods for calculating credit risk requirements for securitisation
positions in the non-trading book, being the standardised and IRB approaches. Both approaches
rely on the mapping of rating agency credit ratings to risk weights, which range between 7% and
1,250%. Positions that would be weighted at 1,250% are deducted from capital. We have nominated
three FSA-recognised ECAIs for this purpose Moodys, S&P and Fitch.
Within the IRB approach, we use the Ratings Based Method (RBM), the Internal Assessment
Approach (IAA) and the Supervisory Formula Method (SFM).
We use the IRB approach for the majority of our non-trading book securitisation positions,
while those in the trading book are treated like other market risk positions.
Securitisation exposures analysed below are on a regulatory consolidated basis and include
those deducted from capital, rather than risk weighted. Movement in the year represents any
purchase or sale of securitisation assets, the repayment of capital on amortising or maturing
securitisation assets, the inclusion of trading book assets when their credit
37
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
ratings fall below investment grade and the revaluation of these assets. Movements in the
year also reflect the re-assessment of assets no longer treated under the securitisation
framework. When
assets within re-securitisations are re-securitised to achieve a more granular
rating, there is no change in the exposure value, and so no movement in the year is reported.
Table 24: Securitisation exposures movement in the year
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total at |
|
|
Movement in year |
|
Total at |
|
|
|
1 January |
|
|
As originator |
|
|
As sponsor |
|
|
As investor |
|
|
31 December |
|
2010 |
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
Aggregate amount of securitisation
exposures (retained or purchased) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Residential mortgages |
|
|
5.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(1.0 |
) |
|
|
4.4 |
|
Commercial mortgages |
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
(0.1 |
) |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
(0.3 |
) |
|
|
3.7 |
|
Credit cards |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
Leasing |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(0.1 |
) |
|
|
|
|
Loans to corporates or SMEs |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(0.2 |
) |
|
|
0.1 |
|
Consumer loans |
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(0.2 |
) |
|
|
0.8 |
|
Trade receivables |
|
|
14.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(2.6 |
) |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
12.8 |
|
Re-securitisations1 |
|
|
54.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(8.1 |
) |
|
|
(3.3 |
) |
|
|
43.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
80.4 |
|
|
|
(0.1 |
) |
|
|
(10.6 |
) |
|
|
(4.4 |
) |
|
|
65.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Aggregate amount of securitisation
exposures (retained or purchased) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Residential mortgages |
|
|
5.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(0.3 |
) |
|
|
5.4 |
|
Commercial mortgages |
|
|
3.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
4.0 |
|
Credit cards |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(0.1 |
) |
|
|
|
|
Leasing |
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(0.5 |
) |
|
|
(0.1 |
) |
|
|
0.1 |
|
Loans to corporates or SMEs |
|
|
8.9 |
|
|
|
(1.8 |
) |
|
|
(0.4 |
) |
|
|
(6.4 |
) |
|
|
0.3 |
|
Consumer loans |
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(0.5 |
) |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
Trade receivables |
|
|
17.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(2.5 |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
14.8 |
|
Re-securitisations1 |
|
|
54.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(4.9 |
) |
|
|
5.4 |
|
|
|
54.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
91.4 |
|
|
|
(1.8 |
) |
|
|
(8.7 |
) |
|
|
(0.5 |
) |
|
|
80.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Re-securitisations principally include exposures to Solitaire Funding Limited, Mazarin
Funding Limited, Barion Funding Limited and Malachite Funding Limited. |
Table 25: Securitisation exposures analysis by method
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
Standard- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Standard- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ised |
|
|
IRB |
|
|
Total |
|
|
ised |
|
|
IRB |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As originator1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Commercial mortgages |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As sponsor |
|
|
|
|
|
|
48.0 |
|
|
|
48.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
58.6 |
|
|
|
58.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Commercial mortgages |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
Trade receivables2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
11.8 |
|
|
|
11.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
14.8 |
|
|
|
14.8 |
|
Re-securitisations |
|
|
|
|
|
|
35.4 |
|
|
|
35.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
43.5 |
|
|
|
43.5 |
|
Other assets3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As investor |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
17.2 |
|
|
|
17.3 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
21.5 |
|
|
|
21.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Residential mortgages |
|
|
|
|
|
|
4.4 |
|
|
|
4.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5.4 |
|
|
|
5.4 |
|
Commercial mortgages |
|
|
|
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
3.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3.6 |
|
|
|
3.6 |
|
Credit cards |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Leasing |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
Loans to corporates or SMEs |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
Consumer loans |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
Trade receivables |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re-securitisations |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
7.9 |
|
|
|
8.0 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
11.2 |
|
|
|
11.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
65.2 |
|
|
|
65.3 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
80.2 |
|
|
|
80.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
For securitisations in which HSBC acts as both originator and sponsor, the exposure is
disclosed under originator only. |
|
2 |
|
Trade receivables As sponsor includes exposures of US$11.8bn (2009: US$8.1bn) which
are treated under IAA. |
|
3 |
|
Other assets As sponsor includes exposures to corporate bonds and Asset-backed
securities (ABSs) of US$0.4bn (2009: nil) which are treated under SFM. |
38
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Table 26: Securitisation exposures asset values and impairment charges
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Securitisation |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Securitisation |
|
|
|
Underlying assets1,2 |
|
|
exposures |
|
|
Underlying assets1,2 |
|
|
exposures |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Impaired |
|
|
impairment |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Impaired |
|
|
impairment |
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
and past due |
|
|
charge |
|
|
Total |
|
|
and past due |
|
|
charge |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As originator |
|
|
1.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Residential mortgages |
|
|
0.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Commercial mortgages |
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit cards |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As sponsor |
|
|
46.7 |
|
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
51.1 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Commercial mortgages |
|
|
2.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Trade receivables |
|
|
9.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
10.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Re-securitisations2 |
|
|
35.4 |
|
|
|
6.8 |
|
|
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
38.4 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As investor3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Residential mortgages |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
Re-securitisations |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Securitisation exposures may exceed the underlying asset values when HSBC provides
liquidity facilities while also acting as derivative counterparty and a note holder in the
SPE. |
|
2 |
|
For re-securitisations where HSBC has derived regulatory capital based on the
underlying pool of assets, the asset value used for the regulatory capital calculation is
used in the disclosure of total underlying assets. For other re-securitisations the
carrying value of the assets per the Annual Report and Accounts 2010 is disclosed. |
|
3 |
|
For securitisations where HSBC acts as investor, information on third party underlying
assets is not available. |
Table 27: Securitisation exposures analysis by risk weighting
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exposure value |
|
|
|
| |
|
Exposure value |
|
|
|
Movement |
|
|
Total at |
|
|
Capital |
|
|
Movement
|
|
|
Total at |
|
|
Capital |
|
|
|
in the year |
|
|
31 December |
|
|
required |
|
|
in the year |
|
|
31 December |
|
|
required |
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Long-term category risk weights |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than or equal to 10% |
|
|
(10.1 |
) |
|
|
40.8 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
(16.4 |
) |
|
|
50.9 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
greater than 10% and less than or
equal to 20% |
|
|
(6.9 |
) |
|
|
12.5 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
6.1 |
|
|
|
19.4 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
greater than 20% and less than or
equal to 50% |
|
|
1.8 |
|
|
|
3.4 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
(1.0 |
) |
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
greater than 50% and less than or
equal to 100% |
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
3.4 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
|
|
|
2.7 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
greater than 100% and less than or
equal to 650% |
|
|
(0.1 |
) |
|
|
2.2 |
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
2.3 |
|
|
|
0.7 |
|
Deductions from regulatory capital |
|
|
(0.2 |
) |
|
|
3.0 |
|
|
|
3.0 |
|
|
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
(14.8 |
) |
|
|
65.3 |
|
|
|
4.5 |
|
|
|
(6.3 |
) |
|
|
80.1 |
|
|
|
4.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Short-term category risk weights |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
less than or equal to 10% |
|
|
(0.3 |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(4.7 |
) |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
(0.3 |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(4.7 |
) |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
39
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Market risk is the risk that movements in market risk factors, including foreign exchange
rates, commodity prices, interest rates, credit spreads and equity prices, will reduce our
income or the value of our portfolios.
We separate exposures to market risk into trading and non-trading portfolios. Trading
portfolios include positions arising from market-making, position-taking and others designated
as marked-to-market. Non-trading portfolios include positions that arise from the interest rate
management of our retail and commercial banking assets and liabilities, financial investments
designated as available for sale and held to maturity.
Where appropriate, we apply similar risk management policies and measurement techniques to
both trading and non-trading portfolios. The application of these to the trading portfolios is
described in the section below.
Further information on Market Risk can be found on page 145 of the Annual Report and
Accounts 2010.
The objective of our market risk management is to manage and control market risk exposures in
order to optimise return on risk while maintaining a market profile consistent with our status
as one of the worlds largest banking and financial services organisations.
Organisation and responsibilities
The management of market risk is principally undertaken in Global Banking and Markets using risk
limits approved by the GMB. Limits are set for portfolios, products and risk types, with market
liquidity being a primary factor in determining the level of limits set.
Group Risk develops the Groups market risk management policies and measurement techniques.
Each major operating entity has an independent market risk management and control function which
is responsible for measuring market risk exposures in accordance with the policies defined by
Group Risk, and monitoring and reporting these exposures against the prescribed limits on a
daily basis.
Each operating entity is required to assess the market risks arising on each product in its
business. It is the responsibility of each operating unit to ensure that market risk exposures
remain within the limits specified for that entity. The nature of the hedging and risk
mitigation strategies performed across the Group corresponds to the market instruments available
within each operating jurisdiction. These strategies range from the use of traditional market
instruments, such as interest rate swaps, to more sophisticated hedging strategies to address a
combination of risk factors arising at portfolio level.
Measurement and monitoring
We employ a range of tools to monitor and limit market risk exposures. These include sensitivity
analysis, VAR and stress testing.
Table 28: Market risk
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
Capital |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Capital |
|
|
|
|
|
|
required |
1 |
|
RWAs |
|
|
required |
1 |
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
Market risk |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest rate position risk2 |
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
14.0 |
|
Foreign exchange position risk2 |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.8 |
|
VAR |
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
13.3 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
13.0 |
|
Calculated under local regulatory rules3 |
|
|
1.7 |
|
|
|
21.1 |
|
|
|
1.9 |
|
|
|
23.9 |
|
Equity position risk2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
Commodity position risk2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total market risk |
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
38.7 |
|
|
|
4.1 |
|
|
|
51.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Calculated as 8% of RWAs. |
|
2 |
|
FSA Standard rules. |
|
3 |
|
Includes requirements calculated under local VAR models and other calculation rules. |
40
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Sensitivity measures are used to monitor the market risk positions within each risk type, for
example, the present value of a basis point movement in interest rates, for interest rate risk.
Sensitivity limits are set for portfolios, products and risk types, with the depth of the market
being one of the principal factors in determining the level of limits set.
VAR is a technique that estimates the potential losses on risk positions as a result of
movements in market rates and prices over a specified time horizon and to a given level of
confidence.
The VAR models we use are based predominantly on historical simulation. These models derive
plausible future scenarios from past series of recorded market rates and prices, taking into
account inter-relationships between different markets and rates such as interest rates and
foreign exchange rates. The models also incorporate the effect of option features on the
underlying exposures.
The historical simulation models used incorporate the following features:
|
|
potential market movements are calculated with reference to data from the past two
years; |
|
|
historical market rates and prices are calculated with reference to foreign exchange
rates and commodity prices, interest rates, equity prices and the associated volatilities;
and |
|
|
VAR is calculated to a 99% confidence level and for a one-day holding period. |
The nature of the VAR models means that an increase in observed market volatility will lead
to an increase in VAR without any changes in the underlying positions.
We routinely validate the accuracy of our VAR models by back-testing the actual daily
profit and loss results, adjusted to remove non-modelled items such as fees and commissions,
against the corresponding VAR numbers. Statistically, we would expect to see losses in excess of
VAR only 1% of the time over a one-year period. The actual number of excesses over this period
can therefore be used to gauge how well the models are performing.
Although a valuable guide to risk, VAR should always be viewed in the context of its
limitations. For example:
|
|
the use of historical data as a proxy for estimating future events may not encompass |
|
|
all
potential events, particularly those which are extreme in nature; |
|
|
|
the use of a one-day holding period assumes that all positions can be liquidated or the
risks offset in one day. This may not fully reflect the market risk arising at times of
severe illiquidity, when a one-day holding period may be insufficient to liquidate or hedge
all positions fully; |
|
|
the use of a 99% confidence level, by definition, does not take into account losses that
might occur beyond this level of confidence; |
|
|
VAR is calculated on the basis of exposures outstanding at the close of business and
therefore does not necessarily reflect intra-day exposures; and |
|
|
VAR is unlikely to reflect loss potential on exposures that only arise under significant
market moves. |
We have not disclosed the scope of our VAR permissions as this is commercially sensitive
proprietary information. |
In recognition of VARs limitations, we augment it with stress testing to evaluate the potential
impact on portfolio values of more extreme, although plausible, events or movements in a set of
financial variables.
The process is governed by the Stress Testing Review Group forum which, in conjunction with
regional risk managers, determines the scenarios to be applied at portfolio and consolidated
levels, as follows:
|
|
sensitivity scenarios consider the impact of any single risk factor or set of factors
that are unlikely to be captured within the VAR models, such as the break of a currency
peg; |
|
|
technical scenarios consider the largest move in each risk factor, without consideration
of any underlying market correlation; |
|
|
hypothetical scenarios consider potential macro-economic events, for example, a global
flu pandemic; and |
|
|
historical scenarios incorporate historical observations of market movements during
previous periods of stress which would not be captured within VAR. |
Stress testing results provide senior management with an assessment of the financial impact
such events would have on our profit. The daily losses
41
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
experienced during 2010 were within the stress loss scenarios reported to senior
management.
Interest rate position risk
Interest rate position risk arises within the trading portfolios, principally from mismatches
between the future yield on assets and their funding cost, as a result of interest rate changes.
Analysis of this risk is complicated by having to make assumptions on embedded optionality
within certain product areas such as the incidence of prepayments.
We aim, through our management of interest rate risk, to mitigate the effect of prospective
interest rate movements which could reduce its net income, balanced against the cost of
associated hedging activities.
Interest rate position risk arising within the trading portfolios is measured, where
practical, on a daily basis. We use a range of tools to monitor and limit interest rate risk
exposures. These include the present value of a basis point movement in interest rates, VAR,
stress testing and sensitivity analysis.
Foreign exchange position risk
Foreign exchange position risk arises as a result of movements in the relative value of
currencies. In addition to VAR and stress testing, we control the foreign exchange risk within
the trading portfolio by limiting the open exposure to individual currencies, and on an
aggregate basis.
Specific issuer risk
Specific issuer (credit spread) risk arises from a change in the value of debt instruments due
to a perceived change in the credit quality of the issuer or underlying assets. As well as VAR
and stress testing, we manage the exposure to credit spread movements within the trading
portfolios through the use of limits referenced to the sensitivity of the present value of a
basis point movement in credit spreads.
Equity position risk
Equity position risk arises from the holding of open positions, either long or short, in
equities or equity based instruments, which create exposure to a change in the market price of
the equities or underlying equity instruments. As well as VAR and stress testing, we control the
equity risk within our trading portfolios by limiting the size of the net open equity exposure.
Interest rate and equity risk in the non-trading book
Non-trading book exposures in equities
At 31 December 2010, on a regulatory consolidation basis, we had equity investments in the
non-trading book of US$8.5bn (2009: US$9.1bn). These consist of investments held for the
following purposes:
Table 29: Non-trading book equity investments
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
Available |
|
|
Designated |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Available |
|
|
Designated |
|
|
|
|
|
|
for sale |
|
|
at fair value |
|
|
Total |
|
|
for sale |
|
|
at fair value |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Strategic investments |
|
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
4.2 |
|
|
|
3.2 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
3.6 |
|
Private equity investments |
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
2.9 |
|
|
|
3.7 |
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
3.8 |
|
Business facilitation1 |
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.1 |
|
Short-term cash management |
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
8.2 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
8.5 |
|
|
|
8.6 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
9.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Includes holdings in government-sponsored enterprises and local stock
exchanges. |
Investments in private equity are primarily made through managed funds
that are subject to limits on the amount of investment. Potential new commitments are subject to
risk appraisal to ensure that industry and geographical concentrations remain within acceptable
levels for the portfolio as a whole. Regular reviews are performed to substantiate the valuation
of the investments within the portfolio. A detailed description of the valuation techniques
applied to private equity can be found on page 313 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Exchange traded investments amounted to US$0.8bn (2009: US$0.9bn), with the remainder being
unlisted. These investments are held at fair value in line with market prices.
On a regulatory consolidation basis, the net gain from disposal of equity securities
amounted to US$0.5bn (2009: US$0.4bn), while impairment of AFS equity securities amounted to
US$0.1bn (2009: US$0.2bn).
42
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Unrealised gains on AFS equity included in tier 2 capital equated to US$2.1bn (2009:
US$1.4bn).
Details of our accounting policy for AFS equity investments and the valuation of financial
instruments are detailed on pages 259 and 34, respectively, of the Annual Report and Accounts
2010.
Non-trading book interest rate risk
Interest rate risk in non-trading portfolios is known as IRRBB, as defined on page 10. This risk
arises principally from mismatches between the future yield on assets and their funding cost, as
a result of interest rate changes. The prospective change in future net interest income from
non-trading portfolios will be reflected in the current realisable value of positions, should
they be sold or closed prior to maturity.
A principal element of our management of market risk in non-trading portfolios is
monitoring the sensitivity of projected net interest income under varying interest rate
scenarios (simulation modelling). We aim to mitigate the effect of prospective interest rate
movements which could reduce future net interest income, while balancing the cost of such
hedging activities on the current net revenue stream.
For simulation modelling, our businesses use a combination of scenarios relevant to them
and their local markets and standard scenarios which are required throughout HSBC. The standard
scenarios are consolidated to illustrate the combined pro forma effect on our consolidated
portfolio valuations and net interest income.
Our control of market risk in the non-trading portfolios is based on transferring the risks
to the books managed by Global Markets or the local Asset and Liability Management Committee
(ALCO). The net exposure is typically managed through the use of interest rate swaps within
agreed limits. The VAR for these portfolios is included within the Group trading and non-trading
VAR.
For more details of the Groups monitoring of the sensitivity of projected net interest
income under varying interest rate scenarios please see page 149 of the Annual Report and
Accounts 2010.
Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people and systems or from external events, including legal risk.
Operational risk is relevant to every aspect of our business and covers a wide spectrum of
issues. Losses arising through fraud, unauthorised activities, errors, omission, inefficiency,
systems failure or from external events all fall within the definition of operational risk.
In the past, we have historically experienced operational risk losses in the following
major categories:
|
|
fraudulent and other external criminal activities; |
|
|
breakdowns in processes/procedures due to human error, misjudgement or malice; |
|
|
system failure or non-availability; and |
|
|
in certain parts of the world, vulnerability to natural disasters. |
We recognise that operational risk losses can be incurred for a wide variety of reasons,
including rare but extreme events.
The objective of our operational risk management is to manage and control operational risk in a
cost-effective manner within targeted levels of operational risk consistent with our risk
appetite, as defined by GMB.
Organisation and responsibilities
Operational risk management is primarily the responsibility of all employees and business
management.
Each Regional, Global Business, Country or Business Unit Head has responsibility for
maintaining oversight over operational risk and internal control, covering all businesses and
operations for which they are responsible.
The Group Operational Risk function and the Operational Risk Management Framework (ORMF)
assist business management with discharging this responsibility.
The ORMF defines minimum standards and processes, and the governance structure for
operational risk and internal control across our geographical regions and global businesses.
The Global Operational Risk and Control Committee, which reports to RMM, meets at least
quarterly to discuss key risk issues and review the effective implementation of the ORMF.
Operational risk is organised as a specific risk discipline within Group Risk. The Group
43
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Operational Risk function reports to the GCRO and supports the Global Operational Risk and
Control Committee. It is responsible for establishing and maintaining the ORMF, monitoring the
level of operational losses and the effectiveness of the control environment. It is also
responsible for operational risk reporting at Group level, including preparation of reports for
consideration by RMM and Group Risk Committee (GRC).
Measurement and monitoring
We have codified our ORMF in a high level standard, supplemented by detailed policies. The
detailed policies explain our approach to identifying, assessing, monitoring and controlling
operational risk and give guidance on mitigating action to be taken when weaknesses are
identified.
In each of our subsidiaries, business managers are responsible for maintaining an
acceptable level of internal control, commensurate with the scale and nature of operations. They
are responsible for identifying and assessing risks, designing controls and monitoring the
effectiveness of these controls. The ORMF helps managers to fulfil these responsibilities by
defining a standard risk assessment methodology and providing a tool for the systematic
reporting of operational loss data.
Operational risk capital requirements are calculated under the standardised approach, as a
percentage of the average of the last three financial years gross revenues. The table below
sets out a geographical analysis of our operational risk capital requirement as at 31 December
2010 along with 31 December 2009 comparatives.
Table 30: Operational risk
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
Capital |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Capital |
|
|
|
|
|
|
required |
1 |
|
RWAs |
|
|
required |
1 |
|
RWAs |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
Operational risk |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Europe |
|
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
39.2 |
|
|
|
3.5 |
|
|
|
42.1 |
|
Hong Kong |
|
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
15.3 |
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
16.0 |
|
Rest of Asia-Pacific |
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
19.0 |
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
16.7 |
|
Middle East |
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
6.5 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
5.5 |
|
North America |
|
|
2.3 |
|
|
|
28.6 |
|
|
|
2.5 |
|
|
|
31.3 |
|
Latin America |
|
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
15.0 |
|
|
|
1.1 |
|
|
|
14.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
9.8 |
|
|
|
123.6 |
|
|
|
10.1 |
|
|
|
125.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Calculated as 8% of RWAs. |
Operational risk and control assessment approach
Operational risk and control assessments are performed by individual business units and
functions. The risk and control assessment process is designed to provide business areas and
functions with a forward looking view of operational risks and an assessment of the
effectiveness of controls, and a tracking mechanism for action plans so that they can
proactively manage operational risks within acceptable levels. Risk and control assessments will
be reviewed and updated at least annually.
All appropriate means of mitigation and controls are considered. These include:
|
|
making specific changes to strengthen the internal control environment; |
|
|
investigating whether cost-effective insurance cover is available to mitigate the risk;
and |
|
|
other means of protecting us from loss. |
We have constructed a centralised database (the Group Operational Risk Database) to record the
results of our operational risk management process. Operational risk and control assessments, as
described above, are input and maintained by business units. Business management and Operational
Risk Business Co-ordinators monitor and follow up the progress of documented action plans.
Operational risk loss reporting
To ensure that operational risk losses are consistently reported and monitored at Group level,
all Group companies are required to report individual losses when the net loss is expected to
exceed US$10,000 and to aggregate all other operational risk losses under US$10,000. Losses are
entered into the Group Operational Risk Database and are reported to the Group Operational Risk
function on a quarterly basis.
44
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
The following tables show the remuneration awards made by HSBC in respect of 2010 and
subsequent paragraphs provide information on decision-making policies for remuneration and links
between pay and performance. These disclosures reflect the
requirements of the FSAs Policy
Statement PS10/21 Implementing CRD3 requirements on the disclosure of remuneration issued in
December 2010. Comparative data have not been provided as this is the first year of disclosure.
Table 31: Aggregate remuneration expenditure
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
Personal |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Global |
|
|
Global |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Financial |
|
|
Commercial |
|
|
Banking and |
|
|
Private |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Services |
|
|
Banking |
|
|
Markets |
|
|
Banking |
|
|
Other |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Aggregate remuneration expenditure
(Code Staff)1,2 |
|
|
12.5 |
|
|
|
4.2 |
|
|
|
284.0 |
|
|
|
31.9 |
|
|
|
138.9 |
|
|
|
471.5 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Code Staff is defined in the Glossary. |
|
2 |
|
Includes salary and bonus awarded in respect of performance year 2010 (including
deferred component) and any pension or benefits outside of policy. |
Table 32: Analysis of remuneration between fixed and variable amounts
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Code Staff |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Senior |
|
|
(non-senior |
|
|
|
|
|
|
management |
|
|
management) |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Number of Code Staff |
|
|
58 |
|
|
|
222 |
|
|
|
280 |
|
Of which, number of UK Code Staff |
|
|
28 |
|
|
|
158 |
|
|
|
186 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
Fixed |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cash based |
|
|
38.2 |
|
|
|
59.3 |
|
|
|
97.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total Fixed |
|
|
38.2 |
|
|
|
59.3 |
|
|
|
97.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total Fixed (UK Code Staff only) |
|
|
18.8 |
|
|
|
36.5 |
|
|
|
55.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Variable1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cash |
|
|
22.1 |
|
|
|
56.0 |
|
|
|
78.1 |
|
Non-Deferred shares2 |
|
|
22.1 |
|
|
|
53.2 |
|
|
|
75.3 |
|
Deferred cash |
|
|
32.3 |
|
|
|
73.6 |
|
|
|
105.9 |
|
Deferred shares |
|
|
40.2 |
|
|
|
74.5 |
|
|
|
114.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total Variable Pay |
|
|
116.7 |
|
|
|
257.3 |
|
|
|
374.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total Variable Pay (UK Code Staff only) |
|
|
60.7 |
|
|
|
111.7 |
|
|
|
172.4 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Variable pay in respect of performance year 2010 |
|
2 |
|
Vested shares, subject to a 6-month retention period |
Table 33: Analysis of deferred remuneration
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Code Staff |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Senior |
|
|
(non-senior |
|
|
|
|
|
|
management |
|
|
management) |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Deferred remuneration at 31 December |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Outstanding, vested |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Outstanding, unvested1 |
|
|
266.3 |
|
|
|
374.0 |
|
|
|
640.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Awarded during financial year2 |
|
|
97.0 |
|
|
|
158.5 |
|
|
|
255.5 |
|
Paid out3 |
|
|
37.7 |
|
|
|
68.9 |
|
|
|
106.6 |
|
Reduced through performance adjustments |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Value of cash and shares unvested at 31 December 2010. |
|
2 |
|
Value of deferred cash and shares awarded during 2010. Share price taken at 31 December 2010. |
|
3 |
|
Value of vested shares during 2010. Share price taken at day of vesting. |
45
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
Table 34: Analysis of sign-on and severance payments
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Code Staff |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Senior |
|
|
(non-senior |
|
|
|
|
|
|
management |
|
|
management) |
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sign-on payments |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Made during year (US$m) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.1 |
|
|
|
7.1 |
|
Number of beneficiaries |
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
|
|
|
3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Severance payments |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Made during year (US$m) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
Number of beneficiaries |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
Highest such award to single person (US$m) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
Decision-making process for remuneration policy
HSBC has an established Remuneration Committee (the Committee) which meets regularly to
consider human resource issues relating to terms and conditions of employment, remuneration and
retirement benefits. Within the authority delegated by the Board, the Committee is responsible
for approving remuneration policy and in doing so takes into account the pay and conditions
across our Group. This includes the terms of bonus plans, share plans, other long-term incentive
plans and the individual remuneration packages of executive Directors and other senior Group
employees, including all in positions of significant influence and those having an impact on our
risk profile (Code Staff), regardless of geographical location.
A global reward strategy for the Group was approved by the Committee in 2007. This strategy
provides a framework for the Committee in carrying out its responsibilities and includes the
following key elements:
|
|
an assessment of reward with reference to clear and relevant objectives set
within a balanced scorecard framework; |
|
|
a focus on total compensation (salary, bonus and the value of long-term
incentives) with variable pay (namely bonus and the value of long-term incentives)
differentiated by performance; |
|
|
the use of considered discretion to assess the extent to which performance
has been achieved rather than applying a formulaic approach which, by its nature, may
encourage inappropriate risk taking and cannot cover all scenarios; |
|
|
a significant proportion of variable pay to be deferred into HSBC Holdings
Restricted Shares to tie recipients to the future performance of the Group and aid
retention; and |
|
|
a total remuneration package (salary, bonus, long-term incentive awards and
other benefits) |
|
|
which is competitive in relation to comparable organisations in each of the
markets in which we operate. |
There were nine meetings of the Committee during 2010. Following each meeting, the
Committee reports to the Board on its activities. The terms of reference of the Committee are
available at www.hsbc.com/boardcommittees.
No Directors are involved in deciding their own remuneration.
a) Composition of the Remuneration Committee
The members of the Committee during 2010 were J D Coombe, W S H Laidlaw, G Morgan, J L Thornton
and Sir Mark Moody-Stuart, who retired as a Director of HSBC Holdings and ceased to be a member
and chairman of the Committee on 28 May 2010. J L Thornton was appointed as chairman of the
Committee on 28 May 2010.
b) Role of the relevant stakeholders
The Committee received independent advice on executive remuneration issues from Deloitte LLP and
remuneration data from Towers Watson during 2010. As global concerns, each of these firms also
provided other consulting services to various parts of HSBC. Other consultants are used from
time to time to advise on specific issues. Going forward, the Committee has agreed to only use
advisers as and when required, and that these would be separate from the Companys advisers.
During the year, the Group Chief Executive provided regular briefings to the Committee and
the Committee received advice from the Group Managing Director, Human Resources, A Almeida, the
Head of Group Performance
and Reward, T Roberts and B Robertson, then the GCRO, who provided advice to the Committee
on the implications of the remuneration policy on risk and risk management.
46
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
c) Code Staff criteria
The following groups of staff have been identified as meeting the FSAs criteria for Code Staff:
|
|
Senior Management whose roles are judged as falling within the FSA Code Staff
definition (including executive board Directors, Group Managing Directors and Group General
Managers); |
|
|
Staff performing a Significant Influence Function within HSBC Bank plc; |
|
|
Global Banking & Markets Operating Committee members (excluding specific
roles that do not have a significant risk impact e.g. business support roles); |
|
|
Global Private Banking Executive Committee members (excluding specific roles
that do not have a significant risk impact e.g. business support roles); |
|
|
Global Banking Management Committee members (excluding specific roles that do
not have a significant risk impact e.g. business support roles); and |
|
|
Global Markets Management Committee members (excluding specific roles that do
not have a significant risk impact e.g. business support roles). |
The categories above cover all senior level management across the Group as well as those
responsible for the management of the Global Banking and Markets businesses and Global Private
Banking. All heads of major Global Banking & Markets businesses are included as well as the
heads of all significant Global Markets products.
Link between pay and performance
Remuneration at HSBC comprises fixed pay (salary and fees) and variable pay (annual bonus and
long-term incentives) designed to reward performance.
In determining the payout under any component of variable pay, we have adopted, as policy,
the use of discretion to assess the extent to which performance has been achieved rather than
applying a formulaic approach which, by its nature, may encourage inappropriate risk taking and
cannot cover all scenarios.
The annual bonus earned by an individual is dependent on the achievement of objectives
(built into a balanced scorecard) which derive from those determined at the Group level. These
are then cascaded throughout the Group, thereby driving an
aligned set of objectives. The
balanced scorecard includes both financial and non-financial metrics, and actual payout levels
depend on the performance of the Group, of constituent businesses and of the individual.
The purpose of the bonus is to reflect the extent to which the Groups annual objectives
have been met under the balanced scorecard approach, risk appetite framework, our absolute and
relative performance to our peers and competitive market practice.
The purpose of the existing Long Term Incentive Plan has been to reflect our relative and
absolute performance over the long-term, taking into account an external measure of value
creation, a measure of the extent to which the return on capital invested in HSBC is in excess
of a benchmark return and a direct measure of the profits generated for shareholders. Its
purpose has also been to reward the creation of sustained growth in shareholder value and to
encourage alignment with shareholders.
At the date of this report, the Committee is in the process of consulting with major
shareholders on the subject of improving further the alignment between shareholders and senior
management with regard to incentivising long-term sustainable performance. Any material changes
to our approach which result following this consultation will be explained to shareholders in
the Chairmans letter accompanying the Notice of the Companys 2011 Annual General Meeting. No
awards have been made under the existing plan since 2008.
Design and structure of remuneration
Reward is delivered via a combination of fixed and variable pay (salary, bonus, other long-term
incentives). The variable pay element is differentiated by performance. Taking into account the
expected value of awards, the performance-related elements of pay make up a considerable
proportion of the total remuneration package for Code
Staff, whilst maintaining an appropriate balance between fixed and variable elements.
Remuneration is structured to provide an opportunity for top quartile total compensation for
higher levels of performance.
Salary and fees
All Code Staff receive either a salary (executives) or fees (non-executives) to reflect their
market value, responsibility and contribution to the Group. We pay market competitive salaries
with variable pay awards based on performance. Our remuneration approach allows us not to pay a
bonus when appropriate. For
47
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
employees globally (including Code Staff), individuals with poor
performance ratings will receive little or no bonus.
Annual bonus
a) Rationale and eligibility criteria
All executive Code Staff are eligible to receive an annual bonus to reflect the extent to which
the Groups annual objectives have been met under the balanced scorecard approach, risk appetite
framework, our absolute and relative performance to our peers and competitive market practice.
Non-executive Code Staff are not eligible to receive an annual bonus.
b) Performance measurement/assessment
The annual bonus is designed to reward performance and is dependent on the achievement of
objectives (built into a balanced scorecard) which derive from those determined at the corporate
Group level. Since 2008, these objectives typically cover four categories: Financial, Customer,
Process (including risk mitigation) and People. This framework facilitates a rounded approach to
objective setting. Individual performance is also reviewed against other risks specifically
chosen such as credit, market, operational and information and security risks.
The determination of bonus pools is a fully discretionary process informed by various
performance metrics (including performance in the context of the risk appetite framework),
affordability (including cost and quantity of capital and liquidity considerations) and the
commercial requirement to remain competitive in the market.
The risk appetite framework shapes our integrated approach to business, risk and capital
management and supports us in achieving our return on equity objectives. The risk appetite
framework is agreed by the HSBC Holdings Board and cascaded across businesses and geographies.
It provides an important input into the Committees deliberations with regard to remuneration.
In addition, individual performance is also reviewed against key risk appetite targets for
credit, market, operational and information and security risks to ensure that proposed
individual remuneration is appropriate against these aspects.
Discretion is applied at all stages including the determination of accruals and
finalisation of pools, and is applied by Group senior management and the Committee.
Our discretionary approach allows full flexibility in aligning bonus pools to business
performance.
The key financial performance metric at Group level is profit before tax. However, senior
management consider in tandem a range of other financial metrics and use them as important
benchmarks to inform in the determination of the level of variable remuneration.
Whilst the achievement of financial objectives is very important, other objectives relating
to efficiency and risk mitigation, customer development and the productivity of our human
capital are also key to financial performance and sustainability of the Group. Within the
balanced scorecard, key risk metrics, both financial and non-financial, such as managing to
risk-weighted asset targets, impairment and operational risk loss levels, and embedding
governance of the HSBC risk appetite framework are explicitly included to ensure that the bonus
pool is shaped by risk considerations. Performance is also assessed by reference to Economic
Profit, which uses Economic Capital as the basis for the calculation. In addition, individual
performance is also reviewed against key risk appetite targets for credit, market, operational
and information and security risks to ensure that proposed individual remuneration is
appropriate against these aspects.
Actual levels of pay will depend on the performance of the Group, of constituent businesses
and of the individual, taking into account competitive market practice.
The GMB balanced scorecard is cascaded down to regions and business scorecards in an
aligned manner, thereby ensuring that return, risk and efficient capital usage shape reward
considerations. This framework impacts on
the level of individual remuneration received as achievement of such objectives is an
important determinant of the level of variable compensation awarded. The GCRO and the Risk
function provide input into the balanced scorecard, ensuring that key risk measures are
included.
The performance and hence remuneration of control function staff is assessed according to a
balanced scorecard of objectives specific to the functional role they undertake. Remuneration is
carefully benchmarked with the market and internally to ensure that it is set at an appropriate
level.
48
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
c) Deferral and vesting
To ensure that the interests of HSBC and its employees are aligned with those of our
shareholders, and that our approach to risk management supports the interests of all
stakeholders, a proportion of variable pay awards above certain thresholds is required to be
deferred into HSBC Holdings Restricted Shares. Vesting of these shares is subject to continued
employment (which may be terminated by HSBC in the event of material misconduct) and the
delivered value will vary in accordance with the share price and dividend. Awards made from 2010
are prior to vesting, subject to amendment, reduction or cancellation at the full discretion of
the Committee.
For Code Staff, 40% to 60% of variable remuneration is deferred over a period of 3 years,
in line with the FSA requirements. 50% of both the deferred and non-deferred components will be
in the form of restricted shares with the remaining 50% as cash. Vesting of deferred awards,
both cash and shares, will be annually over a three-year period with 33% vesting on the first
anniversary of grant, 33% on the second anniversary and 34% on the third anniversary. Deferred
and non-deferred share awards will be subject to a six-month retention period following vesting.
Any Code Staff employee with total remuneration of no more than £500,000 (or local currency
equivalent) and variable remuneration which is no more than 33% of total remuneration will not
be subject to the Code Staff deferral policy.
Long-term incentives
a) Rationale and eligibility criteria
As already described, the existing long-term plan is currently under review, with no awards
having been made since 2008.
Participation in the plan is generally limited to Executive Directors and Group Managing
Directors.
b) Performance measurement/assessment
Vesting for the existing long-term incentive awards is based on three independent performance
measures and an overriding sustained improvement judgement by the Committee. The three Group
measures are relative Total Shareholder Return (TSR) (40% of the award); economic profit
(40%); and growth in Earnings Per Share (20%). These measures provide a basis on which to
measure our relative and absolute performance over the long-term taking into account an external
measure of value creation, a measure of the extent to which the return on capital invested in
HSBC is in excess of a benchmark return and a direct measure of the profits generated for
shareholders. Awards will not vest
unless the Committee is satisfied that HSBC Holdings
financial performance has shown a sustained improvement in the period since the award date.
c) Deferral and vesting
In determining whether HSBC Holdings has achieved sufficiently sustained improvement for the
outstanding awards to vest, the Committee will take account of all relevant factors, in
particular, comparisons against the TSR comparator group in areas such as revenue growth and
mix, cost efficiency, credit performance, cash return on cash invested, dividends and TSR.
The performance conditions are measured over a three-year performance period and awards
forfeited to the extent that they have not been met.
Risk adjustment
As well as assessing performance against a balanced scorecard of objectives and using a
discretionary approach to reward, as already described, the implications of remuneration
decisions for risk management are taken into account as follows:
|
|
a proportion of variable pay awards above certain thresholds is required to
be deferred into HSBC Holdings Restricted Shares. Vesting of these shares is subject to
continued employment (which may be terminated by HSBC in the event of material misconduct)
and the delivered value will vary in accordance with the share price and dividend. Awards
made from 2010 are prior to vesting, subject to amendment, reduction or cancellation at the
full discretion of the Committee; |
|
|
to ensure further alignment with the long-term performance of the Group,
Executive Directors and Group Managing Directors are also subject to formal shareholding
guidelines; |
|
|
the GCRO attends Committee meetings to ensure that any implications they
should take into account in terms of risk are considered prior to review and approval of
the remuneration policy and any other matters where risk parameters should be considered; |
|
|
the GCRO provides written confirmation to the Committee that a review of
behaviours of Code Staff has been undertaken and that the Risk and Compliance functions
have actively engaged with business management to discuss matters relevant to individual
remuneration awards; |
49
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010 (continued)
|
|
decisions regarding bonus pool funding are taken after careful review, by the
Committee, of the risk appetite framework; |
|
|
the Risk function has input into the risk related objectives set as part of
the balanced scorecard framework; |
|
|
the GRC, all members of which are non-executive Directors, was established in
2010. It advises the Board on risk appetite and also on aligning reward structures with
risk appetite. The GRC receives information on risk related aspects of reward structures to
be proposed by the Committee. The GCRO regularly reports to, and attends meetings of, the
GRC. The GRC and Committee have cross-membership; and |
|
|
all variable pay and incentive schemes are required to adhere to a set of
policy principles and approval standards as defined in the Group Standards Manual. Under
the terms of the Group Standards Manual, all plans require the approval of the Finance,
Risk, Legal, Compliance and HR functions. The Finance function validates the achievement of
relevant financial metrics (e.g. the definition of profitability from which bonus funding
is derived). |
We are conscious of the fact that remuneration is only one part of a proper approach to
risk and decision making. Our strong and long-established culture plays the central role in
creating the right environment in which decisions about risk and other issues are taken. Much
effort is put into ensuring that the culture is reinforced and that, to the extent possible,
this is emphasised through the setting of balanced objectives, their assessment, and validating
key cultural themes through comprehensive global staff surveys.
The philosophy of managing risk and reward has been in place for a number of years, but the
integration of risk management with reward formally
commenced in 2008, when the Risk function
became involved in the approval of relevant incentive plans. In addition, the concept of
imputing the cost of capital in the determination of bonus funding has been expanded
progressively across HSBC, starting with our Global Banking and Markets business, and now
applies across the Group.
Other disclosures
Fair value adjustments
The following section provides further information on fair value adjustments. The determination
of fair value of assets and liabilities is described in Note 16 on the Financial Statements on
page 254 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Consolidation basis
The information and data provided in this document is prepared on a regulatory consolidation
basis, as described on page 5. However, the information contained within this section on fair
value adjustments is prepared in respect of assets and liabilities held on an accounting
consolidation basis which is described on page 251 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
Fair value adjustments methodology
Fair value adjustments are adopted when we consider that there are additional factors that would
be considered by a market participant that are not incorporated within the valuation model. The
magnitude of fair value adjustments depends upon many entity-specific factors, and therefore
fair value adjustments may not be comparable across the banking industry.
We classify fair value adjustments as either risk-related or model-related. The
majority of these adjustments relate to Global Banking and Markets.
50
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Table 35: Global Banking and Markets fair value adjustments
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December |
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
Type of adjustment |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Risk-related |
|
|
2.2 |
|
|
|
2.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bid-offer |
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
Uncertainty |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
0.2 |
|
Credit risk adjustment |
|
|
1.4 |
|
|
|
2.2 |
|
Other |
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Model-related |
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
0.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Model limitation |
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
0.4 |
|
Other |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Inception profit (Day 1 P&L reserves) |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
0.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.8 |
|
|
|
3.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Movements in the level of fair value adjustments do not necessarily result in
the recognition of profits or losses within the income statement. For example, as models are
enhanced, fair value adjustments may no longer be required. Similarly, fair value adjustments
will decrease when the related positions are unwound, but this may not result in profit or loss.
The most significant fair value adjustment movement related to the release of US$0.5bn of
credit risk adjustments held for monoline insurers of which US$0.3bn resulted from commutations.
The commutations did not result in a material gain or loss. The remainder of the decrease in the
credit risk adjustment derived primarily from commutations or restructures with non-monoline
counterparties, and internal credit rating upgrades of certain counterparties.
Risk-related adjustments
Bid-Offer
IAS 39 requires that portfolios are marked at bid or offer, as appropriate. Valuation models
will typically generate mid market values. The bid-offer adjustment reflects the cost that would
be incurred if substantially all residual net portfolio market risks were closed using available
hedging instruments or by disposing of or unwinding the actual position.
Uncertainty
Certain model inputs may be less readily determinable from market data, and/or the choice of
model itself may be more subjective. In these circumstances, there exists a range of possible
values that the financial instrument or market parameter may assume and an adjustment may be
necessary to reflect the likelihood that in estimating the fair value of the financial
instrument, market participants
would adopt rather more conservative values for uncertain
parameters and/or model assumptions than those used in the valuation model.
Credit risk adjustment
The credit risk adjustment is an adjustment to the valuation of OTC derivative contracts to
reflect within fair value the possibility that the counterparty may default, and we may not
receive the full market value of the transactions.
Model-related adjustments
Model limitation
Models used for portfolio valuation purposes may be based upon a simplifying set of assumptions
that do not capture all material market characteristics. Additionally, markets evolve, and
models that were adequate in the past may require development to capture all material market
characteristics in current market conditions. In these circumstances, model limitation
adjustments are adopted. As model development progresses, model limitations are addressed within
the valuation models and a model limitation adjustment is no longer needed.
Inception profit (Day 1 P&L reserves)
Inception profit adjustments are adopted where the fair value estimated by a valuation model is
based on one or more significant unobservable inputs. The accounting for inception profit
adjustments is discussed on page 254 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010. An analysis of the
movement in the deferred Day 1 P&L reserve is provided on page 324 of the Annual Report and
Accounts 2010.
Credit risk adjustment methodology
We calculate a separate credit risk adjustment for each HSBC legal entity, and within each
entity for
51
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
each counterparty to which the entity has exposure. The calculation of the monoline
credit risk adjustment and sensitivity to different assumptions is described below. The
description below relates to the credit risk adjustment taken against counterparties other than
monolines, which totalled US$0.8bn at 31 December 2010 (2009: US$1.2bn).
We calculate the credit risk adjustment by applying the probability of default of the
counterparty to the expected positive exposure to the counterparty, and multiplying the result
by the loss expected in the event of default. The calculation is performed over the life of the
potential exposure.
The probability of default is based on our internal credit rating for the counterparty,
taking into account how credit ratings may deteriorate over the duration of the exposure through
the use of historic rating transition matrices. For most products, to calculate the expected
positive exposure to a counterparty, we use a simulation methodology to incorporate the range of
potential exposures across the portfolio of transactions with the counterparty over the life of
an instrument. The simulation methodology includes credit mitigants such as counterparty netting
agreements and collateral agreements with the counterparty. A standard loss given default
assumption of 60% is generally adopted. We do not adjust derivative liabilities for our own
credit risk, such an adjustment is often referred to as a debit valuation adjustment.
For certain types of exotic derivatives where the products are not currently supported by
the simulation, or for derivative exposures in smaller trading locations where the simulation
tool is not yet available, we adopt alternative methodologies. These may involve mapping to the
results for similar products from the simulation tool or where such a mapping approach is not
appropriate, a simplified methodology is used, generally following the same principles as the
simulation methodology. The calculation is applied at a trade level, with more limited
recognition of credit mitigants such as netting or collateral agreements than used in the
simulation methodology described previously.
The methodologies do not, in general, account for wrong-way risk. Wrong-way risk arises
where the underlying value of the derivative prior to any credit risk adjustment is positively
correlated to the probability of default of the counterparty. Where there is significant
wrong-way risk, a trade specific approach is applied to reflect the wrong-way risk within the
valuation.
We include all third party counterparties in the credit risk adjustment calculation and do
not net credit risk adjustments across HSBC Group entities.
During 2010, we made no material changes to the methodologies used to calculate the credit
risk adjustment.
Consideration of other methodologies for calculation of credit risk adjustments
Our credit risk adjustment methodology, in the opinion of management, appropriately quantifies
our exposure to counterparty risk on our OTC derivative portfolio and appropriately reflects the
risk management strategy of the business.
We recognise that a variety of credit risk adjustment methodologies are adopted within the
banking industry.
Some of the key attributes that may differ between these methodologies are:
|
|
the PD may be calculated from historical market data, or implied from current
market levels for certain transaction types such as CDSs, either with or without an
adjusting factor; |
|
|
|
some entities derive their own PD from a non-zero spread, which has the
effect of reducing the overall adjustment; |
|
|
|
differing loss assumptions in setting the level of LGD, which may utilise
levels set by regulators for capital calculation purposes; and |
|
|
|
counterparty exclusions, whereby certain counterparty types (for example
collateralised counterparties) are excluded from the calculation. |
We have estimated the impact of adopting two alternative methodologies on the level of our
credit risk adjustment (excluding the monoline credit risk adjustment), as follows:
|
|
adapting our existing methodology to utilise probabilities of default implied
from CDSs with no adjustment factor applied and also implying our own credit PD from CDSs,
results in an additional adjustment of US$0.3bn (2009: US$0.2bn); and |
|
|
|
adapting our existing methodology to exclude collateralised counterparties,
include our own PD based on historical data, and apply LGD assumptions consistent with
those used in regulatory capital calculations, results in a
reduction of the credit risk adjustment of US$0.3bn (2009: US$0.3bn). |
52
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
Our monoline credit risk adjustment calculation utilises a range of approaches dependent
upon the credit quality of the monoline. The net impact of utilising the methodology adopted for
highly-rated monolines across all monolines would be a reduction in credit risk adjustment of
US$0.1bn (2009: US$0.3bn). The net impact of utilising a methodology based on credit default
swap spreads would be a negligible increase in credit risk adjustment (2009: negligible).
Transactions with monoline insurers
Our exposure to derivative transactions entered into directly with monoline insurers
Our principal exposure to monolines is through a number of OTC derivative transactions, mainly
CDSs. We entered into these CDSs primarily to purchase credit protection against securities held
at the time within the trading portfolio.
During 2010, the notional value of derivative contracts with monolines and our overall
credit exposure to monolines decreased as a number of transactions were commuted, others
matured, and credit spreads narrowed. The table below sets out the
fair value, essentially the
replacement cost, of the remaining derivative transactions at 31 December 2010, and hence the
amount at risk if the CDS protection purchased were to be wholly ineffective because, for
example, the monoline insurer was unable to meet its obligations. In order to further analyse
that risk, the value of protection purchased is shown subdivided between those monolines that
were rated by S&P at BBB or above at 31 December 2010, and those that were below BBB
(BBB is the S&P cut-off for an investment grade classification). The Credit risk
adjustment column indicates the valuation adjustment taken against the net exposures, and
reflects our best estimate of the likely loss of value on purchased protection arising from the
deterioration in creditworthiness of the monolines. These valuation adjustments, which reflect a
measure of the irrecoverability of the protection purchased, have been charged to the income
statement. During 2010, the credit risk adjustment on derivative contracts with monolines
decreased as a number of transactions commuted and others matured.
Table 36: Exposure to derivative transactions entered into directly with monoline
insurers
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Net exposure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Net exposure |
|
|
|
Notional |
|
|
before credit |
|
|
Credit risk |
|
|
after credit |
|
|
|
amount |
|
|
risk adjustment |
1 |
|
adjustment |
2 |
|
risk adjustment |
|
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
|
US$bn |
|
At 31 December 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Derivative transactions with monoline counterparties |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Monoline investment grade (BBB or above) |
|
|
5.2 |
|
|
|
0.9 |
|
|
|
(0.1 |
) |
|
|
0.8 |
|
Monoline sub-investment grade (below BBB) |
|
|
2.3 |
|
|
|
0.6 |
|
|
|
(0.4 |
) |
|
|
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7.5 |
|
|
|
1.5 |
|
|
|
(0.5 |
) |
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Derivative transactions with monoline counterparties |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Monoline investment grade (BBB or above) |
|
|
5.6 |
|
|
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
(0.1 |
) |
|
|
0.9 |
|
Monoline sub-investment grade (below BBB) |
|
|
4.4 |
|
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
(0.9 |
) |
|
|
0.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
10.0 |
|
|
|
2.3 |
|
|
|
(1.0 |
) |
|
|
1.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 Net exposure after legal netting and any other relevant credit mitigation prior to
deduction of the credit risk adjustment.
2 Cumulative fair value adjustment recorded against exposures to OTC derivative
counterparties to reflect their creditworthiness.
For the CDSs, market prices are generally not readily available. Therefore the
CDSs are valued on the basis of market prices of the referenced securities.
The credit risk adjustment against monolines is determined by one of a number of
methodologies, dependent upon the internal credit rating of the monoline. Our assignment of
internal credit ratings is based upon detailed credit analysis, and may differ from external
ratings.
Credit risk adjustments for monolines
For highly-rated monolines, the standard credit risk adjustment methodology (as described on
page 312 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010) applies, with the exception that the future
exposure profile is deemed to be constant (equal to the current market value) over the weighted
average life of the referenced security, and the credit risk adjustment cannot fall below 10% of
the mark-to-market exposure.
53
Capital and Risk Management Pillar 3 Disclosures at 31 December 2010
(continued)
In respect of monolines, where default has either occurred or there is a strong possibility
of default in the near term, the adjustment is determined based on the estimated probabilities
of various potential scenarios, and the estimated recovery in each case.
For other monoline exposures, the credit risk adjustment follows the methodology for
highly-rated monolines, adjusted to include the probability of a claim arising in respect of the
referenced security, and applies implied probabilities of default where the likelihood of a
claim is believed to be high.
HSBCs exposure to direct lending and irrevocable commitments to lend to monoline insurers
We had no liquidity facilities to monolines at 31 December 2010 (2009: minimal).
HSBCs exposure to debt securities which benefit from guarantees provided by monoline insurers
Within both the trading and AFS portfolios, we hold bonds that are wrapped with a credit
enhancement from a monoline. As the bonds are traded explicitly with the benefit of this
enhancement, any deterioration in the credit profile of the monoline is reflected in market
prices and, therefore, in the
carrying amount of these securities at 31 December 2010. For wrapped bonds held in our trading
portfolio, the mark-to-market movement has been reflected through the income statement. For
wrapped bonds held in the AFS portfolio, the mark-to-market movement is reflected in equity
unless there is objective evidence of impairment, in which case the impairment loss is reflected
in the income statement. No wrapped bonds were included in the reclassification of financial
assets described in Note 18 on page 320 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010.
HSBCs exposure to credit derivative product companies
Credit derivative product companies (CDPCs) are independent companies that specialise in
selling credit default protection on corporate exposures. At 31 December 2010, we had purchased
from CDPCs credit protection with a notional value of US$4.9bn (2009: US$5.0bn) which had a fair
value of US$0.2bn (2009: US$0.3bn), against which a credit risk adjustment (a provision) of
US$0.1bn was held (2009: US$0.1bn). At 31 December 2010, none of our exposure was to CDPCs with
investment grade ratings (2009: 83%). The deterioration reflects ratings downgrades and
withdrawals during 2010.
54
Appendix Terms and Conditions of Capital Securities
Capital securities issued by the Group
All capital securities included in the capital base of HSBC have been issued in accordance with
the rules and guidance in the FSAs General Prudential Sourcebook (GENPRU). For regulatory
purposes, HSBCs capital base is divided into two categories, or tiers, depending on the degree
of permanency and loss absorbency exhibited. These are tier 1 and tier 2.
The main features of capital securities issued by the Group are described below. The balances
disclosed in the tables below are the balance sheet carrying amounts under IFRSs from the Annual
Report and Accounts 2010 and are not the amounts that the instruments contribute to regulatory
capital. The regulatory treatment of these instruments and the accounting treatment under IFRSs
differ, for example, in the treatment of issuance costs or regulatory amortisation. Therefore,
the balances disclosed will not reconcile to other amounts disclosed in this document.
Tier 1 capital
Tier 1 capital is comprised of shareholders equity and related non-controlling interests and
qualifying capital instruments such as preference shares and hybrid capital securities, after
the deduction of certain regulatory adjustments.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December |
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
Called up share capital |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
HSBC Holdings ordinary shares (of nominal value US$0.50 each)1 |
|
|
8,843 |
|
|
|
8,705 |
|
1 |
|
All ordinary shares in issue confer identical rights in respect of capital, dividends,
voting and otherwise. |
Preference shares
Preference shares are issues of securities for which there is no obligation to pay a dividend
and if not paid, the dividend is not cumulative. Such shares do not generally carry voting
rights and rank higher than ordinary shares for dividend payments and in the event of a
winding-up. The instruments have no stated maturity date but may be called and redeemed by the
issuer, subject to prior notification to the FSA, and, where relevant, the consent of the local
banking regulator. Dividends on the floating rate preference shares are generally related to
interbank offer rates. The following table lists the qualifying preference shares in issue as at
31 December 2010 together with 31 December 2009 comparatives:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
Preference shares |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US$1,450m |
|
|
6.20% dollar preference shares, Series A, callable from December 20101 |
|
|
1,450 |
|
|
|
1,450 |
|
US$575m |
|
|
6.36% preferred stock, Series B, callable from June 2010 |
|
|
559 |
|
|
|
559 |
|
US$518m |
|
|
Floating rate preferred stock, Series F, callable from April 2010 |
|
|
518 |
|
|
|
518 |
|
US$374m |
|
|
Floating rate preferred stock, Series G, callable from January 2011 |
|
|
374 |
|
|
|
374 |
|
US$374m |
|
|
6.50% preferred stock, Series H, callable from July 2011 |
|
|
374 |
|
|
|
374 |
|
CAD250m |
|
5 year rate reset class 1 preferred shares, Series E, callable from June 2014 |
|
|
251 |
|
|
|
238 |
|
Other preference shares each less than US$200m |
|
|
350 |
|
|
|
334 |
|
1 |
|
These preference shares have a nominal value of US$0.01 each. The amount disclosed
denotes the aggregate redemption price. For detailed description of these preference
shares, refer to page 353 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010. |
55
Appendix Terms and Conditions of Capital Securities
(continued)
Hybrid capital
Hybrid capital securities are deeply subordinated securities, with some equity features that
can be included as tier 1 capital. Hybrid capital securities are issues of securities for
which there is no obligation to pay a coupon and if not paid, the coupon is not cumulative.
Such securities do not generally carry voting rights and rank higher than ordinary shares for
coupon payments and in the event of a winding-up. Coupons on the floating rate hybrid capital
securities are generally related to interbank offer rates. The securities may be called and
redeemed by the issuer, subject to prior notification to the FSA, and, where relevant, the
consent of the local banking regulator. If not redeemed, coupons payable may step-up and
become floating rate or, fixed rate for a further five years based on the relevant reference
security plus a margin. The following table lists the qualifying hybrid capital securities in
issue as at 31 December 2010 together with 31 December 2009 comparatives:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
Hybrid capital securities |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US$3,800m |
|
|
8.00% capital securities, Series 2, callable December 20151 |
|
|
3,718 |
|
|
|
|
|
US$2,200m |
|
|
8.125% capital securities, callable April 20131 |
|
|
2,133 |
|
|
|
2,133 |
|
US$1,350m |
|
|
9.547% preferred securities, Series 1, callable June 2010, steps to 3 month
LIBOR plus 4.06%2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1,349 |
|
US$1,250m |
|
|
4.61% preferred securities, callable June 2013, steps to 3 month LIBOR
plus 1.995%3 |
|
|
1,185 |
|
|
|
1,077 |
|
US$900m |
|
|
10.176% preferred securities, Series 2, callable June 2030, steps to 3
month LIBOR plus 4.98%3 |
|
|
891 |
|
|
|
890 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1,400m |
|
|
5.3687% preferred securities, callable March 2014, steps to 3 month
EURIBOR plus 2%3 |
|
|
1,843 |
|
|
|
1,804 |
|
750m |
|
|
5.13% preferred securities, callable March 2016, steps to 3 month
EURIBOR plus 1.9%3 |
|
|
958 |
|
|
|
960 |
|
600m |
|
|
8.03% preferred securities, callable June 2012, steps to 3 month
EURIBOR plus 3.65%3 |
|
|
801 |
|
|
|
862 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
£700m |
|
|
5.844% preferred securities, callable November 2031, steps to 6 month
LIBOR plus 1.76%3 |
|
|
1,087 |
|
|
|
1,136 |
|
£500m |
|
|
8.208% preferred securities, callable June 2015, steps to 5 year UK Gilts
yield plus 4.65%3 |
|
|
772 |
|
|
|
806 |
|
£300m |
|
|
5.862% preferred securities, callable April 2020, steps to 6 month
LIBOR plus 1.85%3 |
|
|
434 |
|
|
|
412 |
|
1 |
|
For detailed description of these capital securities, refer to page 354 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010. |
|
2 |
|
In June 2010, HSBC redeemed its 9.547% preferred securities, Series 1, at par. |
|
3 |
|
For detailed description of these preferred securities, refer to page 348 of the Annual Report and Accounts 2010. |
56
Appendix Terms and Conditions of Capital Securities
(continued)
Tier 2 capital
Tier 2 capital comprises qualifying subordinated loan capital, related non-controlling
interests, allowable collective impairment allowances, unrealised gains arising on the fair
valuation of equity instruments held as available-for-sale and reserves arising from the
revaluation of properties. Tier 2 capital is divided into two tiers: upper and lower tier 2.
Upper tier 2 capital
Upper tier 2 securities are subordinated loan capital that do not have a stated maturity date
but may be called and redeemed by the issuer, subject to prior notification to the FSA, and,
where relevant, the consent of the local banking regulator. Interest coupons on the floating
rate upper tier 2 securities are generally related to interbank offer or mid rates and in some
cases may be subject to a minimum rate payable. Upper tier 2 capital may also include, for
regulatory purposes, some preference share securities not meeting the full GENPRU requirements
for inclusion in the tier 1 capital base. The following table lists the qualifying upper tier 2
securities in issue as at 31 December 2010 together with 31 December 2009 comparatives:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
Perpetual subordinated loan capital and other Upper Tier 2 instruments |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US$750m |
|
|
Undated floating rate primary capital notes, callable since June 1990 |
|
|
750 |
|
|
|
750 |
|
US$500m |
|
|
Undated floating rate primary capital notes, callable since September 1990 |
|
|
500 |
|
|
|
500 |
|
US$400m |
|
|
Primary capital undated floating rate notes, callable since August 1990 |
|
|
407 |
|
|
|
407 |
|
US$400m |
|
|
Primary capital undated floating rate notes (second series), callable since
December 1990 |
|
|
403 |
|
|
|
404 |
|
US$400m |
|
|
Primary capital undated floating rate notes (third series), callable since August 1991 |
|
|
400 |
|
|
|
400 |
|
US$300m |
|
|
Undated floating rate primary capital notes, series 3, callable since June 1992 |
|
|
300 |
|
|
|
300 |
|
Other perpetual subordinated loan capital each less than US$200m |
|
|
322 |
|
|
|
512 |
|
|
Lower tier 2 capital |
|
Lower tier 2 capital comprises dated subordinated loan capital repayable at par on maturity (in
certain cases at a premium over par) and which have an original maturity of at least five years.
Some subordinated loan capital may be called and redeemed by the issuer, subject to prior
notification to the FSA, and, where relevant, the consent of the local banking regulator. If not
redeemed, interest coupons payable may step-up or become floating rate related to interbank
offer rates and in some cases may be subject to a floor. Lower tier 2 capital may also include,
for regulatory purposes, some preference share or undated capital securities not meeting the
full GENPRU requirements for inclusion in the capital base as either tier 1 or upper tier 2
capital. For regulatory purposes, it is a requirement that lower tier 2 securities be amortised
on a straight-line basis in their final five years of maturity thus reducing the amount of
capital that is recognised for regulatory purposes. The following table lists the qualifying
lower tier 2 securities in issue as at 31 December 2010 together with 31 December 2009
comparatives: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
Subordinated loan capital and other Tier 2 instruments |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US$2,938m |
|
|
6.676% senior subordinated notes due January 20211 |
|
|
2,174 |
|
|
|
|
|
US$2,500m |
|
|
6.5% subordinated notes due September 2037 |
|
|
2,695 |
|
|
|
2,659 |
|
US$2,000m |
|
|
6.5% subordinated notes due May 2036 |
|
|
2,050 |
|
|
|
2,052 |
|
US$1,500m |
|
|
6.8% subordinated notes due June 2038 |
|
|
1,485 |
|
|
|
1,484 |
|
US$1,400m |
|
|
5.25% subordinated notes due December 2012 |
|
|
1,492 |
|
|
|
1,488 |
|
US$1,250m |
|
|
4.875% subordinated notes due August 2020 |
|
|
1,252 |
|
|
|
|
|
US$1,000m |
|
|
4.625% subordinated notes due April 2014 |
|
|
1,009 |
|
|
|
1,002 |
|
US$1,000m |
|
|
5.911% trust preferred securities due November 2035, callable November 2015,
steps to 3 month LIBOR plus 1.926% |
|
|
994 |
|
|
|
993 |
|
US$1,000m |
|
|
|
5.875% subordinated notes due November 2034 |
|
|
971 |
|
|
|
950 |
|
US$750m |
|
|
Subordinated floating rate notes due March 2015, callable March 2010,
0.5% interest margin step2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
750 |
|
US$750m |
|
|
Subordinated floating rate notes due October 2016, callable October 2011,
0.5% interest margin step |
|
|
750 |
|
|
|
750 |
|
US$750m |
|
|
5.625% subordinated notes due August 2035 |
|
|
728 |
|
|
|
712 |
|
US$750m |
|
|
5.00% subordinated notes due September 2020 |
|
|
747 |
|
|
|
|
|
US$700m |
|
|
7.00% subordinated notes due January 2039 |
|
|
694 |
|
|
|
688 |
|
US$500m |
|
|
6.00% subordinated notes due August 2017 |
|
|
526 |
|
|
|
521 |
|
57
Appendix Terms and Conditions of Capital Securities
(continued)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At 31 December |
|
|
|
|
2010 |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
US$m |
|
|
US$m |
|
Subordinated loan capital and other Tier 2 instruments (continued) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US$488m |
|
7.625% subordinated notes due May 2032 |
|
|
582 |
|
|
|
587 |
|
US$450m |
|
Subordinated floating rate notes due July 2016, callable July 2011,
0.5% interest margin step |
|
|
450 |
|
|
|
449 |
|
US$300m |
|
6.95% subordinated notes due March 2011 |
|
|
310 |
|
|
|
321 |
|
US$300m |
|
7.65% subordinated notes due May 2025 |
|
|
342 |
|
|
|
312 |
|
US$300m |
|
Subordinated floating rate notes due July 2017, callable July 2012,
0.5% interest margin step |
|
|
300 |
|
|
|
299 |
|
US$250m |
|
7.20% subordinated notes due July 2097 |
|
|
213 |
|
|
|
213 |
|
US$222m |
|
7.35% subordinated notes due November 2032 |
|
|
258 |
|
|
|
260 |
|
US$200m |
|
7.808% capital securities due December 2026, callable since December 2006 |
|
|
200 |
|
|
|
200 |
|
US$200m |
|
8.38% capital securities due May 2027, callable since May 2007 |
|
|
200 |
|
|
|
200 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1,750m |
|
6.0% subordinated notes due June 2019 |
|
|
2,578 |
|
|
|
2,835 |
|
1,600m |
|
6.25% subordinated notes due March 2018 |
|
|
2,142 |
|
|
|
2,306 |
|
1,000m |
|
5.375% subordinated notes due December 2012 |
|
|
1,405 |
|
|
|
1,549 |
|
800m |
|
Subordinated floating rate notes due March 2016, callable March 2011,
0.5% interest margin step3 |
|
|
1,070 |
|
|
|
1,152 |
|
700m |
|
3.625% subordinated notes due June 2020, callable June 2015, steps to
3 months EURIBOR plus 0.93% |
|
|
928 |
|
|
|
1,005 |
|
600m |
|
4.25% subordinated notes due March 2016, callable March 2011, steps to
3 month EURIBOR plus 1.05%3 |
|
|
823 |
|
|
|
904 |
|
500m |
|
Subordinated floating rate notes due September 2020, callable September 2015,
0.5% interest margin step |
|
|
592 |
|
|
|
639 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
£900m |
|
6.375% subordinated notes due October 2022, callable October 2017, steps to
3 month LIBOR plus 1.3% |
|
|
1,493 |
|
|
|
1,517 |
|
£900m |
|
6.0% subordinated notes due March 2040 |
|
|
1,372 |
|
|
|
|
|
£750m |
|
7.0% subordinated notes due April 2038 |
|
|
1,210 |
|
|
|
1,267 |
|
£650m |
|
6.75% subordinated notes due September 2028 |
|
|
1,000 |
|
|
|
1,043 |
|
£650m |
|
5.75% subordinated notes due December 2027 |
|
|
971 |
|
|
|
1,000 |
|
£600m |
|
4.75% subordinated notes due March 2046 |
|
|
919 |
|
|
|
961 |
|
£500m |
|
4.75% subordinated notes due September 2020, callable September 2015, |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
steps to 3 month LIBOR plus 0.82% |
|
|
774 |
|
|
|
785 |
|
£500m |
|
5.375% subordinated notes due August 2033 |
|
|
729 |
|
|
|
776 |
|
£350m |
|
Subordinated variable coupon notes due June 2017, callable June 2012, steps to sum
of gross redemption yield on the then prevailing 5 year UK gilt plus 1.7% |
|
|
562 |
|
|
|
608 |
|
£350m |
|
5% subordinated notes due March 2023, callable March 2018, steps to sum of gross
redemption yield on the then prevailing 5 year UK gilt plus 1.8% |
|
|
547 |
|
|
|
550 |
|
£350m |
|
5.375% subordinated step-up notes due November 2030, callable November 2025,
steps to 3 month LIBOR plus 1.5% |
|
|
510 |
|
|
|
531 |
|
£300m |
|
6.5% subordinated notes due July 2023 |
|
|
462 |
|
|
|
483 |
|
£250m |
|
9.875% subordinated bonds due April 2018, callable April 2013, steps to higher
of (i) 9.875% or (ii) sum of the yield on the relevant benchmark treasury
stock plus 2.5% |
|
|
467 |
|
|
|
496 |
|
£225m |
|
6.25% subordinated notes due January 2041 |
|
|
347 |
|
|
|
363 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CAD400m |
|
4.80% subordinated notes due April 2022, callable April 2017, steps to 90-day
Bankers Acceptance Rate plus 1% |
|
|
417 |
|
|
|
382 |
|
CAD200m |
|
4.94% subordinated debentures due March 2021 |
|
|
200 |
|
|
|
190 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AUD200m |
|
Subordinated floating rate notes due May 2016, callable May 2011, 0.5% interest
margin step |
|
|
204 |
|
|
|
180 |
|
AUD200m |
|
Subordinated floating rate notes due November 2020, callable November 2015 |
|
|
204 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BRL500m |
|
Subordinated floating rate certificates of deposit due December 2016 |
|
|
301 |
|
|
|
287 |
|
BRL383m |
|
Subordinated certificates of deposit due February 2015 |
|
|
231 |
|
|
|
220 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other term subordinated loan capital each less than US$200m |
|
|
2,383 |
|
|
|
2,785 |
|
1 |
|
Approximately 25% of the 6.676% Senior Subordinated Notes due January 2021 is held by
HSBC Holdings. |
|
2 |
|
In March 2010, HSBC Holdings redeemed its US$750m callable subordinated floating rate
notes due 2015. |
|
3 |
|
On 15 February 2011, HSBC gave notice to holders of its 800m callable subordinated
floating rate notes due March 2016 and its 600m 4.25% callable subordinated notes due
March 2016 that it will call and redeem the notes at par on 29 March 2011 and 18 March
2011, respectively . |
58
Glossary
|
|
|
Abbreviation |
|
Brief description |
|
|
|
A |
|
|
ABS1
|
|
Asset-backed security |
AFS1
|
|
Available for sale |
ALCO
|
|
Asset and Liability Management Committee |
|
|
|
B |
|
|
Basel Committee
|
|
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision |
|
|
|
C |
|
|
CDPC1
|
|
Credit Derivative Product Company |
CDS1
|
|
Credit Default Swap |
CRAOC
|
|
Credit Risk Analytics Oversight Committee |
CRD
|
|
Capital Requirements Directive |
CRR1
|
|
Customer Risk Rating |
CSA1
|
|
Credit Support Annex |
|
|
|
E |
|
|
EAD1
|
|
Exposure at Default |
ECAI
|
|
External Credit Assessment Institution, such as Moodys Investors Service,
Standard & Poors Ratings Group or Fitch Group |
EL1
|
|
Expected Loss |
EURIBOR
|
|
Euro Interbank Offered Rate |
|
|
|
F |
|
|
Fitch
|
|
Fitch Group |
FSA
|
|
Financial Services Authority (UK) |
|
|
|
G |
|
|
GCRO
|
|
Group Chief Risk Officer |
GENPRU
|
|
The FSAs rules, as set out in the General Prudential Sourcebook |
GMB
|
|
Group Management Board |
GMO
|
|
Group Management Office |
GRC
|
|
Group Risk Committee |
G-SIFI
|
|
Global Systemically Important Financial Institution |
|
|
|
H |
|
|
Hong Kong
|
|
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the Peoples Republic of China |
HSBC
|
|
HSBC Holdings together with its subsidiary undertakings |
HSBC Bank
|
|
HSBC Bank plc, formerly Midland Bank plc |
HSBC Holdings
|
|
HSBC Holdings plc, the parent company of HSBC |
|
|
|
I |
|
|
IAA1
|
|
Internal Assessment Approach |
ICAAP1
|
|
Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process |
IFRSs
|
|
International Financial Reporting Standards |
IMM1
|
|
Internal Model Method |
IRB1
|
|
Internal Ratings-Based |
ISDA
|
|
International Swaps and Derivatives Association |
|
|
|
L |
|
|
LGD1
|
|
Loss Given Default |
LIBOR
|
|
London Interbank Offer Rate |
|
|
|
M |
|
|
Moodys
|
|
Moodys Investors Service |
|
|
|
O |
|
|
ORMF
|
|
Operational Risk Management Framework |
OTC1
|
|
Over-the-Counter |
|
|
|
P |
|
|
PD1
|
|
Probability of Default |
59
Glossary
|
|
|
Abbreviation |
|
Brief description |
|
|
|
R |
|
|
RAROC
|
|
Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital |
RBM1
|
|
Ratings Based Method |
Repo
|
|
Sale and repurchase transaction |
Reverse repo
|
|
Security purchased under commitments to sell |
RMC
|
|
Risk Management Committee |
RMM
|
|
Risk Management Meeting of the Group Management Board |
RWA1
|
|
Risk-Weighted Asset |
|
|
|
S |
|
|
S&P
|
|
Standard and Poors Ratings Group |
SFM1
|
|
Supervisory Formula Method |
SIC
|
|
Securities Investment Conduit |
SME
|
|
Small and Medium-sized Enterprise |
SPE1
|
|
Special Purpose Entity |
|
|
|
T |
|
|
TSR
|
|
Total Shareholder Return |
|
|
|
U |
|
|
UK
|
|
United Kingdom |
US
|
|
United States |
|
|
|
V |
|
|
VAR1
|
|
Value at Risk |
|
|
|
1 |
|
Full definition included in Glossary of Terms on page 61. |
60
Glossary
|
|
|
Term |
|
Definition |
|
|
|
A
|
|
|
Arrears
|
|
Customers are said to be in arrears (or in a state of delinquency) when they are behind in fulfilling their
obligations, with the result that an outstanding loan is unpaid or overdue. When a customer is in arrears, the total
outstanding loans on which payments are overdue are described as delinquent. |
|
|
|
Asset-backed securities
(ABSs)
|
|
Securities that represent an interest in an underlying pool of referenced assets. The referenced pool can comprise
any assets which attract a set of associated cash flows but are commonly pools of residential or commercial
mortgages. |
|
|
|
Available-for-sale (AFS)
financial assets
|
|
Those non-derivative financial assets that are designated as available for sale or are not classified as a) loans and
receivables b) held-to-maturity investments or c) financial assets at fair value through profit or loss. |
|
|
|
B
|
|
|
Back-testing
|
|
A statistical technique used to monitor and assess the accuracy of a model, and how that model would have performed
had it been applied in the past. |
|
|
|
Basel II
|
|
The capital adequacy framework issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in June 2006 in the form of the
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. |
|
|
|
Basel III
|
|
In December 2010, the Basel Committee issued final rules Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient
banks and banking systems and Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and
monitoring. Together these documents present the Basel Committees reforms to strengthen global capital and
liquidity rules with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector. The new requirements will be phased in
starting 1 January 2013 with full implementation by 1 January 2019. |
|
|
|
C
|
|
|
Capital conservation buffer
|
|
A capital buffer, prescribed by regulators under Basel III, and designed to ensure banks build up capital buffers
outside periods of stress which can be drawn down as losses are incurred. Should a banks capital levels fall within
the capital conservation buffer range, capital distributions will be constrained by the regulators. |
|
|
|
Code Staff
|
|
Senior management, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions, and any employee whose total remuneration takes
them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers and whose professional activities have a
material impact on the firms risk profile. |
|
|
|
Commercial paper
|
|
An unsecured, short-term debt instrument issued by a corporation, typically for the financing of accounts receivable,
inventories and meeting short-term liabilities. The debt is usually issued at a discount, reflecting prevailing
market interest rates. |
|
|
|
Commercial real estate
|
|
Any real estate investment, comprising buildings or land, intended to generate a profit, either from capital gain or
rental income. |
|
|
|
Common equity tier 1 capital
|
|
The highest quality form of regulatory capital under Basel III that comprises common shares issued and related share
premium, retained earnings and other reserves excluding the cash flow hedging reserve, less specified regulatory
adjustments. |
|
|
|
Conduits
|
|
HSBC sponsors and manages multi-seller conduits and securities investment conduits (SICs). The multi-seller
conduits hold interests in diversified pools of third-party assets such as vehicle loans, trade receivables and
credit card receivables funded through the issuance of short-dated commercial paper and supported by a liquidity
facility. The SICs hold predominantly asset-backed securities referencing such items as commercial and residential
mortgages, vehicle loans and credit card receivables funded through the issuance of both long-term and short-term
debt. |
|
|
|
Core tier 1 capital
|
|
The highest quality form of regulatory capital that comprises total shareholders equity and related non-controlling
interests, less goodwill and intangible assets and certain other regulatory adjustments. |
|
|
|
Countercyclical capital buffer
|
|
A capital buffer, prescribed by regulators under Basel III, which aims to ensure the banking sector capital
requirements take account of the macro-financial environment in which banks operate. This will provide the banking
sector with additional capital to protect it against potential future losses, when excess credit growth in the
financial system as a whole is associated with an increase in system-wide risk. |
|
|
|
Credit default swap (CDS)
|
|
A derivative contract whereby a buyer pays a fee to a seller in return for receiving a payment in the event of a
defined credit event (e.g. bankruptcy, payment default on a reference asset or assets, or downgrades by a rating
agency) on an underlying obligation (which may or may not be held by the buyer). |
|
|
|
Credit derivative product companies (CDPCs)
|
|
Independent companies that specialise in selling credit default protection on corporate exposures in the form of
credit derivatives. |
|
|
|
Credit enhancements
|
|
Facilities used to enhance the creditworthiness of financial obligations and cover losses due to asset default. |
|
|
|
Credit quality step
|
|
A step in the FSA credit quality assessment scale which is based on the credit ratings of ECAIs. It is used to assign
risk weights under the standardised approach. |
61
Glossary
(continued)
|
|
|
Term |
|
Definition |
|
|
|
Credit risk
|
|
Risk of financial loss if a customer or counterparty fails to meet an
obligation under a contract. It arises mainly from direct lending, trade
finance and leasing business, but also from products such as guarantees,
derivatives and debt securities. |
|
|
|
Credit risk adjustment
|
|
An adjustment to the valuation of OTC derivative contracts to reflect the
creditworthiness of OTC derivative counterparties. |
|
|
|
Credit risk mitigation
|
|
A technique to reduce the credit risk associated with an exposure by
application of credit risk mitigants such as collateral, guarantees and credit
protection. |
|
|
|
Customer risk rating (CRR)
|
|
A scale of 23 grades (2009: 22 grades) measuring obligor probability of default. |
|
|
|
Credit spread option
|
|
A derivative that transfers risk from one party to another. The buyer pays an
initial premium in exchange for potential cash flows if the credit spread
changes from its current level. |
|
|
|
Credit Support Annex (CSA)
|
|
A legal document that regulates credit support (collateral) for OTC derivative
transactions between two parties. |
|
|
|
D
|
|
|
Delinquency
|
|
See Arrears. |
|
|
|
E
|
|
|
Economic capital
|
|
The internally calculated capital requirement which is deemed necessary by HSBC
to support the risks to which it is exposed at a confidence level consistent
with a target credit rating of AA. |
|
|
|
Economic profit
|
|
The difference between the return on financial capital invested by shareholders
(return on invested capital) and the cost of that capital. Economic profit
may be expressed as a whole number or as a percentage. |
|
|
|
Equity risk
|
|
The risk arising from positions, either long or short, in equities or
equity-based instruments, which create exposure to a change in the market price
of the equities or equity instruments. |
|
|
|
Expected loss (EL)
|
|
A regulatory calculation of the amount expected to be lost on an exposure using
a 12-month time horizon and downturn loss estimates. EL is calculated by
multiplying the Probability of Default (a percentage) by the Exposure at
Default (an amount) and Loss Given Default (a percentage). |
|
|
|
Exposure
|
|
A claim, contingent claim or position which carries a risk of financial loss. |
|
|
|
Exposure at default (EAD)
|
|
The amount expected to be outstanding after any credit risk mitigation, if and
when the counterparty defaults. EAD reflects drawn balances as well as
allowance for undrawn amounts of commitments and contingent exposures. |
|
|
|
Exposure value
|
|
Exposure at default (EAD). |
|
|
|
F
|
|
|
Fair value
|
|
Fair value is the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability
settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arms length transaction. |
|
|
|
Fair value adjustments
|
|
An adjustment to the fair value of a financial instrument which is determined
using a valuation technique (level 2 and level 3) to include additional factors
that would be considered by a market participant that are not incorporated
within the valuation model. |
|
|
|
Funding risk
|
|
A form of liquidity risk arising when the liquidity needed to fund illiquid
asset positions cannot be obtained at the expected terms and when required. |
|
|
|
G
|
|
|
Global Markets
|
|
HSBCs treasury and capital markets services in Global Banking and Markets. |
|
|
|
Group
|
|
HSBC Holdings together with its subsidiary undertakings. |
|
|
|
H
|
|
|
Haircut
|
|
With respect to credit risk mitigation, an adjustment to collateral value to
reflect any currency or maturity mismatches between the credit risk mitigant
and the underlying exposure to which it is being applied. Also a valuation
adjustment to reflect any fall in value between the date the collateral was
called and the date of liquidation or enforcement. |
|
|
|
Held-to-maturity
|
|
An accounting classification for investments acquired with the intention and
ability of being held until they mature. |
|
|
|
High risk (regulatory)
|
|
Standardised approach exposures that have been defined by the FSA as high risk
exposures. These include exposures arising out of venture capital business
(whether or not the firm itself carries on the venture capital business) and
any high risk positions in Collective Investment Undertakings that are illiquid
and held with a view to long-term sale or realisation. |
|
|
|
I
|
|
|
Impaired loans
|
|
Loans where the Group does not expect to collect all the contractual cash flows
or expects to collect them later than they are contractually due. |
62
Glossary
(continued)
|
|
|
Term |
|
Definition |
|
|
|
Impairment allowances
|
|
Managements best estimate of losses incurred in the loan portfolios at the balance sheet date. |
|
|
|
Institutions
|
|
Under the standardised approach, Institutions are classified as credit institutions or investment firms. Under the IRB approach, Institutions also include
regional governments and local authorities, public sector entities and multilateral development banks. |
|
|
|
Insurance risk
|
|
A risk, other than financial risk, transferred from the holder of a contract to the insurance provider. The principal insurance risk is that, over time,
the combined cost of claims, administration and acquisition of the contract may exceed the aggregate amount of premiums received and investment income. |
|
|
|
Internal Assessment Approach
(IAA)
|
|
One of three calculation methods defined under the IRB approach to securitisations. The IAA is limited to exposures arising from asset-backed commercial
paper programmes, mainly related to liquidity facilities and credit enhancement. The approach consists of mapping an internal rating methodology for credit
exposures to those of an ECAI. Those ratings are used to determine the appropriate risk weights to determine the notional amount of the exposures. |
|
|
|
Internal Capital Adequacy
Assessment Process (ICAAP)
|
|
The Groups own assessment of the levels of capital that it needs to hold through an examination of its risk profile from regulatory and economic capital
viewpoints. |
|
|
|
Internal Model Method (IMM)
|
|
One of three approaches defined by Basel II to determine exposure values for counterparty credit risk. |
|
|
|
Internal ratings-based approach
(IRB)
|
|
A method of calculating credit risk capital requirements using internal, rather than supervisory, estimates of risk parameters. |
|
|
|
Invested capital
|
|
Equity capital invested in HSBC by its shareholders. |
|
|
|
IRB advanced approach
|
|
A method of calculating credit risk capital requirements using internal PD, LGD and EAD models. |
|
|
|
IRB foundation approach
|
|
A method of calculating credit risk capital requirements using internal PD models but with supervisory estimates of LGD and conversion factors for the
calculation of EAD. |
|
|
|
ISDA master agreement
|
|
Standardised contract developed by ISDA used as an umbrella under which bilateral derivatives contracts are entered into. |
|
|
|
L
|
|
|
Leverage ratio
|
|
A measure, prescribed by regulators under Basel III, which is the ratio of tier 1 capital to total exposures. Total exposures include on-balance sheet
items, off-balance sheet items and derivatives, and should generally follow the accounting measure of exposure. This supplementary measure to the
risk-based capital requirements is intended to constrain the build-up of excess leverage in the banking sector. |
|
|
|
Liquidity coverage ratio
|
|
A measure aimed at ensuring banks have an adequate level of liquid assets to meet their liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day horizon under a significantly
severe liquidity stress. The ratio is the stock of high quality liquid assets over net cash outflows over the next 30 days. |
|
|
|
Liquidity risk
|
|
The risk that HSBC does not have sufficient financial resources to meet its obligations as they fall due, or will have to do so at an excessive cost. This
risk arises from mismatches in the timing of cash flows. |
|
|
|
Loss given default (LGD)
|
|
The estimated ratio (percentage) of the loss on an exposure to the amount outstanding at default (EAD) upon default of a counterparty. |
|
|
|
M
|
|
|
Market risk
|
|
The risk that movements in market risk factors, including foreign exchange rates and commodity prices, interest rates, credit spreads and equity prices
will reduce income or portfolio values. |
|
|
|
Mark-to-market approach
|
|
One of three approaches defined by Basel II to determine exposure values for counterparty credit risk. |
|
|
|
Monoline insurers (monolines)
|
|
Entities which specialise in providing credit protection to the holders of debt instruments in the event of default by the debt security counterparty. This
protection is typically held in the form of derivatives such as CDSs referencing the underlying exposures held. |
|
|
|
N
|
|
|
Net interest income
|
|
The amount of interest received or receivable on assets net of interest paid or payable on liabilities. |
|
|
|
Net Stable Funding ratio
|
|
A measure aimed at ensuring long-term assets are funded with at least a minimum amount of stable liabilities in relation to their liquidity risk profiles.
The ratio is the available amount of stable funding over required amount of stable funding. |
|
|
|
O
|
|
|
Obligor grade
|
|
Obligor grades, summarising a more granular underlying counterparty risk rating scale for estimates of probability of default, are defined as follows: |
|
|
Minimal Default Risk: The strongest credit risk, with a negligible probability of default. |
|
|
|
|
|
Low Default Risk: A strong credit risk, with a low probability of
default. |
|
|
|
|
|
Satisfactory Default Risk: A good credit risk, with a satisfactory
probability of default. |
63
Glossary
|
|
|
Term |
|
Definition |
|
|
|
|
|
Fair Default Risk: The risk of default remains fair, but identified
weaknesses
may warrant more regular monitoring. |
|
|
|
|
|
Moderate Default Risk: The overall position will not be causing any
immediate
concern, but more regular monitoring will be necessary as a result of sensitivities to
external events that give rise to the possibility of risk of default increasing. |
|
|
|
|
|
Significant Default Risk: Performance may be limited by one or more
troublesome
aspect, known deterioration, or the prospect of worsening financial status. More regular
monitoring required. |
|
|
|
|
|
High Default Risk: Continued deterioration in financial status, that
requires
frequent monitoring and ongoing assessment. The probability of default is of concern but
the borrower currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitments. |
|
|
|
|
|
Special Management: The probability of default is of increasing
concern and the
borrowers capacity to fully meet its financial commitments is becoming increasingly less
likely. |
|
|
|
|
|
Default: A default is considered to have occurred with regard to a
particular
obligor when either or both of the following events has taken place: the Group considers
that the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations in full, without recourse by
the Group to actions such as realising security, or the obligor is past due more than 90
days on any material credit obligation to the Group. |
|
|
|
Operational risk
|
|
The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and
systems, or from external events, including legal risk. |
|
|
|
Over-the-counter (OTC)
|
|
A bilateral transaction (e.g. derivatives) that is not exchange traded and that is valued
using valuation models. |
|
|
|
P
|
|
|
Private equity investments
|
|
Equity securities in operating companies not quoted on a public exchange, often involving
the investment of capital in private companies or the acquisition of a public company
that results in the delisting of public equity. |
|
|
|
Probability of default (PD)
|
|
The probability that an obligor will default within a one-year time horizon. |
|
|
|
Q
|
|
|
Qualifying revolving retail
exposures
|
|
Retail IRB exposures that are revolving, unsecured, and, to the extent they are not
drawn, immediately and unconditionally cancellable, such as credit cards. |
|
|
|
R
|
|
|
Ratings Based Method (RBM)
|
|
One of three calculation methods defined under the IRB approach to securitisations. The
approach uses risk weightings based on ECAI ratings, the granularity of the underlying
pool and the seniority of the position. |
|
|
|
Regulatory capital
|
|
The capital which HSBC holds, determined in accordance with rules established by the FSA
for the consolidated Group and by local regulators for individual Group companies. |
|
|
|
Re-securitisation
|
|
A securitisation of a securitisation exposure, where the risk associated with an
underlying pool of exposures is tranched and at least one of the underlying exposures is
a securitisation exposure. |
|
|
|
Residual maturity
|
|
The period outstanding from the reporting date to the maturity or end date of an exposure. |
|
|
|
Restricted Shares
|
|
Awards of Restricted Shares define the number of HSBC Holdings ordinary shares to which
the employee will become entitled, generally between one and three years from the date of
the award, and normally subject to the individual remaining in employment. |
|
|
|
Retail IRB
|
|
Retail exposures that are treated under the IRB approach. |
|
|
|
Return on equity
|
|
Profit attributable to ordinary shareholders divided by average invested capital. |
|
|
|
Risk appetite
|
|
An assessment of the types and quantum of risks to which HSBC wishes to be exposed. |
|
|
|
Risk-weighted assets (RWAs)
|
|
Calculated by assigning a degree of risk expressed as a percentage (risk weight) to an
exposure in accordance with the applicable Standardised or IRB approach rules. |
|
|
|
S
|
|
|
Securitisation
|
|
A transaction or scheme whereby the credit risk associated with an exposure, or pool of
exposures, is tranched and where payments to investors in the transaction or scheme are
dependent upon the performance of the exposure or pool of exposures. |
|
|
|
|
|
A traditional securitisation involves the transfer of the exposures being securitised to
an SPE which issues securities. In a synthetic securitisation, the tranching is achieved
by the use of credit derivatives and the exposures are not removed from the balance sheet
of the originator. |
|
|
|
Securitised revolving exposure
|
|
The securitisation of revolving exposures. Revolving exposures are those where the
balance fluctuates depending on customers decisions to borrow or repay, such as credit
cards. |
|
|
|
Significant Influence Function
|
|
FSA registered role, recognised as being a control function role. |
64
Glossary
|
|
|
Term |
|
Definition |
|
|
|
Specialised lending exposure
|
|
Specialised lending exposures are defined by the FSA as exposures to an entity which
was created specifically to finance and/or operate physical assets, where the
contractual arrangements give the lender a substantial degree of control over the
assets and the income that they generate and the primary source of repayment of the
obligation is the income generated by the assets being financed, rather than the
independent capacity of a broader commercial enterprise. |
|
|
|
Special Purpose Entity (SPE)
|
|
A corporation, trust or other non-bank entity, established for a narrowly defined
purpose, including for carrying on securitisation activities. The structure of the
entity and activities are intended to isolate the obligations of the SPE from those
of the originator and the holders of the beneficial interests in the securitisation. |
|
|
|
Specific issuer risk
|
|
Specific issuer (credit spread) risk arises from a change in the value of debt
instruments due to a perceived change in the credit quality of the issuer or
underlying assets. |
|
|
|
Standardised approach
|
|
In relation to credit risk, a method for calculating credit risk capital requirements
using ECAI ratings and supervisory risk weights.
|
|
|
|
|
|
In relation to operational risk, a method of calculating the operational capital
requirement by the application of a supervisory defined percentage charge to the
gross income of eight specified business lines. |
|
|
|
Supervisory Formula Method
(SFM)
|
|
An alternative Ratings Based Method to be used primarily for own originated or
sponsored securitisations. It is used to calculate the capital requirements of
exposures to a securitisation as a function of the characteristics of the collateral
pool and contractual properties of the tranche or tranches retained. |
|
|
|
Supervisory slotting approach
|
|
A method for calculating capital requirements for Specialised Lending exposures where
the internal rating of the obligor is mapped to one of five supervisory categories,
each associated with a specific supervisory risk weight. |
|
|
|
T
|
|
|
Tier 1 capital
|
|
A component of regulatory capital, comprising core tier 1 capital and other tier 1
capital. Other tier 1 capital includes qualifying capital instruments such as
non-cumulative perpetual preference shares and hybrid capital securities. |
|
|
|
Tier 2 capital
|
|
A component of regulatory capital, comprising qualifying subordinated loan capital,
related non-controlling interests, allowable collective impairment allowances and
unrealised gains arising on the fair valuation of equity instruments held as
available-for-sale. Tier 2 capital also includes reserves arising from the
revaluation of properties. |
|
|
|
Total return swap
|
|
A credit derivative transaction that swaps the total return on a financial instrument
(cash flows and capital gains and losses), for a guaranteed interest rate, such as an
inter-bank rate, plus a margin. |
|
|
|
V
|
|
|
Value at risk (VAR)
|
|
A technique that measures the loss that could occur on risk positions as a result of
adverse movements in market risk factors (e.g. rates, prices, volatilities) over a
specified time horizon and to a given level of confidence. |
|
|
|
W
|
|
|
Write-down
|
|
Reduction in the carrying value of an asset due to impairment or fair value movements. |
|
|
|
Wrong-way risk
|
|
An adverse correlation between the counterpartys probability of default and the
mark-to-market value of the underlying transaction. |
65
Contacts
|
|
|
Group Management Office London |
|
|
Communications
|
|
Investor Relations |
|
|
|
Robert Bailhache
|
|
Alastair Brown |
Head of Group Press Office
|
|
Manager Investor Relations |
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7992 5712
|
|
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7992 1938 |
|
|
|
Robert Quinlan |
|
|
Manager Investor Relations |
|
|
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7991 3643 |
|
|
|
Hong Kong |
|
|
Communications
|
|
Investor Relations |
|
|
|
Cindy Tang
|
|
Hugh Pye |
Head of Group Communications (Asia)
|
|
Head of Investor Relations (Asia) |
Telephone: +852 2822 1268
|
|
Telephone: +852 2822 4908 |
|
|
|
Patrick McGuinness |
|
|
Head of Group Financial Public Relations |
|
|
Telephone: +852 3663 6883 |
|
|
|
|
|
Chicago |
|
|
Communications
|
|
Investor Relations |
|
|
|
Lisa Sodeika
|
|
Cliff Mizialko |
Executive Vice President Corporate Affairs
|
|
Senior Vice President Investor Relations |
Telephone: +1 224 544 3299
|
|
Telephone: +1 224 544 4400 |
|
|
|
Paris |
|
|
Communications |
|
|
|
|
|
Jonathan Mullen |
|
|
Head of Communications Continental Europe |
|
|
Telephone: +33 (0) 1 40 70 3096 |
|
|
66
SIGNATURE
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused
this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.
HSBC Holdings plc
By: /s/ Iain J. Mackay
Name: Iain J. Mackay
Title: Group Finance Director
Date:
09 March 2011